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on regional freight mobility. Yet, it is evident that the New York metropolitan
region is highly dependent on trucks for moving freight, that truck traffic has been
growing steadily, and that, therefore, truck traffic has been making an increasing
contribution to highway congestion that is more and more endemic in the region.
In general, the whole problem of regional freight mobility in the New York metro-
politan region, perhaps in other metropolitan areas as well, has been under-appre-
ciated. For these reasons, we deemed it timely to prepare a report that describes the
region’s freight mobility challenge and proposes a framework for assessing alterna-
tive investments in freight rail, highway and transit capacity that might improve
the region’s ability to deal with growing highway congestion in response to
increased passenger and goods transport demand.
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Highway congestion in the New York metropolitan area is escalating. Slow traffic
frustrates commuters, puts New York’s businesses at a competitive disadvantage,
and leads to unnecessary air pollution and emissions of greenhouse gases. Conges-
tion is not only a multibillion dollar drain on the area’s economy; it is also a health
risk, as smog and fine particulates from idling trucks and cars contribute to the
region’s high asthma rates among children.
Over the next 20 years, traffic on the region’s highways will get much worse if
truck and car traffic increases at the projected rates, among them an increase in
truck vehicle miles traveled of over 200 billion. Historically, state transportation
agencies have tried to solve the traffic problem in part by building more highways,
but despite their investment of tens of billions of dollars over the last 20 to 30
years, traffic conditions are much worse than they were two decades ago. This is so
even though New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey have one of the most exten-
sive mass-transit systems in the world and during this period have invested tens of
billions of dollars in improving this system.
While these huge sums have been invested in encouraging people to shift
from cars to transit, however, state transportation agencies have not taken a com-
parable look at alternative ways of moving goods through the region other than by
truck in more than a quarter of a century, although, fortunately, they have very
recently begun to pay more attention to this issue. As a result, the contribution of
trucks to highway congestion has risen. In general, the region has under-appreci-
ated the contribution of freight movement to regional highway congestion and the
importance of improving alternatives to trucks as part of a regional mobility strat-
egy. This is so particularly in the East-of-Hudson subregion. This must change. It
is time to consider very seriously alternative freight transport options, first and
foremost, freight rail.
The question therefore is whether we can help mitigate the region’s worsening
congestion by increasing the diversity of the freight transportation system.To do this
would require a radical shift in transportation planning, in looking at alternative ways
of not only moving people but, just as important, the region’s goods. The question
facing policymakers, business leaders, freight transportation advocates, and envi-
ronmentalists is not whether to invest but how much to invest in each component of
New York’s freight transportation network: railroads, waterways, and highways.
This report discusses regional freight transport and recommends that we
address the region’s worsening congestion problems by shifting a significant por-
tion of the goods shipped to, from, and through the region from highway to rail. It
suggests that such a shift can be cost-effective, practical, and good for business.
These measures, along with major investments in the region’s transit system that
are far advanced in the planning stage, should be coupled with roadway congestion
pricing and other incentives designed to improve mobility and air quality.
Increased investment in rail, as well as transit, with the extensive use of roadway
congestion pricing, will greatly improve mobility and provide enhanced choice for
shippers, with huge benefits for the economy and the environment.
Freight rail can be about half as expensive and is as much as twice as clean as truck
transport for moving many kinds of goods. Unfortunately, owing to its geography,
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historical circumstances, changes in economic conditions, and inadequate atten-
tion to freight movement in transportation planning, New York City and the rest
of the East-of-Hudson subregion have been poorly served by freight railroads—
although the region West-of-Hudson has been reasonably well served.
In order to move more freight on trains, particularly on the east side of the
Hudson River, the region’s freight rail infrastructure must be improved dramati-
cally. Even though the region has invested tens of billions of dollars over the last 20
years in its expansive transit system and is poised to spend a comparable amount
over the next 20 years, the amount of money that it has invested in its freight rail
system is measured in tens of millions of dollars. This report concludes that a very
significant increase in freight rail investments is warranted.
In light of the growing congestion problem we face and the increasing role of
trucks in contributing to that congestion, this report focuses on the freight trans-
port component of our congestion problem and the viability of large investments
in freight rail to improve mobility. This report also synthesizes and makes
digestible the vast amounts of information available on freight movement.
Freight rail can have decided advantages over trucks in terms of energy effi-
ciency, emissions and cost for certain freight movements, just as transit in this
metropolitan region can have great advantages over driving. With the right invest-
ments, shippers currently transporting freight by truck should gain significant
mobility benefits from an improved freight rail system.
Reducing congestion is one matter; maintaining less congested conditions is
another. Unfortunately, when better freight rail or transit frees up roadway capac-
ity and improves mobility, more trucks and cars are attracted to these less con-
gested conditions. This is in part because driving—and therefore the pollution and
congestion that it causes—is often perceived as a “free” option. One feasible way
for cars and trucks to derive the full benefit of investments in transit and freight
rail is for the region to implement roadway-pricing incentives that create a truly
competitive market among freight options. We therefore advocate a concerted
strategy of freight rail as well as transit investments, coupled with a comprehensive
congestion-pricing strategy that would apply to the major roadways as well as the
currently tolled bridges and tunnels.
1. Accommodating more freight traffic while improving mobility 
Highway mobility may be a problem invisible to many citizens, but congestion
costs the New York City region, conservatively, $7.66 billion each year just in
wasted fuel and lost work time. Congestion harms every area of the economy. By
some estimates, traffic moves almost 50 percent more slowly than it would if the
highway system worked as designed. Shipping by truck is slow and costly because
the highway system is not able to handle the demand for freight traffic, putting
New York City and the East-of-Hudson subregion’s businesses at a competitive
disadvantage, with needlessly high transportation costs.
The shipment of goods is a massive part of our economy. Each year the New
York City region handles about $1.44 trillion worth of freight. In the region as a
whole, trucks transport the great majority of goods, around 80 percent, while
freight rail handles a small sliver, less than 6 percent, a fraction that is two-and-a-
half times smaller than the national average. This is so even though the kinds of
viii
goods that traditionally move by freight rail—low-value bulk goods like fuel, lum-
ber, paper, pulp, scrap metal, chemicals, and building materials-constitute about
half the region’s flow of freight.
For the economies of New York City, the lower Hudson Valley, Long Island, and
southwestern Connecticut, moving goods across the Hudson River is critical. The
area’s number one trading partner is itself. For businesses to the west of the River, this
usually means shipping goods across New York Harbor and into New York City, Long
Island, and southwestern Connecticut. All the other top five trading partners are
to the west of the Hudson—upstate New York, the Midwest, the mid-Atlantic
and the Southeast—which means that shippers in the region’s hub, New York
City, must receive and send goods across the Hudson River. International freight,
which is largely sea based, accounts for just 12 percent of the region’s freight flow.
Since the Hudson River is such a critical boundary, this report divides the
metropolitan area into the East-of-Hudson and West-of-Hudson subregions.
West-of-Hudson includes northern New Jersey and parts of downstate New York.
East-of-Hudson includes New York City, the lower Hudson Valley east of the
river, Long Island, and Connecticut. Each subregion handles a nearly equal
amount of freight, but a closer look shows that the East-of-Hudson subregion uses
freight rail hardly at all. Less than 2 percent of goods in the region moves by train,
a figure that is surprisingly low given the kind of freight that the region handles.
The western part of the metropolitan area moves about 9 percent of its freight by
rail, a figure somewhat lower than the national average of 16 percent. In short, a
broad view of the region’s freight system reveals that remarkably little freight is
moved by rail, particularly to the east of the Hudson River subregion.
Much of the region’s traffic problem is the result of congestion caused by the
overwhelming reliance on trucks to move freight. During the morning rush on the
Cross Bronx Expressway, for example, 72 percent of the vehicles on the road are
commuter cars. But because each truck occupies as much road space as about four
cars, during the morning rush, trucks—accounting for less than a third of the vehi-
cles on the road—actually occupy 60 percent of the available road space.
Over the next 20 years the regional freight transportation network will face a
Herculean test. Projections made after September 11 suggest that by 2025 New York’s
transportation system must cope with 50 to 70 percent more freight, not to mention
30 to 40 percent more car miles traveled. Major highways, already choked with
traffic, will have to accommodate an estimated 48 percent increase in truck volume
at the same time that car traffic is expected to grow. Despite extensive investment,
the highway system is more congested today than it was two decades ago. Even
with continued expansion, congestion on the region’s roadways—already the
source of pollution, frustration, and billion dollar losses in productivity—will likely
get worse without a more diverse regional transportation system.
Our goal therefore is to create a freight rail system in the region that, coupled
with transit improvements, increased barge transport and roadway pricing, would
ensure that freight mobilityis substantially better by 2025 than it is today and that air
pollution associated with freight transport drops dramatically. This is an ambitious
goal. This will entail more than doubling the regional freight rail mode share from
6% to 16%, today’s national average, by 2025, and shifting a significant portion of
truck trips to low-use hours. This change in mode split will require steady
improvements in freight rail services that cross the Hudson River at Selkirk and enter
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the downstate New York region via the Hudson Lines. But it will require very dra-
matic improvements in those services coming from the south that could benefit
from an efficient freight rail connection across the Harbor in the urban core.
2. A deficient East-of-Hudson freight rail network
West of the Hudson River, the freight rail system is reasonably well developed.
This subregion has a modern system of rail yards and terminals and access to the
major national rail corridors. Most of the tracks have height clearances and weight
ratings that can accommodate the large, efficient, and sought-after freight trains
that stack two freight containers, one on top of the other, on every flatcar. It also
has many dedicated freight rail lines.
By contrast, rail moves only 1.68 percent of the freight in the East-of-Hudson
subregion. The East-of-Hudson rail system is poorly integrated not just with the
national system but also with the West-of-Hudson rail system right across the
river. In order to move freight across the Harbor and into New York City, rail
operators have two options: they can use the overland crossing near Albany, 140
miles north of the City, or they can use the Cross-Harbor Railroad float system.
Both options have drawbacks. The carfloat service, which moves trains by barge, is
slow, small, and inefficient. It is seldom used. But using the overland crossing
requires a tremendously circuitous trip for shipments from or heading to the south
of the region. In order to revitalize freight rail the region must be able to move a
large number of trains across the Hudson River efficiently.
In the eastern subregion, most of the rail infrastructure was built early or before
the 1900s. Weight restrictions and low clearances mean that, in many cases, cheap
and efficient heavy-load trains are barred; and cramped rail yards, too few in number,
leave little unloading and transloading space. In addition, the subregion’s extensive
passenger rail system does not share its tracks with freight rail as much as it could.
To attract more rail freight customers, therefore, the region must improve the rail
infrastructure East-of-Hudson. This will require substantial public investment.
State agencies have begun to see the merits of freight rail. The New York State
Department of Transportation and the Port Authority recently initiated a $40.2 mil-
lion program to improve the regional rail network. The agencies plan to raise clear-
ances on the Hudson Line, upgrade track and yard capacity in Brooklyn and Queens,
and improve track safety. Other projects—by the state of New Jersey, Metro-North,
and others—will also improve regional freight rail service. The Port Authority has
embarked on the second phase of its freight rail investment study. The New York
Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC) is completing a freight transport
study that will propose a range of investment options. While these plans suggest a
growing consensus that public money should be spent on freight rail, none of these
projects will lead to kind of revitalization we propose. The public agency that has
been thinking in the boldest terms about revitalization is the City’s Economic
Development Corporation through the Cross-Harbor Freight Movement Project.
3. Setting goals and criteria for freight transport investments
Mobility in the Hudson River region can be improved in many ways, even when
we consider only those directed at freight transport. With the region’s myriad
xinterests in mind, we propose six criteria according to which the region should
evaluate prospective freight transport investments. They are (1) the impact on con-
gestion reduction; (2) the effect on the surrounding land and communities; (3) the
anticipated changes in energy efficiency and air quality; (4) the macroeconomic
repercussions, particularly with respect to employment; (5) the costs, both fixed
and variable; and (6) the extent to which the region’s security concerns are satis-
fied. Overall, investments in freight rail are capable of satisfying these criteria, per-
haps better than investments in highway capacity are.
4. Evolving freight rail technology and expansion opportunities
The time has come to abandon antiquated notions of freight rail as being necessarily
slow, unreliable, and useful only for long, time-insensitive hauls of large amounts
of heavy commodities. Modern technologies must be developed and adopted, and
operational strategies must change to make the best use of these technologies
maintaining and increasing the competitiveness and convenience of freight rail.
The railroads are aware of the problems with their speed and dependability
and should begin to place greater emphasis on addressing them. As a general rule,
freight trains can move much faster than they do today. In most cases, trains aver-
age 10 mph more if their freight is intermodal. This is not simply good fortune. It
is good planning. Yet the advantages of intermodal service are far from fully real-
ized. To improve service, freight rail carriers in the region must modify their oper-
ations in several ways, with technological change going hand in hand with changes
in institutional thinking about which routes have the potential to be profitable.
The freight railroads need to continue to increase their use of precise schedul-
ing of freight trains, especially in or near urban areas. Irregular dispatching disap-
points many current customers and turns away potential customers, particularly
those for shorter hauls, who see many advantages in freight rail but cannot afford
the vagaries of freight rail delivery. The railroads must work closely with passenger
carriers to schedule service on passenger rail tracks during off-peak hours. This can
be done only by also meeting the preceding requirements. In this effort, some
international examples are worthy of emulation.
As we explore in chapter 4, advanced intermodal technologies will make it easier
to move freight in efficient combinations of trains and trucks, helping them explore
markets from which current operational practices exclude them and new ones that
they have never served. This is particularly true for geographical and product markets
that require frequent, punctual trips with fewer cars than are hauled by most freight
trains today. Some advances that allow trucks to drive onto cars with extremely low
clearances, such as the Iron Highway, have been developed by the American rail-
road industry, and should be more widely used and improved. Another innovative
service allows shippers simply to attach rail wheels to the bottom of specially
designed trailers, eliminating the need for a rail car. Both these services could be a
tremendous boon to trucking companies that want to avoid the horrendous traffic
in the metropolitan area by putting their vehicles on rail for a short distance.
Revitalizing the float system in the New York Harbor will also give shippers more
options, increasing the efficiency of freight transport and distribution. If the region
invests in the system, it will not be as slow or undependable as it is today.The current
system, which is relatively new but is based on turn-of-the-century engineering,
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should be modernized to incorporate 21st century technology. If modern ferries can
be efficiently run over distances of hundreds of miles, as they are in Alaska and east-
ern Europe, they certainly can be run just as efficiently across New York Harbor.
Over the next 20 years it seems unlikely that rail will lose its edge as the most
environmentally friendly means of transport. Even now, ton for ton, locomotives
emit only a third of the particulate matter and nitrogen oxides that trucks do. New
EPA standards will make new and upgraded locomotives even more efficient.
While train engineering has been developing, the carriers have sometimes
neglected to keep up with customer service. If more freight rail carriers use global
positioning systems and freight rail logistics become more computerized, freight
rail will become more responsive to its customers’ needs. In coordination with
changes in its dispatching practices, these advances can help freight rail reenter
short-haul markets, so that it does not continue to lose market share as profitabil-
ity demands drive it to refuse anything but long, time-insensitive trips.
5. A downstate cross-Hudson rail link and better freight rail
infrastructure
In order for technologies to be used properly and for institutional changes in oper-
ational strategies to have the greatest impact on freight rail’s market share and
profitability, its basic infrastructure must be brought up-to-date. As we describe in
chapter 5, we consider a number of changes in the region’s physical infrastructure
that should improve the East-of-Hudson freight rail network and connect it bet-
ter to the national network. These include a cross-harbor tunnel and revitalization
of the cross-harbor float system.
For these connections to offer rail carriers the maximal shipping flexibility and
freight rail economies of scale, vertical clearances must be raised in some places,
and weight restrictions must be lifted. Existing yard space must be used more effi-
ciently, and new yard space must be found. Currently, there are too many limita-
tions on what kind of, and how, freight can be moved into the East-of-Hudson
subregion. Some of these limitations result from track infrastructure that must be
improved to allow for efficient freight rail movement.
The railroads must also take advantage of existing passenger rail infrastruc-
ture. Although their ability to do this is largely dependent on instituting the tech-
nological and institutional changes just described, the railroads themselves must
take the initiative to expand their opportunities to use shared tracks.
6. A regional mobility plan
When we consider freight investment in the context of improving regional mobil-
ity, several investments become clearly desirable to increase freight movement in
and through the Hudson region . The Hudson region should build a cross-harbor
tunnel. If such a tunnel were accompanied by the proper infrastructure improve-
ments elsewhere in the region, the two sides of the Hudson River would be effi-
ciently connected, and freight could move easily through the Hudson region.
Construction of the Phelps Dodge Terminal in Maspeth, Queens, is essential to
this effort. Certain other yards, discussed in detail in the report, must be used more
efficiently and, in other cases, expanded to accommodate the increase in rail
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freight traffic that an improved infrastructure, modern technology, and changes in
institutional thinking will bring. At the same time, the private freight railroads and
transportation agencies must continue to improve rail infrastructure and services
to and through the downstate region from the Selkirk crossing to the north.
One of the principal goals of this report is to demonstrate that investing in
improving the freight rail system is very much in the region’s interest and may satisfy
the criteria described in chapter 3 better than large-scale investments in expanding
highway capacity. These investments would reinforce the benefits of many of the
transit investments that the region is now considering, such as the Access to the
Region’s Core and the East Side Access for the Long Island Railroad projects.
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), NYMTC, the Port Author-
ity and New Jersey Transit use transportation models to estimate the number of auto
trips that a major transit project is capable of diverting from congested roadways. For
the East Side Access project, the MTA estimates a diversion of over 11,000 auto-
mobile trips per day, 24,000 daily hours of travel saved, and the elimination of over
340,000 daily automobile vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in 2010. For the Access to
the Region’s Core project, the North Jersey Travel Demand Forecasting Model
and the MTA Regional Transit Forecasting Model estimate that, depending on
the alternative adopted, 4,200 to 9,400 daily automobile trips will be diverted.
Cambridge Systematics’ most conservative estimates predict that the New Jer-
sey tunnel would yield a reduction in daily truck VMT of 156,000 miles, with
2,796 fewer daily truck trips, many going through some of the most congested
choke points of the region, eliminated. Since a truck occupies approximately four
times the roadway space that a car does, this is akin to a reduction of over 10,000
daily car trips. While the trips diversions for the freight rail tunnel and the two
transit projects are not fully comparable, they do suggest that, insofar as trip diver-
sions and reduced vehicular VMT are criteria in the region’s transit investment
decision-making process, large scale freight rail improvements that include the
tunnel meet the threshold for serious consideration.
The combination of diverting the movement of freight from truck to rail and
diverting the movement of passengers from cars to public transit will help the
region’s mobility by taking large numbers of vehicles off the road. However, free-
ing up capacity on the region’s highways will not by itself relieve congestion. In
such heavily populated areas, expanding highways simply encourages more people
to take to the road. The Hudson River region must take measures to keep new
trucks and cars from clogging those roadways again.
Properly implemented, one of the best possible ways to do this is to establish a
regional congestion-pricing scheme. Charging drivers a fee for using congested
roads will encourage individuals to use mass transit, and shippers to use rail. It will
make users of the region’s roadways pay for their maintenance, ease the congestion
already afflicting them, and slow the rate at which new vehicles exhaust the road-
way capacity created by the investments just described. Time-of-day tolls also will
shift some traffic, including truck movement, to off-peak hours, reducing conges-
tion even further. The Port Authority has already instituted a form of congestion
pricing on their facilities, it should certainly be strengthened for trucks and ship-
pers, and further modification for cars should be thoroughly analyzed.
Reducing congestion will improve regional mobility, but its benefits will not
end there. These reductions will translate into better air quality through fewer
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emissions of volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and
other pollutants, both because the number of vehicles in the regional road network
will be smaller and those still on the roads will be moving faster, thereby cutting
back on their individual emissions. These reductions mean better air and better
health, most notably for children and the elderly, with lower rates of asthma, car-
diopulmonary disease, and early mortality.
7. Financing and planning
The federal government discriminates against freight rail. Truckers pay a diesel
tax, and in return the government sinks massive amounts of money into highways.
Although the freight rail companies pay the same diesel tax, earmarked for high-
way improvements, the government does not subsidize freight infrastructure as
heavily. Because of the tax code, furthermore, rail freight companies end up under-
writing their competitors. Even though trucks will continue to play a central role
in moving goods in and through the region, the truckers are not benefiting from a
system that almost exclusively subsidizes highway expansion and makes conges-
tion worse. Just as governments must continue to invest in roadways, they should
increase their investment in freight rail. This will benefit not only rail carriers but
also road users, including truck drivers.
The federal government has an interest in efficiently moving goods through a
densely populated urban area like metropolitan New York. Aside from promoting
interstate commerce, freight rail improvements would protect the government’s
investment in the interstate highway network. Funding for major freight rail
improvements in the metropolitan area, including the tunnel, should be included
in the reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st century (also
known as the TEA 21 surface transportation bill) either through a freight rail title
or through a special provision with federal support for rail projects of national sig-
nificance. Some funds could come from the state government, local agencies, and
congestion toll receipts, since drivers and truckers would gain from the better
freight rail system. Finally, the tunnel-use fees, which initially should be low in
order to encourage business, could help pay for the tunnel over the long term.
While a new agency need not be created to oversee the system, existing agen-
cies should pay closer attention to freight transportation than they do today. The
Port Authority, which has recently provided millions of dollars for freight rail
improvements and has conducted studies to evaluate further investment, should
move in this direction. But the New Jersey and New York Departments of Trans-
portation, the Port Authority, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Author-
ity and the City’s Economic Development Corporation must all work together to
improve rail freight and, more generally, mobility in the Hudson River region. To
some extent, they already have begun to do this by commissioning studies and
cooperating to make small-scale freight rail improvements. However, freight trains
must be able to run without interruption through New Jersey, under the Hudson
River, into Brooklyn and downstate New York, and on to Connecticut or Long
Island. To make this possible, all these agencies must make freight rail a priority.
Freight trains that run through the East-of-Hudson subregion must use the tracks
of a more than one carrier. Gaining access at prices that encourage competition
often is difficult. An oversight body would enable safe and timely dispatching and
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make sure that freight carriers are treated equitably. This body could be a govern-
ment agency or a mix of public and private agencies charged with partial or total
control of track usage and maintenance East-of-Hudson.
Conclusion
The time has come for innovative thinking about the future of freight movement in
the New York metropolitan region. The region’s economy and environment will face
a crisis as freight traffic increases over the next 20 years. A regional mobility plan
composed of the investments and initiatives proposed in this report will improve
its functioning and attract shippers to freight rail. Moving freight into trains and
moving trucks off the region’s crowded roadways will save billions of dollars in lost
time and costly highway investments and will provide better air quality.
PART A
An overview of freight transport
in the Hudson region
2The impetus to do something about the New York City region’s freight transport
system is the congestion it is experiencing now and will likely encounter in the
coming years. This congestion is damaging both the economy and the environ-
ment of the metropolitan region consisting of New York, New Jersey, and Con-
necticut. To give readers a better sense of the region’s congestion problem, this
chapter provides a detailed outline of today’s freight market. It describes the type
and volume of freight moved through the area, how it is transported, and where it
goes. Since most of the region’s goods are loaded onto trucks and driven along the
area’s highways, this chapter focuses on truck-based freight traffic. We should
note, however, that the freight rail system, particularly in the subregion east of the
Hudson River, is underutilized.
As the economy expands over the next two decades, more goods will flow
through the region, putting pressure on its congested and strained transportation
network.The exact size of the increase in freight traffic is an open question, but there
is general agreement that it will be huge. The Taub Urban Research Center’s 1998
study offers a low-end estimate of a 23 percent increase in volume. But without sig-
nificant improvements in the area’s infrastructure, even that increase would cripple
the region’s highway network. When coupled with the projected increases in passen-
ger vehicle traffic, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council’s (NYMTC’s)
consultants predict a 47 percent increase in tonnage, and the New York City Eco-
nomic Development Corporation’s (EDC’s) analysis, the most recent of the three,
sees a 70 percent increase. A 70 percent increase in freight volume means that the
roads will have to accommodate 48 percent more trucks. By 2020, the American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) predicts a
national rise of 220 billion to 276 billion truck vehicle miles traveled (VMT), with
subsequent additional highway user costs as high as $492 billion.
Are the region’s highways capable of handling such an increase in traffic? The
importance of the highway system to the region’s economy and quality of life cannot
be overstated. By all accounts, approximately 80 percent of the total volume of goods
is transported throughout the region via truck. The network’s most popular bridge
and tunnel crossings and highways already are congested and have a heavy burden of
truck traffic: on some routes, trucks use 60 percent of the road space during rush
hour.Two decades ago, the region’s roads were faster and more efficient than they are
today. And if the past is any guide, multibillion-dollar improvement efforts may not
be capable of alleviating the heavy congestion of the region’s major roadways.
In sum, the region’s roadways already are strained by the enormous number of
freight and cars that move through the region. As the economy grows and the
freight traffic increases, New York faces a major challenge to regional mobility and
thus a huge challenge to the region’s economic and environmental well-being.
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 give a broad overview of freight movement in the
New York metropolitan area. Section 1.3 looks at freight movement on a
smaller scale, in the subregions east and west of the Hudson River. Section 1.4
examines and compares forecasts of the growth in highway traffic, and sec-
tion 1.5 considers the current highway infrastructure and its ability to handle
this growth.
CHAPTER 1
Growth in highway freight traffic
PART A
31.1 The region’s boundaries
How does our report define the “New York metropolitan area”? Because the main
studies of New York’s transportation system do not select the same boundaries, we
must be careful when making direct comparisons.
Originally, the New York City Economic Development Corporation’s Major
Investment Study (MIS) included 30 counties in northern New Jersey, downstate
New York, and southwestern Connecticut. To accommodate the Environmental
Impact Statement’s (EIS) modified study area, EDC included Litchfield and New
Haven counties in Connecticut and excluded Mercer County in New Jersey.
Nevertheless, its focus service area for a cross-harbor tunnel is the New York City
metropolitan area, rather than the entire Northeast (see Figure 1-1).
The NYMTC study area is made up of Staten Island, Rockland, Putnam,
Westchester, Suffolk, and Nassau, as well as Queens, the Bronx, Brooklyn, and
Manhattan (see Figure 1-2).
We divided the Hudson region—not to be confused with the “metropolitan
region” discussed earlier—into two zones: East-of-Hudson and West-of-Hudson.
The East-of-Hudson subregion encompasses the counties in downstate New York
and southwestern Connecticut that are east of the Hudson River, and the West-
of-Hudson subregion covers the counties in northern New Jersey and downstate
New York west of the Hudson River.
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FIGURE 1-1
EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project EIS internal study area
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4Unless otherwise specified, in this report, “the region,” “New York region,”
“New York area,” and “metropolitan area” all refer to the boundaries set by the EIS.
The area east of the Hudson is called the “East-of-Hudson subregion,” and that
west of the Hudson, the “West-of-Hudson subregion.”
1.2 A regional perspective on moving goods
The majority of the high volume of freight moved through the Hudson region
moves within the region itself or is exchanged with trading partners west of the
Hudson River (see Tables 1-1 and 1-2).1
Together, these six regions account for about two-thirds of the flow of freight
in the New York area.2 Interregional flows account for 58 percent of the overall
tonnage; intraregional flows for 23 percent; through-trips for 7 percent; and inter-
national freight for 12 percent.3 In other words, a great majority (93 percent) of the
freight flowing through the area has an origin or an end point in the region, and
only a small portion of goods are exchanged internationally.
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FIGURE 1-2
The NYMTC region
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TABLE 1-1
The Hudson region’s major trading partners
Trading Partner Tonnage (millions) Value ($billions)
Hudson region 164.8 318.6
Northern New York State 67.2 96.3
Midwest 51.0 235.7
Southern New York State 37.8 84.6
Delaware Valley—New Jersey 36.0 57.3
Southeast 34.7 158.1
Source: EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow Analysis
5MAIN COMMODITIES
Heavy, low-value goods dominate the freight tonnage moved in this region.Tradition-
ally, this kind of freight is well served by cheap, high-volume forms of transport, such as
rail and water, instead of relatively expensive trucking (see Figure 1-3).4 Nevertheless,
trucking is still the region’s dominant mode of transportation.
Overall, warehoused goods, fuel (i.e., petroleum and coal), building materials,
chemicals, and food products dominate the movement of freight in the region,
accounting for about 70 percent of all freight exchanges by tonnage. The fact that
many major inbound commodities also are major outbound commodities demon-
strates that the region is an important distribution center.
1.3 The movement of regional goods East-of-Hudson versus
West-of-Hudson
The East-of-Hudson subregion is one of the nation’s most densely populated
urban areas, generating a tremendous demand for goods.5 Even though its economy
now is primarily service based, its commodity mix suggests that manufacturing
and light industrial development remain important to the subregion. More than
half of all its freight is moved across the Hudson River.
The West-of-Hudson subregion is a major warehouse and distribution center
for a great number of goods that either originate in or are consumed by the East-
of-Hudson subregion.
The two subregions move nearly equal amounts of freight in both weight and
value, and they also trade extensively with each other, as approximately 15 percent
of the freight flow is intraregional (see Table 1-2, page 6).6 Their respective trading
partners are determined in large part by geography and the connectivity of sub-
regional freight networks, with the East-of-Hudson subregion trading extensively
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FIGURE 1-3
Cross Harbor Region top commodities by weight
Source: EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow Analysis
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6in the north and east, and the West-of-Hudson subregion trading heavily with
regions west and south of it (see Tables 1-3 and 1-4).
MAIN COMMODITIES
East-of-Hudson. Despite the area’s transition to a service economy, low-value bulk
goods still hold a significant share of the freight market. In other areas of the
country, these kinds of goods often move by freight rail. Fuel, lumber, paper, paper
pulp, scrap metal, chemicals, primary metal products, and building materials make
up 57 percent of the subregion’s freight volume.7
Four kinds of goods—fuels,8 building materials,9 warehoused goods, and
food products—dominate the subregion’s freight movements. Together they
account for nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of all freight tonnage. Fuel is the top
commodity by weight (22 percent of the total freight), but it is not in the top 10
commodities by value. Building materials, warehoused goods, and food are
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TABLE 1-3
The East-of-Hudson subregion's major trading partners
Trading partner Tonnage (millions) Value ($billions)
Northern New York State 52.7 80.6
East-of-Hudson subregion 48.7 113.1
Southern New York State 29.5 66.3
Eastern Connecticut and Rhode Island 23.6 31.6
Midwest 19.5 97.2
Southeast 15.0 81.2
Source: EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow Analysis
TABLE 1-2
Hudson regional and subregional freight hauled in 2000a
Movement Tonnage (millions) Value ($billions)
HUDSON REGION
Intraregional 164.8 318.6
Imports into the region 236.4 699.9
Exports out of the region 181.0 422.4
Total 582.2 1,440.9
EAST-OF-HUDSON SUBREGION
Intraregional 48.6 113.0
Imports into the region 154.0 419.9
Exports out of the region 112.4 275.1
Total 315.0 808.0
WEST-OF-HUDSON SUBREGION
Intraregional 69.7 127.8
Imports into the region 128.9 357.6
Exports out of the region 115.0 225.0
Total 313.6 710.4
a The value dollars in this report have been calculated using the U.S. Department of Transportation’s 1993 national
Commodity Flow Survey. The values also have been adjusted to 2000 dollars using data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. (The figures were adjusted to 2000 dollars because the study used the 2000 TRANSEARCH
database.)
Source: EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow Analysis
7nearly equal (15 percent, 14 percent, and 12 percent of tonnage, respectively)
(see Figure 1-4).
By value, machinery accounts for more than 20 percent of the subregion’s
freight flow ($162 billion), followed by warehoused goods and apparel (each
about 10 percent of value, or $80 billion each). The subregion’s high value-
added manufactured goods are represented by instruments, photographic
goods, optical goods, clocks, and watches and account for 6.6 percent of the
total value.
Exports of waste or scrap materials, excluding municipal solid waste, account
for 5.9 million tons, making them the sixth largest commodity by weight
(5.22 percent of the total tonnage). In its 1999 waste export plan, New York City’s
Department of Sanitation estimated that approximately 5.6 million tons of
municipal solid waste are exported annually. If we add that figure to the exports of
other waste and scrap materials, we get a total export tonnage of about 11.5 mil-
lion tons, making waste or scrap materials the subregion’s fourth largest export.
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TABLE 1-4
The West-of-Hudson subregion's major trading partners
Trading partner Tonnage (millions) Value ($billions)
West-of-Hudson subregion 69.7 127.9
East-of-Hudson subregion 46.4 77.6
Midwest 31.5 138.5
Delaware Valley--New Jersey 28.2 46.7
Southeast 19.7 76.9
Mid-Atlantic 17.5 29.9
Source: EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow Analysis
FIGURE 1-4
Top commodities move in the East-of-Hudson Region—by weight
Source: EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow Analysis
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8Waste materials are generally considered an ideal candidate for rail transport, as
they are a low-value bulk good that is not time sensitive.
West-of-Hudson. Warehoused goods, fuel, building materials, and food products
dominate the subregion’s freight movements, accounting for about 66 percent of
all its freight exchanges. Approximately 45 percent of all imports to this subregion
are building materials, warehoused goods, and food products. Warehoused goods
are the leading commodities by both weight (83 million tons) and value
($146.4 billion). Machinery and transportation equipment account for approxi-
mately $199 billion (28 percent of the total value of the freight movements), with
more than half that figure ($101 billion) being machinery.
MODE SPLITS
In tonnage and in value, trucking is still dominates the freight transport market on
both sides of the Hudson. Comparing mode splits of the Hudson subregions high-
lights this dependency on trucks, and the greater importance of freight rail West-
of-Hudson than East-of-Hudson (see Figure 1-5). This difference and the reasons
for it will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2. It is clear that the East-of-
Hudson subregion is not efficiently connected to the rest of the national rail net-
work, as much of the freight is offloaded from rail in northern New Jersey and
then trucked to destinations east of the Hudson.
1.4 Predicted growth in freight traffic
If the Hudson region grows at a moderate pace over the next two decades, the vol-
ume of goods that the area handles will soar. The size of this increase is of interest
to infrastructure planners, who need a reasonably precise estimate to make deci-
sions about expanding highways, upgrading bridges, addressing bottlenecks, and
planning transit or rail improvements.
Unless the region refocuses its priorities, most of the extra freight will end up
on tractor-trailer trucks. The next subsection examines the freight market forecasts
prepared by EDC and NYMTC.
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• Rail     • Truck     • Air     • Water
WEST OF HUDSON EAST OF HUDSON
Truck
76.0%
Truck
78.6%
Rail
8.7%
Air
0.1%
Rail
1.7%
Air
0.1%
Water
15.2%
Water
19.6%
FIGURE 1-5
Mode splits by tonnage hauled, 2000
Source: EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow Analysis
9REGIONAL ECONOMIC FORECAST FOR 2020
• Population growth. Over the next 20 years the population of the New York-
northern New Jersey area is projected to grow at 0.2 to 0.3 percent annually.10
During this time, the population of the East-of-Hudson subregion will grow
by 5 percent, and that of the West-of-Hudson subregion, by 7.5 percent.
• Income growth. Income in the area is predicted to grow at a robust 5.2 percent
annual rate for the East-of Hudson subregion and 4.6 for the West-of-Hud-
son subregion.
• Economic activity. The combination of low population growth and high
income growth for the region will result in an economically dynamic environ-
ment. Manufacturing employment is projected to decline by 2.1 percent in the
East-of-Hudson subregion and 1.0 percent in the West-of-Hudson subre-
gion. This is consistent with the recent decline in manufacturing activity East-
of-Hudson. In contrast to manufacturing, services are estimated to grow at a
1.5 percent annual rate across the region, a significant portion of which will be
in warehousing services for transportation.
THE EDC STUDY AREA’S FREIGHT FLOW FORECASTS FOR 2025
These projections were made on the assumption that no changes or improvements
will be made in the existing freight transportation network.11
Tonnage. In 2025, the total tonnage is projected to reach 989.3 million tons annu-
ally, with an estimated value of $2.5 trillion. These numbers represent a 70 percent
increase in total tonnage and a 79 percent increase in total value.
Modal split. Without substantial investments in rail and marine operations, the
modal split in the region will widen. Truck tonnage is forecast to increase from
79.4 percent to 85.7 percent, while rail’s share will decrease from 5.6 percent to 4.7
percent. Marine movements will decline from 14.9 percent to 9.3 percent (see Fig-
ure 1-6). Accordingly, the congestion, air quality, and economic development
impacts of this imbalance may be severe.
Traffic increases by mode. Using EDC’s estimates, in 2025, 385 million additional
tons of freight will travel by truck, 5.3 additional tons by water, 13.8 by rail, and
0.81 by air. The total tonnage in 2025 by mode would then be 847.8 million tons
by truck, 46.5 by rail, 92.0 by water, and 3.0 by air.
Traffic increase by subregion. The projections for each of the two subregions suggest
an increase of 211.9 million tons in truck tonnage in the East-of-Hudson subre-
gion and 194.6 million tons in the West-of-Hudson subregion.12
THE NYMTC STUDY AREA’S FREIGHT FORECAST FOR 2025
Tonnage. In the NYMTC study area, commodity flows are expected to grow at
an annual rate of 1.4 percent. If they were to do so, the volume of freight would
rise by 47 percent, from 333 million tons in 1998 to 490.5 million tons annually
in 2025.13
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Mode split. The mode split in 1998 will likely persist through 2025. The shares for
truck, rail, and air will rise to 80.9, 0.9, and 0.2 percent, respectively (up from 80.7,
0.8, and 0.1). The marine share will likely fall from 18.3 to 18.0 percent.
Freight volume increases by mode. The volume of rail freight is predicted to increase
by 59.3 percent, from 2.8 million tons in 1998 to 4.3 million tons—still a very low
market share. The volume of truck freight will grow by 47.6 percent, from 268.9
million tons to 396.9 million tons. Airfreight’s minuscule tonnage will increase by
109.1 percent, from 400,000 tons to 900,000 tons. Domestic water freight will
grow by 45 percent, from 61 million tons to 88.4 million tons, although its share of
the overall market will nevertheless drop.
Main commodities. Despite painful losses in the manufacturing sector, the fastest-
growing commodities for the NYMTC study area (by tonnage) continue to be
bulk goods, which often move by rail (see Figure 1-7).
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE TWO STUDIES
Next we compare the NYMTC and EDC forecasts, particularly for the East-of-
Hudson subregion. The two analyses set different baseline years (NYMTC uses
1998; EDC uses 2000) and geographic boundaries. The NYMTC study includes
Rockland County but excludes Dutchess County in New York and Fairfield,
Litchfield, and New Haven counties in Connecticut. Otherwise, the studies cover
the same area and counties. In order to compare them, this report uses only those
figures from the areas covered by both studies.
To ensure an accurate comparison, we did not count freight moving between
the excluded counties or between the excluded counties and other regions of the
country, but we did count freight flowing between the excluded counties and the
New York region. Since NYMTC did not provide detailed figures for Rockland
County, this analysis excludes that county completely.14
Because the new data set does not significantly affect the modal splits, our
analysis assumes that they remain the same.
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FIGURE 1-6
2025 East-of-Hudson mode split—EDC
Source: EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow Analysis
Truck
85.73%
Air
0.20%
Water
12.70%
Rail
1.37%
11
Some of the principal differences between the two studies’ findings of rele-
vance to our report are displayed in Table 1-5, page 12.
The differences between the two reports are not trivial. EDC’s estimate of
trucking’s share is 2 percentage points higher than NYMTC’s, which distributes
that additional 2 percent evenly to rail and marine modes. The modal splits for
2025 diverge even more, with EDC expecting an even greater truck share and a
much smaller marine share than NYMTC does. Nonetheless, both forecast a
higher truck share in 2025 than in the base year: 85.7 percent and 80.9 percent, for
EDC and NYMTC, respectively. In addition, EDC predicts 150 percent more
truck trips than NYMTC does (see Figure 1-8).
According to Cambridge Systematics, the differences in the two analyses are
attributable to the baseline years used. The lower baseline tonnage and the different
mode split in EDC’s 2000 data set are the result of more direct reporting of com-
modity movements by rail and highway carriers to Reebie Associates, the consulting
firm employed by EDC. The divergence in the 2025 growth forecasts reflects differ-
ent regional economic outlooks in the fall of 2000 and the fall of 2001. The
NYMTC study’s predicted growth rate reflects the then accepted view that the ex-
plosive economic expansion of the 1990s would taper off smoothly over the next 25
years.The EDC study was completed after the September 11, 2001 attacks and dur-
ing a period of continued national economic cooling. Its forecasts echo the widely
held view that owing to extensive rebuilding efforts, the New York metropolitan
region will expand faster than previously envisioned. The fact that NYMTC and
EDC ultimately predict the same total adjusted tonnage for 2025 is coincidental.
Despite these differences, the reports offer similar forecasts: a huge increase in
goods moved in the region, a mode split overwhelmingly in favor of trucks, and a
correspondingly substantial rise in truck tonnage and trips. Our report takes this as
a given. The question naturally arises as to whether the region is capable of accom-
modating such a huge growth in trucking activity.
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FIGURE 1-7
Top 10 regional (NYMTC) commodities in 1998 and 2025
Source: NYMTC Regional Freight Plan—Task 4
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1.5 The highway system’s ability to handle growth
New York City and the surrounding area cover 4,065 square miles and have a popula-
tion of about 17 million people. The concentration of such a large population in a
limited space leads to serious urban infrastructural challenges, with the urban mobil-
ity of 5.469 million peak-period road travelers among the most pressing.
Economic development has followed the motorways and is concentrated around
their entrances and exits. The resulting diffused regional travel pattern is responsible
for the congested condition of nearly two-thirds of all motorways during peak periods.
SEVERITY OF THE CONGESTION PROBLEM
The Texas Transportation Institute reported in its 2002 Urban Mobility Report
some alarming statistics regarding congestion in the metropolitan area in 2000:
• The region’s travel time index (TTI) is equal to 1.41, which means that
because of congestion, a peak-hour trip in the region takes 41 percent longer
than it would at free-flow speeds.
• The annual number of person-hours of delay is measured at 400,115, second
only to that for Los Angeles. The annual delay per peak road traveler and per
person is estimated at 73 and 23 hours, respectively.
PART A
TABLE 1-5
Notable differences between the EDC and NYMTC studies
East-of-Hudson Feature EDC NYMTC
Baseline year tonnage (tons) 278.6 million 320.6 million
Year 2025 tonnage (tons) 472.4 million 473.4 million
Projected percent growth in tonnage 69.6% 47.6%
Projected truck tonnage growth (tons) 185.9 million 124.3 million
ADDITIONAL ANNUAL TRUCK TRIPS
Under maximum loada 4.7 million 3.1 million
Under average loadb 10.6 million 7.1 million
YEAR 2025 TOTAL TRUCK TRIPS
Under maximum load 10.1 million 9.6 million
Under average load 23.1 million 21.9 million
BASELINE MODAL SPLIT (BY TONNAGE)
Truck 78.6% 80.7%
Marine 19.6% 18.3%
Rail 1.7% 0.8%
Air 0.1% 0.1%
YEAR 2025 MODAL SPLIT (BY TONNAGE)
Truck 85.7% 80.9%
Marine 12.7% 18.0%
Rail 1.4% 0.9%
Air 0.2% 0.2%
a It is assumed that trucks carry the intercity maximum (without permit) of 40 tons.
b On average, trucks carry much less than the legal limit (including empty return trips, etc.). According to Cambridge
Systematics, past experience has shown that 17.5 tons per truck is a broad-based average payload.
Sources: EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow Analysis and NYMTC Regional Freight
Plan—Task 4
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• A total of 658 million gallons of fuel are wasted each year. In other words, each
peak road traveler consumes 120 gallons of excess fuel per year.
• The annual cost to the region due to congestion is $7.66 billion ($6.645 billion
from delays and $1.015 billion from fuel). This translates into an annual con-
gestion cost of $1,400 per peak road traveler and $450 per person.
• Thirty-five percent of daily and 69 percent of peak period travel occur in con-
gested conditions.
• Fifty-five percent of freeway and 65 percent of principal arterial lane-miles are
congested during the peak period.
• The growth of the average number of annual vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
was measured at 2.5 percent.15 This in turn implies that for freeways and prin-
cipal arterial streets, 167 and 185 additional lane-miles, respectively, will be
needed each year to prevent further congestion growth.
• Projecting to the year 2025 (and assuming a constant 2.5 percent annual VMT
growth rate) a total of 5,704 and 6,319 additional lane-miles will have to be
added to the current freeway and principal arterial road system, respectively, in
order to maintain 2000 mobility conditions described by the regional roadway
congestion index (RCI). Nevertheless, if we take into account the expansion of
the region’s urban boundaries and the corresponding increase in VMT for
which it is responsible, we should assume a more conservative annual VMT
growth rate. If the assumed growth rate is set at 1 percent, the previous num-
bers will change to 1,887 and 2,090 total additional lane-miles.
WORSENING CONGESTION
Even though the New York State Department of Transportation (DOT) spends about
$15 billion a year on transportation, and the federal government spends several
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FIGURE 1-8
Average number of total annual truck trips—adjusted comparison
between NYMTC and EDC studies
Source: EDC and NYMTC
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billion more, highways have become more congested in the last 20 years. This sug-
gests that highway expansion by itself is not the solution and that the Hudson
region should invest in finding innovative ways to reduce the amount of traffic on
the road.
A brief consideration of recent data from the Texas Transportation Institute
demonstrates that in every measurable way, congestion is becoming an increasingly
urgent social and economic problem:
• The percentage of peak-period travel that occurs on congested roadways rose
from 28 percent in 1982 to 69 percent in 2000.
• The percentage of travel at all times that occurs on congested roadways grew
from 14 percent in 1982 to 35 percent in 2000.
• The annual delay per peak road traveler increased by 265 percent, from 20 to
73 hours in the past 18 years (see Figure 1-9).
• The region’s travel time index climbed 25 percent, from 1.13 in 1982 to 1.41
in 2000 (see Figure 1-10).
• The percentage of the region’s congested lane-miles of roadway rose from
30 to 55 percent for freeways and 55 to 65 percent for principal arterial streets.
The outlook for the next 20 years is even worse. NYMTC’s Regional Freight
Plan concluded that those areas predicted to experience the greatest increase in
freight tonnage, such as New York County (with a projected 50.4 percent increase
of 30.5 million tons), are in grave danger of truck gridlock.16
CHOKE POINTS AT RIVER CROSSINGS AND MAJOR CORRIDORS
The New York metropolitan region has an extensive and highly utilized highway
network.17 Even though the majority of vehicles that use it are not for freight, the
network plays a crucial role in the movement of goods.
There are two main routes for transporting freight into New York City, Long
Island, and the downstate New York counties (Westchester, Rockland, etc). The
most popular option is the Northern Crossing of the Hudson River via the George
Washington Bridge (GWB) and onto the Cross Bronx Expressway (CBX). This
crossing is severely and chronically congested and is the only crossing over the
Hudson River capable of accommodating 53-foot tractor-trailers. A second option
is the Southern Crossing from northern New Jersey to Brooklyn via the Goethals
Bridge and Outerbridge Crossing onto the Staten Island Expressway and the Ver-
razano-Narrows Bridge.18 The Outerbridge Crossing is used mainly by small and
medium-size trucks that service retail stores in Staten Island, Brooklyn, and
southern Long Island. Trucks also use the Tappan Zee Bridge to get to and from
downstate New York.
In both cases, the gateway corridor to the region is the I-95/New Jersey Turn-
pike. For the Northern Crossing, drivers often use U.S. 1-9. Congestion on the
I-95/New Jersey Turnpike/U.S. 1-9 corridor is moderate, and it serves the many rail
yards, intermodal terminals, warehouses, and manufacturing centers that ship goods
across the Hudson River. Both routes continue in the East-of-Hudson area on vari-
ous expressways: the Gowanus, Bronx-Queens, Van Wyck, Long Island, Major
Deegan, and Cross Westchester, as well as the New England Thruway (I-95). For
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truckers, the Northern I-95/GWB/CBX crossing is a vital through route. Since it is
the only Hudson River crossing that is suitable for 53-foot tractor-trailers, it serves a
huge volume of truck traffic (approximately 27,600 truck trips per day).
Another important corridor for truck traffic is the Van Wyck Expressway,
which is the primary link for airfreight into and out of JFK International Airport.
The Van Wyck also connects the Triborough and Bronx-Whitestone bridges with
the Long Island Expressway and New York State Route 27. It suffers from chronic
and severe congestion, which hinders airfreight transportation. Since airfreight is
time sensitive, truck operators need to factor in congestion and anticipate addi-
tional time delays. This necessity in turn increases shipper and labor costs and
PART A
FIGURE 1-10
New York region Travel Time Index (TTI), 1982–2000
Source: Texas Transportation Institute, 2000 Urban Mobility Study
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2000199419901982
Tr
av
el
 T
im
e 
In
de
x
1.13
1.31 1.31
1.41
FIGURE 1-9
Annual delay per peak road traveler, 1982–2000
Source: Texas Transportation Institute, 2000 Urban Mobility Study
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makes JFK less appealing as an airfreight distribution center, thereby shifting traf-
fic to Newark International Airport to the west of the Hudson River.19
In general, the highways that accommodate through-traffic tend to have the
highest truck volumes: the New England Thruway (I-95), Cross Westchester
Expressway, New York State Thruway, and Cross Bronx Expressway. For intrare-
gional truck trips, the Southern Crossing, Van Wyck, New York State Route 27,
and Long Island Expressway are the main routes; and the East River bridges cater
to suppliers who are situated in Brooklyn or Queens and do business in Manhattan.
CURRENT HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENTS
In order to deal with some of its major highway bottlenecks, the region has a num-
ber of highway improvement projects under way or in an advanced phase of study.
The New York DOT’s Region 11 office (which encompasses the five boroughs of
New York City) has a number of projects completed or under way and a few in the
planning stage.
The Bruckner/Cross Bronx Expressway Interchange Rehabilitation has con-
solidated several projects, rehabilitating portions of the CBX, Throgs Neck
Expressway, and Hutchinson River Parkway, as well as the Bruckner Interchange,
including 14 ramps and bridge structures. The project has improved overall road
conditions, installed an intelligent transportation system (ITS), enhanced the
adjacent landscaping, and eased congestion in the surrounding communities. The
project’s cost is estimated to be more than $200 million.
Other notable projects under way are the Long Island Expressway (LIE)
Reconstruction Project, the Brooklyn Queens Expressway (BQE) Reconstruction
Project, the LIE/Cross Island Parkway Interchange Improvements, and the
Clearview Expressway/LIE Interchange Improvements.
• The LIE Reconstruction Project will rehabilitate the highway in Queens from
the Queens-Midtown Tunnel to the Grand Central Parkway. It was originally
scheduled for completion in the fall of 2003. As of December 2003, all compo-
nents of the project with any impact on traffic (i.e., all components, excluding in-
stallation of the noise barrier and beautification measures) had been completed.
• The BQE Reconstruction Project will repair parts of the BQE between
Broadway and Twenty-fifth Avenue. The vertical and horizontal alignments
of the road as well as the derelict state of some 16 bridges will require that the
BQE overpasses and adjacent streets be restructured. The lowering of two
streets and the raising of the freight rail tracks will be necessary. The project’s
completion date is set for spring 2004.
• The LIE/Cross Island Interchange Improvements will address structural,
operational, and safety deficiencies on a two-mile stretch of the LIE between
Exit 29 (Springfield Boulevard) and Exit 32 (Little Neck Parkway). The pro-
ject’s completion date is scheduled for September 2004 and should cost about
$130 million. The Clearview Expressway/LIE Interchange reconstruction
project will cost $30 million, and all major construction components of the
project have been completed.
• Other projects that are still in the planning stage and that will affect the move-
ment of goods via trucks in the region include the Kosciuszko Bridge Project,
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the Bruckner-Sheridan Interchange and Commercial Access to Hunts Point
Peninsula Project, and the Bronx Arterial Needs Major Investment Study (see
www.dot.state.ny.us/reg/r11/r11.htm for further details).
The New Jersey DOT-sponsored Portway project will have a large impact on
the movement of goods in the region. It will consolidate a number of different pro-
jects with the goal of improving truck access to the major ports. Of the
thirteen planned projects, two will be managed by the Port Authority, five are already
under construction, and the final six are in the feasibility assessment stage (see
www.transstreamnet.org/nchrp/state_projects/projects_nj1.asp for further details).
Even with these very expensive improvements, highway congestion will
steadily worsen if truck and car traffic grow as projected.
1.6 Conclusion
Trucks comprise a high percentage of the total number of vehicles, including during
peak hours, on chronically congested regional roadways, reaching 20, 30, or even
45 percent of vehicles in some cases.Trucks also carry about 80 percent or more of the
region’s freight. The total truck tonnage and trucks’ modal share are projected to in-
crease, signaling a huge growth in truck movements. In order for the region to main-
tain its current mobility condition, as measured by its roadway congestion index
(RCI), it will have to build hundreds of additional lane-miles of roadway capacity.
Cost, land use, and environmental considerations suggest that the New York
metropolitan region will be hard-pressed to “build its way” out of its congestion
problems by expanding its highway capacity without also investing in major
freight rail and transit improvements. Since 1982, congestion has been getting
steadily and consistently worse. The region’s TTI, the percentage of congested
peak-period travel, and the annual delay per peak road traveler have risen by
approximately 25, 146, and 265 percent, respectively.
Chapter 1 notes
1 Unless otherwise noted, all the information in section 1.2 is from the New York City Economic
Development Corporation’s Commodity Flow Analysis for the Cross-Harbor Freight Movement
Project’s EIS.
2 Other important trading partners are the mid-Atlantic region and other northeastern regions, the
Southwest, southern New Jersey, northern New England, California, and parts of Canada.
3 Data are from the EDC’s MIS.
4 A notable exception is warehoused goods, which generally have a high value and make up a large
portion of the region’s freight market. Goods in this category are moved from major distribution
centers (indicating warehousing clusters) to retail locations (indicating commercial activity).
5 All the information in section 1.3 is from the New York City Economic Development Corpora-
tion’s Commodity Flow Analysis for the Cross-Harbor Freight Movement Project’s EIS.
6 Note that the East-of-Hudson and West-of-Hudson figures do not add up to the total for the
whole region. If we make that calculation, we will end up double-counting the freight movements
between the two subregions (interzonal). Instead, in order to get the total, we must add together
the East-of-Hudson and West-of-Hudson figures and then subtract the interzonal movements.
7 It is clear that marine modes transport primarily bulk commodities such as petroleum or coal
products. On both sides of the Hudson, the disparity between the marine’s modal share by weight
and by value serves to illustrate this point.
8 Petroleum and coal.
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9 Clay, concrete, glass, or stone products.
10 The regional economic forecasts in this section were derived from the EDC’s MIS. The commod-
ity flow analysis for the EIS is not based on these figures. For the EIS, the Economic Development
Corporation hired DRI-WEFA, an economic consulting and forecasting firm (since renamed
Global Insight). These numbers predicted a temporary post-September 11 decline in activity, fol-
lowed by a return to historical growth trends.
11 All the regional commodity flow forecasts in this section were derived from the EDC’s commod-
ity flow analysis for the EIS.
12 Recall that the East-of-Hudson and West-of-Hudson figures do not add up to the total for the
whole region. If we make that calculation, we will end up double-counting the freight movements
between the two subregions (interzonal).
13 All the regional commodity flow forecasts in section 1.4 were derived from NYMTC’s Regional
Freight Plan—Task 4 and the EDC Cross Harbor Freight Movement Project Commodity Flow
Analysis.
14 This does not significantly change the overall picture, since Rockland moves relatively little
freight, about 3 percent of the region’s total tonnage.
15 VMT and lane-mile increases include urban and land-size increases. These rates are much higher
than the “true” increase rates, that is, those based on new travel or road construction. The rates
shown are the average annual growth rates for freeways and principal arterial streets between 1995
and 2000.
16 NYMTC, NYMTC Regional Freight Plan: Task 4—Definition and Assessment of Needs (Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge Systematics, 2001), p. 8-8.
17 Unless otherwise noted, all the information in this section is from NYMTC’s Regional Freight
Plan—Task 2.
18 There are a few other Hudson River crossings, such as the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, but their
dimensions and location are not convenient for heavy trucking operations. Trucks, which can sat-
isfy the limiting weight and height criteria, do use these crossings but avoid doing so during peak
commuting hours when the congestion is severe.
19 JFK is still highly appealing to international carriers because of its stellar customs service. Many
carriers fly into Newark and then truck their goods to JFK to clear customs.
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This chapter offers a broad explanation of the freight rail system so that residents
can understand the importance of a revitalized system to their region’s future.
Section 2.1 describes how the freight rail system in the New York metropoli-
tan area is connected to the national network. Section 2.2 looks at the system
West-of-Hudson, its major corridors, connections to the national network, pas-
senger and freight rail operators, rail yards, and intermodal terminals. Section 2.3
discusses the features of the East-of-Hudson rail freight system, and section 2.4
examines the Hudson region’s antiquated and in some cases problematic track sys-
tems with low clearances and low weight limits. Finally, section 2.5 describes the
freight rail improvement projects already under way.
2.1 A system not adequately connected to the national network
The national freight rail network is an important part of the United States’
national freight transportation system, for example:1
• Rail moved more than 40 percent of the intercity freight tonnage.
• In 2000, rail moved 16 percent of the total domestic freight tonnage. Trucks
moved 78 percent.
• When measured in ton-miles, rail’s total domestic share was 28 percent.
• Rail accounted for 6 percent of freight by value, indicating that rail transport is
often used for low-value bulk commodities.
• Rail moved 2 billion tons of freight, valued at $600 billion, for more than 1.2
trillion ton-miles.
Railroads handle a huge volume of freight traffic in the Midwest and South-
east and also much of that on the Atlantic seaboard. But New England and down-
state New York, particularly in the East-of-Hudson subregion and Long Island,
have a very low volume of rail freight traffic.
Much of New York’s and New Jersey’s rail traffic passes through upstate
New York and Pennsylvania, on one of two main through routes linking the New
York metropolitan area to the Midwest and the West, one passing through New
York State and the other through Pennsylvania. The first goes north to Albany,
then turns west and continues onward to Buffalo, Cleveland, and Chicago. His-
torically this has been called the Water Level Route because it parallels rivers,
lakes, and canals. The other route crosses into Pennsylvania from the New York
metropolitan area southwest to Harrisburg, then west to Pittsburgh, Cleveland,
and Chicago.
Of the two major routes linking New York with the national rail network, the
New York State route allows the movement of rail freight going to or from the
East-of-Hudson subregion because the metropolitan area lacks an efficient cross-
harbor link. Such a link is required for an on-rail connection between the East-of-
Hudson subregion and the Pennsylvania route without necessitating a circuitous
movement via Selkirk, New York.
CHAPTER 2
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Freight traffic moving from East-of-Hudson to the Middle Atlantic and
Southeast must pass through Selkirk, again because the harbor currently does not
have an efficient, high-capacity option for moving rail freight.
2.2 Freight rail to the West: modern, efficient, and accessible
The West-of-Hudson subregion has an extensive, modern, and highly utilized rail
freight network. According to the New York City Economic Development Cor-
poration’s (EDC’s) Commodity Flow Survey (see chapter 1), in 2000, rail moved
8.65 percent of the subregion’s total tonnage, or approximately 27.1 million tons.
This section examines the West-of-Hudson rail system’s connections to the
national network, major corridors and rail lines, passenger and freight operators,
rail yards, and intermodal terminals. Weight limits and vertical clearances are not
discussed, since they are not significant problems west of the Hudson.
CONNECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL NETWORK
Four major corridors connect New Jersey to points west and south:
The Southern Corridor combines the parallel Chemical Coast and Lehigh Main
lines and links the West-of-Hudson rail yards to Philadelphia and Harrisburg and
from there to the rest of the national rail network. New Jersey Transit operates
passenger service over some of these routes, but this does not severely constrain
freight operations. Rail lines leading to Harrisburg with connections to Pitts-
burgh, Chicago, and points south are owned by Norfolk Southern (NS) and con-
stitute its main freight gateway in the region. New Jersey has some passenger
service (approximately 60 weekday passenger trains) on a five-mile segment
between Aldene and Newark, shared by the NS and CSX Transportation (CSX)
railroads.2 The CSX West Trenton Line is also a part of this corridor and connects
New Jersey to Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Richmond, with connections to Jack-
sonville and Chicago. There is no passenger service on this line in New Jersey east
of the West Trenton station. The New York Susquehanna and Western Railway
(NYS&W) has trackage rights on the former Lehigh and Hudson River Line
between Campbell Hall and Warwick, where it connects with its own line.
The West Shore Line Corridor connects the major West-of-Hudson rail yards and
warehouses with the freight rail route close to the Great Lakes known as the
Water Level Route, which is CSX’s main entrance into the West-of-Hudson sub-
region. The CSX River Line is the most important freight line in this corridor,
since it connects northern New Jersey to Albany and the CSX Water Level
Route—and therefore Buffalo, Cleveland, Chicago, and other points west. The
route can also be used to link northern New Jersey by rail to the Boston metropol-
itan area in New England. The River Line provides frequent and consistent service
to all major CSX freight facilities and terminals in northern New Jersey, especially
North Bergen and Little Ferry. There are no passenger operations south of Albany
on the River Line.
The Southern Tier Line Corridor is a competitive alternative to the Water Level
Route /CSX River Line approach to the West-of-Hudson subregion. It is owned by
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NS and links New Jersey to Buffalo with track on or close to New York State’s
southern border, with connections to Cleveland and Chicago along Lake Erie. The
NYS&W and Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) have been granted trackage rights on
the NS Southern Tier Route. Passenger service can be found east of Port Jervis, New
York, and becomes denser east of Suffern, New York. The NYS&W has trackage
rights on the Southern Tier Line from Binghamton to Campbell Hall, New York.
The Northeast Corridor, stretching from Washington, D.C., to Boston, is one of
the country’s busiest pieces of track and is used extensively by Amtrak and other
local carriers for passenger and commuter operations.3 In general, there is very lit-
tle through-freight activity on this line, except for Amtrak’s mail and express ser-
vice. Nonetheless, it does connect northern New Jersey and the East-of-Hudson
subregion to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and points south and west and
could be an important freight corridor if the proper technology were adopted,
integrating its scheduling with that of the passenger lines.
SHARED USE
Substantial portions of the Hudson region’s track add options for railroads and the
shippers that buy their services. To encourage public acceptance of the acquisition
of Conrail by CSX and NS, and to guard against monopolistic behavior, the two
railroads were required to establish three large geographic zones in the former
Conrail system so that shippers and receivers within the zones would have equal
access to either CSX or NS. The zones established are, roughly, northern New Jer-
sey, metropolitan Philadelphia (around Camden), and Detroit. The most impor-
tant of the three is the northern New Jersey zone.
The freight railroads and the freight and passenger operations all share use of
the rail lines. The two main commuter and passenger rail operators in northern
New Jersey are Amtrak and New Jersey Transit (NJT). While the region has many
dedicated freight rail lines, the passenger and freight operations still share some of
the lines, especially in parts of the NJT network. Judging by the volume of rail
movement in the region and the unhindered operation of NJT and Amtrak, pas-
senger and freight rail coexist harmoniously.
Amtrak owns track from New Rochelle in the east to Washington, D.C., in the
south, including the Hudson River tunnels and the rail lines through New York’s
Penn Station in the East-of-Hudson subregion. Along the Amtrak main line in New
Jersey, several shippers are served by trains originating in and around Newark.4
NJT’s rail lines are only partially publicly owned; CSX, NS, and Conrail own
a substantial amount of right-of-way in New Jersey. With a fleet of 92 loco-
motives, 411 coaches, and 290 self-propelled cars, NJT carries almost 50 million
passengers trips per year, on a schedule of approximately 660 daily trains. The 350-
mile NJT network encompasses approximately 980 miles of track and is extensively
shared with freight operations.5 The main freight arteries, terminals, yards, and
feeder lines have remained in the hands of private for-profit freight railroads such
as CSX, NS, CP, and small short lines.
MAJOR RAIL FREIGHT YARDS AND INTERMODAL TERMINALS
The West-of-Hudson subregion has an ample network of rail yards and terminals,
most of which could easily be expanded to accommodate more traffic.6 If the East-of-
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Hudson subregion used more rail freight, most of the infrastructure to the west would
be ready to handle the increase.
• CSX North Bergen is an intermodal transfer facility owned and operated by
CSX. Well situated for truck access, the terminal sits along U.S. 1-9 just off
Exit 16E on the New Jersey Turnpike. In 2000 160,000 container lifts were
performed. 7 The increase in traffic can be attributed to freight diversion from
Little Ferry to North Bergen.
• CSX South Kearney, located off Exit 15E of the New Jersey Turnpike, is the
largest intermodal facility in the region. It can handle as many as 360,000 lifts
a year. The terminal mainly serves international traffic originating from Pacific
Coast ports, while domestic freight is limited to north/south moves to and
from Jacksonville and New Orleans. Immediately adjacent to South Kearney
is the former APL Limited site, which is currently under CSX ownership and
handles approximately 114,000 lifts per year.
• CSX Little Ferry was once Sea Land’s regional rail intermodal facility. In 1994
the terminal began a major expansion, which culminated in CSX’s buying Sea
Land. Current volumes are estimated at 100,000 lifts per year, with the major-
ity of domestic traffic going to Chicago, Ohio, and St. Louis, on the CSX
River Line.
• CSX Trumbull Street Yard in Elizabeth, New Jersey, is a reload center con-
trolled and exclusively used by CSX. Rail access to this easily developed termi-
nal location is best via the Port Reading Line for north/south traffic.8
• ExpressRail9 is the Port of New York and New Jersey’s on-dock intermodal
rail terminal at the Port Elizabeth Marine Terminal. It links the port with key
inland markets and all major rail systems in the United States. In 2001, the
33-acre facility handled more than 200,000 container moves. It provides
direct, double-stack rail service through NS to the Midwest and New Eng-
land. ExpressRail’s five tracks can accommodate 300 ocean containers at one
time and can be loaded and unloaded simultaneously. The current ExpressRail
terminal is being replaced with a 70-acre complex that is three times larger.
The new ExpressRail will have a dedicated lead track and a rail overpass sep-
arating train traffic from roadway traffic.
• The NS E-Rail Terminal is located in Elizabeth, New Jersey, and handles
approximately 120,000 lifts per year. It is operated by the “K” Line’s Rail-
Bridge subsidiary, RBTC. Domestic container and “K” Line Pacific Rim cargo
(about 25 percent of the total) are the terminal’s major clients. The terminal is
off Exit 13A of the New Jersey Turnpike and is on the NS Lehigh Line and
the Penn Route. It is the region’s most southerly intermodal terminal.
• NS Croxton is located in Jersey City, off Routes 1 and 9 and Exit 15W of the
New Jersey Turnpike. It handles approximately 160,000 lifts per year. Cus-
tomers include steamship line carriers, trailer traffic, and domestic trucking
companies. The terminal is at the center of the Northern New Jersey Terminal
district and has unobstructed rail access to all major routes.
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• Resources Terminal is a small intermodal terminal compared with the others
in northern New Jersey and is located just east of Croxton on the NYS&W
line. It handles 25,000 to 30,000 lifts per year.
• CP’s Oak Island Terminal is located adjacent to the Oak Island Yard, the prin-
cipal classification rail yard in northern New Jersey.10 The terminal currently
handles about 800 lifts weekly and deals exclusively with Canada-bound
freight. The terminal connects to the NS Lehigh Line and from there to the
national rail network.
• There are two rail yards in Greenville, New Jersey, which collectively comprise
what used to be (and is referred to elsewhere in this report as) the Greenville
Yard. One is a support yard for the large Tropicana warehouse and other
nearby freight rail users. This is a Conrail yard. A second and smaller yard in
Greenville is operated by the New York Cross-Harbor Railroad (NYCH) and
serves as a supplementary yard for the traffic coming from and going to
Brooklyn by way of marine transfer. It includes a float bridge.
2.3 Freight rail to the East: underused, isolated, and outdated
The East-of-Hudson subregion has an extensive, highly utilized rail passenger net-
work. Yet rail moved only 1.68 percent of the total freight tonnage in 2000, or about
5.30 million tons, a rate ten times lower than the national average. This section
examines the East-of-Hudson rail system in detail—its connection to the national
network, its major corridors and rail lines, its passenger and freight operators, its rail
yards and intermodal terminals, and its vertical clearances and weight restrictions—
with an eye to discovering why the subregion ships so little freight by rail.
CONNECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL NETWORK
Currently two routes are commonly used to move rail cars between the national
rail network and the East-of-Hudson subregion.
1. The main on-track overland rail connection to the Midwest, West, and South is
via the CSX Selkirk Yard. Selkirk is 140 miles north of New York City. It is not
a major impediment to freight moving to the Midwest and West but is a formi-
dable service and costly detour for moving freight to the Middle Atlantic and
Southeast by rail (see Figure 2-1, page 24). Although this is a circuitous 48-
hour, 280-mile route, it is often employed for long-haul shipments and is exten-
sively used by CSX and CP. Rail cars going to eastern Canada and New
England can go either by way of Selkirk or the former New Haven Line. A
large, 1,250-acre and 128-track, highly utilized rail yard, Selkirk has the capac-
ity to handle a total of 8,500 rail cars at one time.11
2. The second option for moving freight to the East-of-Hudson subregions is via
rail marine, a traditional method in New York Harbor. Currently, only one
operation exists, which is operated by the New York Cross-Harbor Railroad
(NYCH) between Bay Ridge in Brooklyn and Greenville, New Jersey. In south
Brooklyn, rail marine transfer consists of moving rail cars from track on land to
track built onto a barge and then moving the barge over water. NYCH makes
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the transfer at Greenville using a traditional float bridge and, in Brooklyn, a
pontoon. The NYCH’s fleet has two 340-foot float barges and two 290-foot
float barges, two float bridges, and three locomotives. This service is limited to
carload traffic. In 2003, the volume of Cross-Harbor’s general freight was close
to an all-time high of 1,600 cars.
The Hudson Line connects the East-of-Hudson metropolitan area to the Hud-
son River crossing at Selkirk and the rest of the national rail network. It runs along
the east shore of the Hudson River. At the south end it is used extensively by Metro-
North for commuter service. Amtrak also operates intercity passenger service on this
line. At the south end of the line, in the Bronx near Highbridge, a newly constructed
all-freight track, the 1.8-mile-long Oak Point Link, connects the Hudson Line with
the former New Haven Line. Oak Point Yard (the primary classification and support
yard East-of-Hudson), Hunts Point Terminal, Harlem River Yard, and the freight
line across the Hell Gate Bridge to geographic Long Island connect to this line.
CSX and CP offer freight service over the full length of the Hudson Line,
from the Bronx to Fresh Pond. The Providence and Worcester Railroad (P&W)
uses the CSX freight line in the Bronx and Queens to connect with the New York
and Atlantic Railway (NYA).
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s (MTA’s) Long Island Rail Road
lines serve freight users on geographic Long Island (including Brooklyn and
Queens). Freight service is provided exclusively by the NYA, the railroad selected
by the MTA to conduct freight operations on those lines.
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FIGURE 2-1
The Selkirk detour
Rail connections to points north and east.
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The Bay Ridge Branch is a dedicated freight line in Brooklyn and Queens that
is owned by the LIRR. The NYA is the main operator on this line, through an
interchange with the NYCH at the Sixty-fifth Street yard. The Bay Ridge Line
extends from Sixty-fifth Street in Brooklyn to Fresh Pond in Queens with con-
nections to Long Island and via the Fremont Secondary Line and the Hell Gate
Bridge to points north. Fresh Pond, a junction of rail lines in Queens, is the nexus
for rail services on geographic Long Island. Lines connecting the Long Island rail
network to the national network extend from Fresh Pond north across the Hell
Gate Bridge. Most North American rail freight moves in cars classified plate C (15
feet, 6 inches) or plate B (15 feet, 1 inch), but an increasing number of cars are
being built 17 feet above the rail, or plate F. For the East-of-Hudson subregion,
plate F cars present an increasingly daunting challenge: On the one hand, the com-
modities transported East-of-Hudson on plate F cars are important commodities,
such as paper. On the other hand, unlike plate B or C cars, plate F cars cannot move
freely through the East-of-Hudson rail system.
In North America, a growing number of new freight railcars of all plate
dimensions are being constructed with trucks (or wheels) that allow 286,000
pounds gross weight on rail (GWOR). The lines East-of-Hudson are gradually
being upgraded to handle 286,000 pounds GWOR, but the upgrading must be
accelerated in order for the East-of-Hudson subregion even to maintain (let alone
improve on) its current level of competitiveness.
SHARED USE OF PASSENGER RAIL
The New York metropolitan region has the most extensive and heavily traveled com-
muter rail systems in North America.12 In general, the passenger and freight rail lines
West-of-Hudson are separately owned and managed, although some are shared. East-
of-Hudson, however, other than the Bay Ridge Line, most rail freight moves on track
that is publicly owned and used to move passengers.The agencies that own and oper-
ate the region’s rail lines provide extensive commuter and passenger services. Generally,
these agencies are subsidized by a mixture of federal, state, and local government funds.
Since the 1980s, virtually all the rail lines East-of-Hudson have been owned and
maintained by public agencies: the Long Island Railroad, Metro-North, and Amtrak.
The transfer of the subregion’s rail lines to public hands greatly changed the freight
rail landscape. On Long Island, the freight service was provided by the LIRR until the
system was privatized and the NYA started operating in 1997. In the Bronx, West-
chester, and points north, freight services were always provided by private railroads.
East of the Hudson, public agencies invested heavily in improvements to and
expansions of the passenger network but did little to keep the subregion’s rail freight
infrastructure up-to-date. This is understandable, for public transportation agencies
recognize that the enhancement and improvement of passenger operations should
be their primary focus and that the smooth operation of freight services is not. His-
torically, public agencies have not viewed freight service as within their mandate,
and therefore the system has suffered from disinvestment and underutilization. A
telling point is that even though much of the decline in freight traffic on the LIRR
may not be directly attributable to management, the privately owned NYA has been
able to reverse the long downward trend in Long Island rail freight traffic.
The LIRR is the country’s most heavily traveled commuter railroad, providing
service from geographic Long Island to Penn Station in New York City. It owns
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and maintains virtually all the rail lines in Long Island. With 68 locomotives, 187
coaches, and 933 EMUs,13 the LIRR carries 290,000 passengers on a typical week-
day, with a schedule of approximately 940 daily trains.14 The LIRR network spans
approximately 320 route miles, with 738 miles of track and 14 lines and branches.
The MTA Metro-North Railroad owns and maintains almost every rail line in
the Bronx, Westchester, Putnam, and Dutchess counties. The Metro-North main-
tains and provides service on all Connecticut rail lines, extending to New Canaan,
Danbury, Waterbury, and New Haven. The rail lines in Connecticut are owned by
the state. Metro-North was created in 1982 to replace Conrail, which provided
commuter rail operating and maintenance services to the MTA. Metro-North
operates and maintains 738 track miles on three main routes terminating at Grand
Central Terminal in Manhattan. On a typical weekday, the Metro-North operates
397 revenue passenger trains carrying 200,000 passengers.15
MAJOR RAIL FREIGHT YARDS AND INTERMODAL TERMINALS
Today, the East-of-Hudson subregion does not have the efficient and high-capac-
ity rail yards that the West-of-Hudson system has. Nevertheless, the region has a
number of yards, many of which can be upgraded (see Figure 2-2).
• Oak Point Yard is a 35-acre, highly utilized rail freight terminal in the South
Bronx, owned and operated by CSX. CSX and CP are the only carriers at
Oak Point.
• Fresh Pond Yard is a 10-acre rail freight yard in the Fresh Pond district of
Queens, owned by the LIRR and operated by the NYA.The main rail carriers at
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The freight rail network east of the Hudson River
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Fresh Pond are the NYA, CSX, CP, and P&W. All on-rail freight originating or
terminating in Brooklyn, Queens, or Long Island is delivered or received by the
NYA at Fresh Pond from the intercity carriers CSX, CP, and P&W. The NYA
is the sole freight carrier in Brooklyn, Queens, and Long Island.
• Harlem River Yard is a 28-acre facility in the South Bronx, owned by the
New York State Department of Transportation (DOT) and operated by Har-
lem River Yard Ventures, Inc. CSX and CP serve this yard, which consists of
an intermodal transfer facility and a large municipal waste transfer facility.
• Hunts Point Market is the largest food distribution center in North America,
providing 80 percent of New York City’s produce and 40 percent of the city’s
meat.16 The produce terminal is served by rail. The complex also includes a
major East-of-Hudson rail reload center that specializes in the distribution of
flour. EDC rehabilitated its rail infrastructure with $5 million in federal and
state funds.
• The Sixty-fifth Street Yard is a 25-acre yard owned by EDC and currently
leased to CP. CP trains are forwarded to the yard from Fresh Pond by the
NYA via the Bay Ridge Line. The facility contains 13 tracks, an intermodal
transfer area, a reload area, and two float bridges to accommodate cross-harbor
float operations (see Figure 5-1).
• In southwest Connecticut, CSX operates a reload center in the former Cedar Hill
rail yard near New Haven. The Cedar Hill yard, now underutilized, was once
used to distribute large amounts of freight throughout Connecticut. The P&W
recently opened a reload center in southwest Connecticut (see Figure 2-1).
2.4 Improvement issues
In order to run modern freight trains along New York’s tracks, the region must
improve its obsolete rail network. Most of the railroad infrastructure in the area,
especially in the East-of-Hudson subregion, was built in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, but since then the tracks, in many cases, have not been well
maintained or upgraded for freight rail use. In the past, freight cars were shorter
and lighter, so consequently bridges and other structures that limit the height and
weight of rail cars were constructed over tracks that the freight system shares with
commuter rail. In practice, this means that the East-of-Hudson has segments of
track that limit those types of freight traffic that are in the greatest demand.
Freight rail improvements must take into account modern-day elevation and
weight requirements for intermodal freight trains. Improving the tracks is a sensi-
ble option from a cost perspective,17 as better tracks will improve overall efficiency,
decrease costs, and render freight rail more convenient and competitive east of the
Hudson than it is today.
RESTRICTIONS ON INTERMODAL FREIGHT RAIL
Intermodal freight is a vital part of the national freight network.18 Today, much of
the container traffic is off-loaded from trains in eastern Pennsylvania and northern
New Jersey, mounted on tractor-trailer trucks, and driven across the Hudson
River. A more efficient system might accommodate intermodal train traffic east of
the Hudson. This subsection describes the basic features of trailer on flatcar
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(TOFC), container on flatcar (COFC), and double-stack intermodal freight trains
that use the West-of-Hudson system.
Intermodal trains move truck trailers and containers and carry many kinds of
finished consumer goods, refrigerated foods, scrap, and raw materials. Because
trailers and containers are able to move between modes, intermodal traffic is typi-
cally two way, in contrast to unit or mixed carload trains. Imported international
containers may move inland from a seaport, be unloaded, and then reloaded with
cargo, taking advantage of discounts offered by the railroads and container owners
for the “backhaul.”19 This has helped make containers the fastest-growing segment
of the maritime sector and thus crucial to the railroads.20
The two main components of an intermodal rail car are the container or trailer
and the supporting flatcar.
Containers/trailers. Intermodal containers usually are between 8 feet, 6 inches, to
9 feet, 9 inches, high and measure 20 to 53 feet long.21 International container
capacity is measured in 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs), with one 20-foot con-
tainer equaling one TEU, and one 40-foot container equaling two TEUs or one
40-foot equivalent unit (FEU). Most domestic containers range between 48 and
53 feet in length. The 40-foot containers are the standard in waterborne trans-
portation. In 2000, international and domestic containers accounted for 51 and
23 percent, respectively, of total intermodal traffic. Traditional truck trailers vary
from 28 to 53 feet in length and are typically 13 feet, 6 inches, in height; truck
trailers account for about a quarter of intermodal moves (26 percent).
Flatcars. The many different kinds of flat cars have varying lengths, widths, and
heights. The heights can range from 1 foot, 11 inches, to 4 feet, 8 inches, with
most flat cars standing two to three feet above the rail, although according to the
NS Intermodal Rules Circular, unrestricted rail transport is based on a worst-case
flatcar deck height of 50 inches.
Most truck-to-rail traffic uses one of the three following methods:
Container on flatcar (COFC). Containers are directly placed on a flatcar. The 90-
foot flatcars can accommodate up to four TEUs.
Trailer on flatcar (TOFC). Traditional truck trailers, or containers on a truck chas-
sis, are lowered onto flatcars, wheels and all. Standard flatcars can accommodate
no more than two containers or trailers, although some specially outfitted cars can
handle as many as five.
Double-stack. Two containers are stacked, one on top of the other, and placed on
special low-deck “well cars.” Well cars can carry from two to 10 containers,
depending on their length.22 Double-stacking containers is an attractive option for
shippers and clients because a train can move more than double the freight with
greater fuel efficiency and a relatively small crew.
Although they are not structurally similar to TOFC and COFC cars, auto car-
riers handle time-sensitive, high-value goods. Automobiles are moved on special
bi- or trilevel carriers, which have roughly the same overhead clearance as double-
stack cars. Other innovative intermodal options are discussed in chapter 4.
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As Table 2-1 shows, intermodal rail cars require certain minimal overhead
clearances.
In the real world, the height of TOFC and COFC rail cars varies with the
equipment. A special “bogie” well car that sits 16 inches off the ground makes the
total height of a TOFC car 15 feet, 0 inches.23 Obviously this kind of car can run on
any part of the regional network. But generally, rail car manufacturers and railroad
professionals believe clearances should be determined by each rail line. More than
just bridges influence the desired clearance for a particular line. Other factors are the
positioning of the overhead catenary (the electrical wire used to carry electricity to
trains), the configuration of the tunnels, and the width of the tracks.Therefore, while
a particular TOFC clearance may work on one line, it may not on another.
VERTICAL RAIL CLEARANCES AND WEIGHT LIMITS IN THE HUDSON REGION
One pressing problem for the improvement of the general freight rail lines
east of the Hudson is clearances. On some lines, bridges and pedestrian crossings
are simply too low for modern trains. Generally, clearance requirements are based
on the height of individual cars, the size of containers stacked on a car, and the ver-
tical space between the tracks and the car bottoms. The Association of American
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TABLE 2-1
Minimum height clearances for intermodal cars
COFC single-stack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 feet, 6 inches
TOFC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 feet, 6 inches
Double-stack COFC (international containers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 feet, 4 inches
Most multilevel auto carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 feet, 8 inches
Enclosed trilevel auto carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 feet, 2 inches
High cube double-stack (domestic containers)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 feet, 6 inches
Source: NYMTC Regional Freight Plan—Task 2, “Description of Freight Transportation System in the Region” (2001).
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Railroads (AAR) sets the standards for rail clearances. “Plate” designations refer to
the total vertical height of a rail car and are the standard system for estimating the
heights of the rail cars and determining the necessary clearances.
Virtually all the freight rail lines providing service in New Jersey have clear-
ances high enough for double-stack cars and cars that are 286,000 pounds gross-
weight-on-rail (GWOR) compliant.24 Thus, they can handle the heaviest freight
rail cars without height restrictions.
The East-of-Hudson subregion, however, lags behind the national standards
for clearances and weight limits. Currently, only the relatively low plate B and
plate C boxcars can move freely in the subregion. Height restrictions rule out the
use of popular, cheap, and efficient intermodal trains, which are heavy and tall.
Movements of plate F cars, those with the greatest height, are restricted to areas
outside the East-of-Hudson urban core. At the subregion’s south end, plate F cars
can move only between the float bridges and Brooklyn’s Sixty-fifth Street yard.25
At its north end, plate F cars can run only as far south as the Oak Point Yard.
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TABLE 2-2
AAR height designations for common freight cars
Plate B boxcar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 feet, 1 inch
Plate C boxcar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 feet, 6 inches
Plate E boxcar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 feet, 9’inches
Plate F boxcar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 feet, 0 inches
Plate H boxcar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 feet, 2 inches
Plate I (includes double-stack well cars) boxcar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 feet, 6 inches
National clearance standard (future electrification) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 feet, 0 inches
NOTE: The 23⁄4 inches above the top of the rail is the absolute minimum under any and all conditions of lading,
operation, and maintenance. The LIRR demands a 4 inches buffer above the car, whereas Metro-North needs
6 inches.
Source: The Official Railway Equipment Register, vol. 117, no. 4, April 2002.
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In addition, the subregion’s rail network cannot handle the new weight limits.
East-of-Hudson tracks meet the old standard of 263,000-pound GWOR, but
national railroads rely on new cars that can carry 286,000 pounds. Individual line
specifications for the subregion are as follows:
• Hudson Line. The Hudson Line currently allows limited TOFC service from
Selkirk through Tarrytown and along the Oak Point Link to the Harlem River
and Oak Point yards. As of February 2003, one track was able to accommodate
TOFC cars along this entire distance.26 Aside from that one track, the Hudson
Line does not have TOFC clearance between Tarrytown and the Oak Point
Link,27 although it is scheduled to obtain clearance by 2004 on a second track
through the Port Authority-New York DOT rail freight initiative (see section
2.5). The Hudson Line, in accordance with all Metro-North rail lines, is
cleared for 286,000-pound GWOR cars.
• LIRR Main Line track (including the Bay Ridge Branch). At present, there is no
TOFC clearance in Brooklyn, Queens, and Long Island, except for a very lim-
ited piece of track. Furthermore, 286,000-pound GWOR cars are not allowed
on LIRR track, except for the recently cleared Lower Montauk Branch and
the portion of track between Maspeth and Fresh Pond.
• Fremont-Hell Gate. There is no TOFC or 286,000-pound GWOR clearance
in this corridor. The Hell Gate Bridge is a particularly important part of the
network, which has not yet been cleared for 286,000-pound cars; CSX and
Amtrak are working to resolve that issue.
• New Haven Line. This line is cleared only for plate C cars, although its tracks
are rated for 286,000 pounds.
2.5 Rail projects currently underway and in the planning stage
In order to make the region’s rail system more efficient, a number of repairs,
improvements, and investments are needed. Maintenance of the existing rights-
of-way, track expansion, rail yard development, and removal of height and weight
limitations are key steps toward a more efficient freight system.
The New Jersey DOT, the New York DOT, Metro-North, the LIRR, and the
Port Authority all are currently undertaking projects to enhance the regional rail
freight system. Although all these projects are essential, none is large enough in
scope to change the region’s freight system dramatically. These public subsidies do,
however, signal a shift toward public-sector investment in freight rail.
JOINT NEW YORK DOT-PORT AUTHORITY INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT
This joint effort between the State Department of Transportation, the
Port Authority, and the railroad industry will upgrade critical rail
routes and facilities in the metropolitan region, in order to accommodate
the doubling of freight traffic we anticipate over the next two decades.
—NEW YORK GOVERNOR GEORGE PATAKI, SEPTEMBER 22, 2002
The New York DOT and the Port Authority are jointly sponsoring a $40.195 mil-
lion project to improve the regional rail freight network. New York State and the
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Port Authority view the program as a first step toward alleviating the region’s con-
gestion problem.
The recommended projects are increasing track and yard capacity in Brooklyn
and Queens; removing height and weight restrictions in Queens and the Bronx;
and improving the flow of freight along the Hudson River Line in Westchester
County, which today is the primary rail route for bringing freight into New York
City and Long Island.28
The state is contributing $15.195 million, and the Port Authority, $25 million.
The projects can be divided into four geographic components:
• $13.06 million ($6.5 million from the Port Authority) for clearance improve-
ments on the Hudson Line. Metro-North has already committed funding in
its 2000-2004 capital plan for the replacement of many station pedestrian
overpasses to facilitate rail operations.29 The funds allocated through the joint
state-Port Authority initiative will finance the incremental cost of improving
the vertical clearance to 23 feet, 0 inches, at the Metro-North Hastings Sta-
tion pedestrian overpasses, as well as undercutting the track at two limiting
structures at Dobbs Ferry. The initiative will also fund an additional power
station for Track 1 in order to facilitate routing of freight and passenger oper-
ations. All these improvements will permit a second TOFC route on the Hud-
son Line south of Tarrytown to the Oak Point Link. 30
• $7.4 million ($5.0 million from the Port Authority) for the Harlem River Yard,
Oak Point Yard, and Hunts Point Market. This program includes a new inter-
modal track and TOFC support tracks that are meant to help the CSX TOFC
and CP Expressway intermodal trains as well as the waste management sidings
at Harlem River Yard. The plan also includes upgrading tracks and switches to
accommodate plate F and 286,000-pound GWOR standards on at least two
tracks at Oak Point Yard and the route leading to Hunts Point Market.31
• $11.8 million ($7.8 million from the Port Authority) for Queens. This will
fund the extension of the second track northward to provide interchanges and
passing siding to increase capacity and reduce delays between the Oak Point
and Fresh Pond yards. Money has been allocated for the upgrade of existing
rail yard facilities used by the NYA at Blissville and Maspeth. The funding
necessary to re-rate the Hell Gate Bridge to 286,000-pound GWOR stan-
dards has been budgeted and will be taken out of the remaining balance.
• $7.935 million ($5.7 million from the Port Authority) for the Brooklyn Bay
Ridge Branch and part of the Bushwick Branch. These funds will be used to
make track and safety improvements on the Bay Ridge and Bushwick
branches. In addition, the Fresh Pond Yard will be improved, including the
relocation of the NYA engine house, more security fencing, and the restora-
tion of an interchange track to facilitate rail car transfers. Finally, the project
will perform engineering analyses to upgrade the Bay Ridge Line into a 17-
foot 9-inch-, 286,000-pound-compliant piece of track.32
NEW JERSEY’S $80 MILLION FREIGHT RAIL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
In 2003, New Jersey Governor James McGreevey announced an $80 million pack-
age to improve freight rail access to the Meadowlands and Port Newark/Elizabeth.
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The package includes a joint initiative with NS, CSX, and Conrail to increase the
rail capacity of the Port Newark/Elizabeth marine terminal. The state’s $25 million
will be matched with an equal investment from the railroads. An additional $30
million of state money will go toward eliminating a grade crossing (where a road-
way crosses a railroad) at Croxton Yard, by building a road bridge over the yard.
The state has also agreed on a $50 million plan in conjunction with the Port
Authority to
• Add a second mainline track on the Chemical Coast Line serving the port
complex to relieve congestion and improve efficiency.
• Provide a second track near Conrail’s Oak Island Yard to improve train move-
ments and eliminate delays.
• Provide a second main line track on the Lehigh Valley Line between Bound
Brook and Clark to allow trains to move in both directions simultaneously,
eliminating the need to idle on sidings.
• Acquire additional property in Oak Island to accommodate additional capacity
and eliminate the “mountain” of stored containers that has grown over the years.33
OTHER ONGOING PROJECTS
Staten Island Railroad reactivation. In 1994 EDC purchased from CSX 10 miles of
freight rail right-of-way known as the Travis Branch and the Arlington Yard, a 50-
acre terminal in northern Staten Island. By the end of 2004, EDC plans to restore rail
service between the northern-bound Chemical Coast Line in New Jersey and Staten
Island. EDC also will improve Arlington Yard and build an extension of the Travis
Branch to connect to the new Fresh Kills waste transfer station. Bridge replace-
ments along the Travis Branch are being considered as well. The rail line will con-
nect to the Visy paper plant and will be able to handle some municipal solid waste.
Hudson Line Platform and Station Improvement Project. In January 1999, Metro-
North started this project to repair 17 stations on the Hudson Line, from Morris
Heights in the Bronx through Ossining in Westchester County. Because Metro-
North is obligated to allow plate F cars to run on the Hudson Line, the recon-
struction efforts will take that into account. The New York DOT will provide
funding to raise the height of three structures that are lower than 17 feet, 9 inches,
the clearance that Metro-North requires for TOFC. Phase I of the project, the
rehabilitation of structures from Morris Heights through Greystone, began in the
fall of 2001 and will be completed in the fall of 2004.
Hell Gate Bridge Rehabilitation Project. The purpose of this project is to enable the
Hell Gate Bridge to accommodate 286,000-pound rail cars. Amtrak owns the
bridge, and CSX has trackage rights over it. Engineering personnel of the two rail-
roads are reviewing the requirements and costs of enabling full 286,000-pound
service over the bridge. The improvements will be financed by the New York
DOT-Port Authority rail freight package.
LIRR Third-Track Project. The purpose of this project is to build a third track on
the LIRR Main Line between Hicksville and Jamaica, a well-known traffic bottle-
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neck for passenger operations. Although the primary purpose of this investment is
to help increase the number of rush-hour trains to Manhattan and improve intra-
island and reverse-commute operations, it will also facilitate freight rail operations.
The project’s proposed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was included in
the 2000–2004 MTA capital program.
New York DOT Downstate Rail Clearance Program. This project will provide a
comprehensive inventory of all structures and their vertical clearances throughout
downstate New York. DOT staff members have been collaborating with the LIRR
and Metro-North on this very important task.
CURRENT STUDIES
Hudson Railroad Corridor Transportation Plan. The purpose of this study is to provide
a comprehensive analysis of train operations and infrastructure needs for the East-of-
Hudson Line rail corridor.34 This project will benefit the Metro-North, Amtrak),
New York DOT, CSX, and CP. The study will analyze the following rail routes East-
of-Hudson: Schenectady to New York City, Selkirk to Stuyvesant (i.e., CSX Selkirk
Branch), and Highbridge Yard to Harlem River Yard (i.e., the Oak Point Link).
This project is supposed to produce a railroad corridor transportation plan
with recommended infrastructure capital improvement programs for the near term
(2007) and the long term (2022). It will include operational service plans to extend
passenger and freight train movements, to raise schedule reliability, to increase
speeds, to reduce lengths of trips, and to improve operating efficiencies.
Work on the project began in August 2002 and was to be completed by the
third quarter of 2003.. It is slightly behind schedule, as the data collection is taking
a little longer than expected. Metro-North is the contracting agency.
LIRR Clearance Study. The LIRR is conducting a clearance study of the Bay Ridge
Branch and other rail lines in geographic Long Island. According to LIRR offi-
cials, the Bay Ridge and Montauk West portions of the network have almost been
completely surveyed.
LIRR Bridge (Weight) Study. NYMTC and the MTA will determine whether certain
sensitive structures on the LIRR track are capable of handling 286,000-pound
GWOR trains. At least 18 undergrade crossings need to be examined. LIRR officials
have indicated that a consultant has been selected and that the project is under way.
Pilgrim State Intermodal Facility Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). New York
DOT is contemplating the development of a rail transload and TOFC/COFC
terminal on state land near Deer Park Station on the LIRR Main Line. An EIS
has been commissioned for this purpose. A consultant has been hired, and the EIS
is due at the end of 2004.
Port Authority East of Hudson Infrastructure Improvement Program. This project is
examining medium-term improvements to and investments in the rail system, and
it will address the need to find customers to ship by rail. In effect, this study’s main
goal is to sort and analyze existing EDC data in order to use the current freight rail
system most efficiently.
PART A
35
Cross-Harbor Freight Movement EIS. The New York City EDC is examining and
analyzing a variety of alternatives to optimize rail freight transport in the region,
including the construction of a cross-harbor rail freight tunnel.
2.6 Conclusion
The freight rail system west of the Hudson River is reasonably well integrated into
the national freight rail system. It has an extensive system of rail yards, adequate
clearances, and dedicated freight rail routes. The system east of the river, however,
is not as well connected to the national rail network. Particularly in downstate
New York, it suffers from clearance and track weight limits, deficiencies in yard
space and intermodal facilities, problems inherent in the widely shared use of
track, and no direct efficient connection across the Hudson River in the metropol-
itan region. All these problems make freight rail unattractive to many shippers
doing business in the subregion. In many places in the subregion, railroads do not
have the clearance required to take full advantage of economies of scale.
Several projects to improve the regional rail system have been launched.
The New York DOT and Port Authority are improving the infrastructure on
several lines in order to accommodate heavier loads, and the state of New Jersey
is expanding its rail system to reduce delays. Other, smaller projects are at-
tempting to increase the weight-bearing capacity and efficiency of the regional
rail system. Several studies are being conducted to determine possibilities for
new rail yards, greater clearance, and general increases in rail efficiency. While
these efforts are promising, they will not achieve revitalization of the regional
freight rail system.
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Given the dire states of both the trucking and rail networks in the Hudson region,
it is crucial to ask which sorts of improvements, and in what proportions (rail ver-
sus trucking), would best meet the current and future freight needs of the region.
Should investments in freight transport be principally in roadway capacity or in a
combination of rail and water transport improvements, and should investments in
highways to remove bottlenecks be limited? In order to compare investments in
highway and freight rail capacity, we need a framework with criteria for measuring
the costs, benefits, and impacts.
Any transportation investment should be good for the economy, the environ-
ment, and people’s quality of life. This report compares investments in highways and
freight rail to improve freight mobility options by using the following six criteria:
1. Which investment best reduces congestion on the region’s roadways?
2. Does the investment have minimal land-use impacts? How does it change the
quality of life of the surrounding communities and ecosystems?
3. Which investment leads to the biggest gains in air quality and the reduction of
fossil-fuel consumption?
4. Which project does the most to strengthen the economy and provide jobs?
5. How expensive is the proposal? What are the operating and capital expenses?
6. Will the project improve security in downstate New York and the greater met-
ropolitan area?
We suggest these criteria as a basis for comparing the merits of truck and rail
improvements as the two main alternatives for increasing freight mobility and
improving freight service in the Hudson region.
3.1 The potential for a capacity investment to reduce congestion
Nationwide, roadway congestion is heavily impeding mobility. A recent U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office report states that “congestion is generally growing for pas-
senger and freight travel and will continue to increase at localized bottlenecks
(places where the capacity of the transportation system is most limited), at peak
travel times, and on all surface and maritime transportation modes to some
extent.”1 Capacity is most limited in regions with heavily urbanized areas, like the
Hudson region.
Recent studies by the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council
(NYMTC) and the New York City Economic Development Corporation (EDC)
predict that, if no action is taken, the movement of freight will dramatically
increase, along with an equally dramatic increase in the number of truck vehicle
miles traveled (VMT) and the number of trucks on the road. Nevertheless, a large
investment in highway capacity cannot easily be restricted to truck use. Typically, in
the New York metropolitan region and in every other metropolitan region, adding
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more highway lanes and building new roads actually lead to more car trips and
more VMT. Paradoxically, more asphalt can result in less free space on our roads.
Without a well-formulated pricing system to deter potential new highway users,
it is difficult to see how a greater highway capacity would help truck mobility.
Transportation planners often fail to take into account the impact of added capacity
on housing and business decisions. Instead, they tend to assume that car and truck
VMT is independent of capacity, an assumption refuted by the experience of
added highway capacity typically filling rapidly and congestion quickly returning.
An expanded and improved freight rail network may not have the same sec-
ondary effects on induced travel and decentralized land-use decisions. Although a
shift from trucking to freight rail may free up highway capacity, it may not encour-
age travel as much as highly visible highway improvements could.
3.2 The comparative impacts of highway and freight rail
investments in adjacent land and communities
The expanding roadways in the New York metropolitan region are squeezing land
resources and adjacent communities. By some measures, the region is the most
densely populated in the country, with concentrated office, retail, and business cen-
ters, and it usually is impossible to expand highways without encroaching on land
that has other uses. Increasingly, community opposition thwarts highway projects,
and for understandable reasons. Many local residents strongly opposed the expansion
of the LIE in Queens and in some portions of Nassau County, and they have compli-
cated efforts by the New York Department of Transportation (DOT) to expand the
Staten Island Expressway. While transportation planners may think on paper about
expanding roadway capacity, community or environmental organizations—rightly
concerned about community and environmental impacts—can impede these plans.
Expanding freight rail or waterborne freight capacity may not have similar im-
pacts on adjacent land use and communities. The region does not need to evict resi-
dents and tear down miles of businesses to lay tracks; most existing freight rail lines,
like the Bay Ridge Branch in Brooklyn, can easily accommodate more freight rail
transport. Many rail lines in the region have land in their rights-of-way for more
trackage that will not encroach on adjacent land. Expanding freight rail yard
capacity may have undesirable impacts on adjacent communities or businesses.
Raising clearances and increasing the strength of track to accommodate heavier
freight rail cars have no impact whatsoever on adjacent land use and communities.
Nevertheless, local noise and air pollution from the greater number of trains can
extend beyond the rail right-of-way, just as vehicular traffic noise typically saturates
the surrounding area. Communities are aware of this, and they often express con-
cerns about rail system changes that affect their neighborhoods, just as communi-
ties located next to major roadways do. Noise barriers and, eventually, the noise
reduction technologies discussed in chapter 4, could reduce these concerns.
3.3 Comparative impacts of highway and freight rail investments
in air quality and fossil-fuel energy consumption
What are the likely effects of comparative investments in highway versus freight rail
for air pollutant emissions and fossil-based energy use? Freight rail is significantly
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more energy efficient and cleaner per ton-mile than trucks are and will be so for
the foreseeable future.2 If we assume that freight rail engines are used efficiently,
several studies suggest that freight rail has decided advantages over truck use in
regard to the emission of fine particulates and nitrogen oxides, as well as energy
consumption per ton-mile of goods moved. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) data suggest that per ton-mile, trucks emit three times more nitrogen
oxides and particulate matter of than a locomotive does.3 Compared to their share
of ton-miles of freight hauled nationally, it appears trucks are responsible for a dis-
proportionately large share of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the trans-
portation sector (see Figure 3-1).
One recent study of fuel economies found that railroads are a little more than
three times as fuel efficient as diesel trucks are, with an efficiency of 455 ton-miles
per gallon, compared with diesel trucks’ 105 ton-miles per gallon.4 Furthermore,
according to the U.S. Department of Energy, trucks expend 3,200 BTUs of energy
per ton-mile, compared with a locomotive’s average of 352, making trains almost
10 times as energy efficient.5
Improved truck engine technology and cleaner truck fuels can alter this equa-
tion, as reflected in EPA’s recently affirmed truck engine emission and fuels rule
that will take effect in 2006–2007.6 Although under this rule all trucks will be
required to use low-sulfur diesel fuel, the new emission control standards cur-
rently apply only to new trucks. For the foreseeable future, freight trains should
be considered cleaner and more efficient than tractor-trailer trucks on a per-ton-
mile basis. One of the main issues for both truck and rail improvements is that
regional air quality benefits are generally achieved at the expense of some local
increases in air pollution near intermodal facilities, depending on the particular
engine technologies, fuels, and emissions standards. If residential communities
are right next to such facilities, they are much more likely to notice the impact on
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FIGURE 3-1
National transportation sector CO2 emissions and ton-miles of freight hauled, 2001
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics
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their local air quality than regional residents are to notice the benefits to their
regional air.
3.4 Comparative development impacts of investments in highway
and rail
Economic development is a primary consideration when evaluating a major trans-
portation project. Given the very high cost of highway and rail transport invest-
ments, it is understandable to want to know what the region will get in return for
its investment. Engineering and consulting firms use a variety of models to assess
a specific project’s overall effect on a region’s economy.
It is very difficult to isolate the benefits of a particular freight transportation
project, particularly when one includes external economic benefits as well as those
not directly realized by the market, like reduced transportation costs because of the
increased connectivity of the freight network.7 On a quantitative level, economic
development estimates may be based on regional freight transport costs and fuel
efficiency, freight reliability, international trade volume, freight facility productiv-
ity, and many other factors.8 All of these affect a region’s employment rates, per-
sonal income levels, and corresponding standard of living. Overdependence on
trucking, high shipping costs, high levels of congestion on critical freight corri-
dors, and high warehousing costs all can hinder economic development in the
East-of-Hudson subregion.9 Any major transportation project would have to
account, in some way, for its effects on shipping, warehousing, and congestion
costs, which most large studies do not.
A comprehensive rail transportation project may alter shipping costs, fuel
efficiency, freight reliability, international trade volume, and freight facility
productivity. The reliable and cheap movement of goods translates into greater
levels of employment, personal income, spending power, and economic growth.
Nevertheless, the dearth of owned and available yard space in the East-of-Hudson
subregion has made it impossible for freight rail to reach many important dis-
tribution centers to which shippers would move their products by rail if they
had such access. In many areas of the regional rail network, track on both land
and bridges (as well as dispatching and clearance, which will be discussed later)
must be improved for rail to be able to carry certain types of freight effectively
and efficiently.
In an effort to reach beyond merely stating the truism that every potential
infrastructure investment is unique and that its development impact will depend in
large part on other improvements, we offer the following comparative measures.
Recent estimates by the American Trucking Associations (ATA) and the Associa-
tion of American Railroads (AAR) indicate that it costs 2.7 cents per ton-mile to
ship by rail, compared with 5 cents per ton-mile by truck. Based on data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Department
of Transportation estimates that labor productivity as measured by either output
per hour worked or per employee grew by about 30 percent for trucking and
95 percent for railroads between 1987 and 2000.10
These data suggest that freight rail is becoming overall a more efficient means of
transportation, reducing costs for shippers and end users. However, because freight
rail offers generally higher productivity per employee, investments in rail infrastructure
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may reduce employment in the transportation sector even while they reduce costs,
in other sectors. These reduced costs could lead to increases in income and employ-
ment in those sectors.
3.5 Comparative total capital and maintenance costs of highway
and freight rail investments
It is nearly impossible to compare the capital and operating costs of rail with those
of highways. Freight rail lines are dedicated to transporting goods, whereas high-
ways are designed for both passenger vehicles and trucks. It is also difficult to
divide highway capital and maintenance costs between trucks, on the one hand,
and cars, on the other. Who will bear these costs and in what proportions are still
more difficult to determine: the traditional methods of financing freight rail and
highway capital and operating costs are very different, as chapter 7 explains in
detail. In addressing any regional mobility problem, benefit-cost ratios of alterna-
tives must be determined using appropriate economic forecasting based on com-
modity flows and consumer and shipper demand for various modes. This kind of
evaluation is beyond the scope of this report.
3.6 Security and transportation-option diversification
It may be advantageous to have a modally more diverse system of freight transport
in the Hudson region—and certainly the East-of-Hudson subregion—than what
we have today, and freight rail could provide a meaningful alternative to the subre-
gion’s near-total dependence on truck transport. That is, if the use of one of the
major current Hudson River crossing were precluded, this diversity might allow
goods to continue to flow relatively uninterrupted and the economy to continue to
function. In general, the use of both road and rail would add travel options and
would mitigate the effects of such events.
3.7 Conclusion
Although transportation planning agencies and elected officials are willing to
consider spending hundreds of millions or billions of dollars to expand the region’s
highway and transit systems, they have not seriously considered investing compa-
rable sums to improve and expand freight rail capacity. Instead, the thinking for
recent and current freight rail projects is in terms of tens of millions of dollars, not
much larger sums. Indeed, a comparison of the benefits of investing large sums in
freight rail or highway capacity with a view to improving freight mobility based on
the preceding six criteria suggests that large investments in freight rail in the order
of hundreds of millions or billions of dollars deserve serious consideration.
The six criteria presented in this chapter will be our rough guide in evaluating
potential regional mobility improvements. Our focus will be on those dealing with
freight rail, since the criteria suggest that these may, on the whole, yield greater
benefits to regional freight mobility than roadway capacity improvements will.
However, if we are going to think about large investments in the region’s freight
rail system, we should know what the state-of-the-art freight rail technologies
look like and can do for the system’s convenience, speed, and reliability. This is the
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subject of chapter 4. We then need to look at the options for major improvements
in the freight rail system, particularly East-of-Hudson, with efficient trans-Hud-
son connections to the national freight system and adequate intermodal yard
capacity. This is the subject of chapter 5.
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Over the past two decades the American railroad industry has developed and
adopted new technologies that have made it more efficient and better able to
adjust to the changing industrial demographics. As a result, all trains move faster;
labor productivity is higher per ton-mile by almost 300 percent; and the rate
charged per ton-mile to move freight is about 30 percent less than it was in 1981.1
Today, new technologies are evolving that, when ready and integrated, will allow
the railroads to offer competitive short-haul services.
In order to realize the full benefits of the technological advances available now
and in the near future, railroads must modify their operations. In the United
States, nearly all rail freight transportation is provided by privately owned share-
holder companies, each of which falls into one of three broad categories: Class I,
regional (Class II), and short-line (Class III) railroads. In 2000, the six Class I rail-
roads generated 86 percent of the freight carloads and 94 percent of freight rail
revenue. While numbering in the hundreds, short-line railroads are, for the most
part, spin-off segments of track not wanted by the Class I carriers. Their fiscal sus-
tainability often depends on public funding. Regional railroads, which number no
more than a dozen and a half, generally serve self-contained markets.The Providence
and Worcester Railroad (P&W), which covers southern New England, and the
Wisconsin Central, which serves the north central plains region, are two examples
of this.The nature of their markets allows most regional carriers to be less dependent
on interchanges provided by Class I carriers than short lines are.
In the years immediately preceding the railroads’ deregulation, begun in 1980, the
number of Class I carriers dropped quickly because of mergers and other forms of
consolidation.2 As these large carriers consolidated, management was able to direct
traffic to selected core corridors, partially in response to the 1980 Staggers Act’s relax-
ation of restrictions on the abandonment of unprofitable lines.3 Concurrently, rail-
roads employed various operational optimization models to respond better to the
demand for freight rail services than they had previously.4 These models invariably
instructed the railroads to focus more on long, time-insensitive hauls on the core cor-
ridors, usually in heavy commodity markets in which the unreliability of rail deterred
shippers less and the economies of scale offered by adding cars to create long trains
could be fully realized. Following the models, the railroads greatly improved the effi-
ciency of their operations. The core corridors became the focus of a vast infrastruc-
tural and technological makeover to enhance efficiency, the success of which is
evidenced by the industry’s posting in 2000 the lowest cost per ton-mile ever attained.
These institutional changes have led to increases in the rate of return on capi-
tal investment in railroads.5 Although the rate of return remains below the cost of
capital, it continues to rise, often through capital expenditure cuts made in
response to shareholders’ dissatisfaction with the railroads’ tendency to shift effi-
ciency gains to customers rather than to the shareholders themselves.6
Nevertheless, these achievements have had a price, for even though the indus-
try is setting productivity and ton-mile records, rail’s share of the freight market
has declined, and whole geographic areas of service have been abandoned.7 Indeed,
relative to the growth in the economy, we could even say that the industry is
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underperforming. Economic growth has allowed the railroad industry to focus on
a small corner of the freight transportation market, namely, heavy goods and some
light intermodal goods carried over very long distances. Some long-term results of
these policies for the Hudson region are the absence of a reasonably truck-com-
petitive intermodal rail service (1) between the New York metropolitan area and
other metropolitan areas, such as Cleveland, Detroit, and Pittsburgh; and (2) along
the entire Northeast Corridor from Richmond, Virginia, to Portland, Maine.
As the railroads consolidate, they will continue to exploit their comparative
advantage in the long-haul movement of light intermodal freight through high-
density, high-production corridors. To prevent competition, deselected lines (i.e.,
those downgraded from main-line usage following the consolidation of assets)
have been, and will continue to be, abandoned, and intermodal transfer facilities
will often be established in locations on the outskirts of metropolitan areas.8
From these facilities, trucks will carry the loads the rest of the way. This practice
maximizes the benefits from longer hauls but leaves the railroads with few other
ways of sustaining themselves as they abandon the competing infrastructure and
tailor their line capacity and technology to the heavier and longer trains traveling
great distances. These trends, while to some degree applicable to all U.S. rail-
roads, have been felt particularly East-of-Hudson, where their reversal requires
changes in operations.
In sum, in order to maintain and increase market share, the railroads must
begin to serve markets that involve shorter hauls on stricter schedules and, in many
cases, with shorter trains. To do this in a way that satisfies both operational opti-
mization models and shareholders, they must adopt new technologies. This chap-
ter discusses the institutional changes required to advance this effort in the context
of the technological changes that will enable and, in some cases, accelerate it.
Section 4.1 considers faster service for all types of freight rail, and section 4.2
describes a few innovative intermodal technologies. The East-of-Hudson subre-
gion needs a more efficient and dependable way to move freight trains across the
Hudson, and to that end section 4.3 considers the potential of and requirements
for a modern railway barge system and modern loading float bridges. The technol-
ogy report concludes with sections 4.4 and 4.5, a discussion of improved tracks,
cleaner fuel-consuming locomotives, and better customer service.
4.1 Faster service
The average freight train may never be as fast as a truck, but the system can come
close. Electric braking, tight dispatching, more modern and fuel-efficient locomo-
tives, and well-maintained tracks and equipment can make regular freight rail ser-
vice better than it is now.
Intermodal service already is significantly faster than most freight trains and
some highway truck service, and could be improved even more by using the exist-
ing railroad infrastructure effectively, as well as alternative and parallel routes (sec-
tion 4.2 looks at improved intermodal service).
Just how slow is freight rail? Class I railroads move freight at an average speed of
about 25 miles per hour (see Table 4-1).9 This is not as slow as it sounds, since it
includes some idling time, but it is still much slower than the speed of trucks. Never-
theless, intermodal freight, which generally is time sensitive, moves about 30 to 40
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percent faster than this, demonstrating that slow service is not built into the system
but is to some degree a by-product of the operational trends just described.
In fact, intermodal trains are slowed by having to share track with longer,
slower-moving freight trains. Intermodal trains could run as fast as 70 mph, but in
order for them to do so, sidings and tracks would have to be added in some places,
and the operation of other freight trains would have to be changed. Some freight
trains in the Northeast already operate at or about 70 mph, and most of those do
not go faster for one or both of two reasons. The first pertains to the good being
transported. If their customers do not demand a scheduled delivery, the railroads
run the trains slower to reduce wear and tear and sometimes fuel consumption.
The second reason is precautionary: trains are run slower than 70 mph so that
faster speeds can be reserved for making up lost time.
Although many freight trains can go even faster than 70 mph, that threshold is
not at all arbitrary. Most freight track is classified either at Class 3 or Class 4 and,
when the track is used by high-speed passenger trains, Class 5.10 At Class 5, the
Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA’s) regulations do not permit freight trains
to go faster than 80 mph. Since time must be allotted for recovering from delays,
this effectively caps freight trains’ speed on Class 5 track at roughly 70 mph. When
an operator wants to run a freight train faster than 80 mph, the FRA requires that
the track be at Class 6 and that the train meet certain dynamic requirements.11 For
longer hauls, the railroads have little incentive to upgrade the track. The initiation
of shorter, scheduled trips at higher speeds would help them acquire market share
in many markets in which they are currently marginalized, but in some cases, the
track would have to be improved for rail to be competitive with trucking.
Operating trains at high speeds also requires that the right-of-way and the rail
cars be well maintained and that an advanced signaling system be in place. Of
course, railroads are enormously capital intensive, and many lack the capital to make
crucial improvements (see chapter 5 for a discussion of specific improvements and
chapter 7 for a brief description of the financial state of the freight rail industry).
New locomotives are capable of moving freight significantly faster than they do
now. While many such locomotives are designed for passenger service, freight rail
could use them if they were accompanied by other technological improvements.
Currently, a large part of the reliability problem with freight rail stems from its irreg-
ular velocity due to the trains’ frequent stops, some systematic and some sporadic.
New braking technology makes it possible for freight trains to stop in much
shorter distances—up to 70 percent shorter—than is currently the case in the Hudson
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TABLE 4-1
Average train speeds
Freight carrier All trains Intermodal trains
CSX Transportation 22.4 mph 29.9 mph
Norfolk Southern 23.3 mph 29.8 mph
Union Pacific Railway 25.3 mph 32.0 mph
Burlington Northern Santa Fe 25.4 mph 35.1 mph
Kansas City Southern Lines 27.0 mph 28.4 mph
Canadian Pacific Railway 27.5 mph 32.9 mph
Canadian National 28.1 mph 34.1 mph
Source: Railroad Performance Measures (www.railroadpm.org). All figures are third-quarter 2003 averages.
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region. By now all passenger cars in the United States
and Canada are equipped with electric braking systems,
but since the 1860s, freight trains have relied on air
brakes, a system of pressurized tubes that begins in the
locomotive. For particularly long freight trains, it can take
as long as two minutes for the air pulse to travel to the last
car, making stopping distances extraordinarily long.
Some freight trains have recently been fitted with electro-
dynamic braking, also called electronically controlled
pneumatic braking, or ECP. ECP systems synchronize
braking and have sophisticated self-diagnostic tools.
These systems reduce slack action, breakaways, and
derailments. Because freight trains with ECP have shorter stopping distances, it is
possible to run them closer together, interspersed between passenger trains at any
time of day when appropriate, permitting faster and more efficient shipping that
meets the regularity required for sharing tracks with passenger trains, compared
with freight trains with traditional air brakes.12
Another problem with dispatching freight trains is the system used to keep
trains a safe distance apart. Today, most freight trains are dispatched using a block
system: a train is assigned a block of track, regardless of length, and inside that
space it has freedom of movement. The River Line in New Jersey exemplifies the
underutilized capacity resulting from the fixed nature of the block system. A more
efficient system, using a global positioning system (GPS), would make it safe to
run trains comparatively close together, with automatic slowdowns and engine
cutoffs if the trains draw too close. Passenger trains already use this system, usually
called positive train control (PTS). Freight carriers could retrofit their fleets with
PTS technology, which would lead to safer train operation, better fuel efficiency,
and faster service.13 Even with ECP and PTS, long, 9,000-foot freight trains
would have difficulty sharing a track with passenger trains. Freight railroads could
therefore use shorter trains to take advantage of this more efficient service to
attract business from customers currently shipping by truck.
Trains equipped with high-speed capabilities mean little to customers unless
they arrive on time and provide dependable service. The relaxed dispatching of
freight trains makes this extremely difficult, however. Freight trains do not have
the regular schedule of passenger rail, operators are not penalized for late service;
and trains are not scheduled as closely as possible. Even so, relaxed dispatching has
become commonplace. Shipments sometimes arrive days later than planned,
undoubtedly discouraging prospective customers from using rail.
Dispatching is the responsibility of individual carriers. Disciplined dispatching
in accordance with a fixed operating plan is certainly a reasonable expectation. Com-
panies that move time-sensitive intermodal freight (just-in-time shipping) already
run tight schedules, although some people would argue that elapsed times are still
too long. Generally speaking, North American railroads have a good record for
moving dedicated intermodal trains fast and reliably. Some major intermodal
users, such as UPS, pay a premium for faster-than-normal intermodal train service.
The users of these special trains are given a money-back guarantee of on-time
departure and arrival. A good example of top-of-the-line train speed in the East is
the CSX Buffalo-to-Selkirk Corridor, where intermodal trains run up to 70 mph for
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substantial periods of time. Even though the extra
expense of moving freight at this speed is not always
economically efficient, the current system of dispatch-
ing is damaging freight rail’s long-term health.
Freight rail should be able to work closely with
passenger rail carriers. Penn Central once ran a late-
night mail and express train through Pennsylvania
Station, from New Haven to Philadelphia. It was a
train of considerable length, used COFC equipment,
and even had a caboose. The service was discontinued
when the Northeast Corridor (and the tunnels
between Washington, D.C., New York, and Boston),
on which it ran, was sold to Amtrak. In recent years Amtrak has opposed efforts to
allow the operation of intermodal trains through New York’s tunnels and Pennsyl-
vania Station.14 Yet the service exemplifies the benefits attainable with the close
cooperation of freight and passenger rail. Tighter scheduling and faster service are
technologically feasible when freight and passenger managements are willing and
public or private sources are available to finance the necessary technological and
infrastructure improvements.
ADVANCES IN EUROPEAN SERVICE
Over the past 30 years, the amount of freight moved by rail in Europe has declined
sharply. Compared with freight rail in North America, the European system is
balkanized and expensive but exceptionally well maintained. Rail moves only 8.4
percent of goods in Europe, about half the American average, and service is gener-
ally poor.15 In Europe, freight trains move at an average of 12 mph. As one Euro-
pean Union (E.U.) report points out, this is about the speed of an icebreaker in the
Baltic Sea cutting a path during the chilliest part of winter. Most of Europe looks,
with some chagrin, to the superior freight rail system in North America.
Nevertheless, in recent years Europe—particularly France, Italy, Switzerland,
Austria, and Germany—has tried to move more freight by rail. The European
Commission is in the process of finalizing a five-point plan to improve rail freight
service.16 With this project, the E.U. envisions a 70 percent increase in freight rail
tonnage by 2020, doubling rail’s share of the freight market.17 Partly as a result, the
continent has become a crucible of freight rail modernization in infrastructure,
technology, and operational strategies.
Why the sudden emphasis on freight rail? Like the American Northeast,
much of Europe is densely populated, and roadways have become overwhelmed by
truck traffic. For both environmental and economic reasons, the E.U. seeks a more
diverse freight transportation system. Moreover, particularly in the Alps, govern-
ments and residents have looked to freight rail for safety and environmental rea-
sons. Although noisy roadways and exhaust fumes have, in the views of many,
marred the mountains, safety has become the primary impetus to shift truck traf-
fic to trains.
In part, advances have been forced by a number of catastrophes that closed
various routes to commerce for lengthy periods of time. Through the 1990s,
Europe suffered a series of horrific disasters in Alpine highway tunnels resulting
in dozens of fatalities, many of them involving tractor-trailer trucks carrying
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freight. Probably the worst was the 1999 Mont Blanc tunnel disaster, in which a
truck carrying margarine and flour caught fire. The ensuing conflagration took
three days to put out and killed 39 people. But this was hardly the only, or the
last, incident. In the fall of 2001, a head-on tractor-trailer collision in Switzer-
land’s Gotthard Tunnel sparked another fire that left 10 people dead. Likewise, in
North America the safety record of trucks pales next to that of trains.18 With
these kinds of disasters in mind and wary of the human cost of moving trucks
through the Alps, European governments redoubled their efforts to move freight
by rail.
Ironically, before the Gotthard disaster, Switzerland’s constitution had been
amended by a popular referendum to require that all trans-Alpine traffic be moved
by rail.19 A second article stipulated that the transition to freight rail must be com-
pleted within 10 years, and it imposed a tariff to fund the project.20
Italy, France, Switzerland, Austria, and Germany are collaborating to build a
network of tunnels, including the 71.7-kilometer Lyon-Turin Ferroviare, which
will accommodate both passenger and freight operations. In order to integrate
high-speed passenger service with freight rail, Alpine freight carriers have been
forced to make two major changes. First, they have built modified TOFC cars that
can run tractor-trailer trucks through low-clearance passenger rail tunnels and
within the clearance profile envelope under the catenary system. Second, they have
been forced to dispatch freight trains with extreme efficiency to accommodate the
fixed schedules of passenger service.
Freight train dispatching in the Alps is, by necessity, timely and efficient. In
part, the freight companies have been forced to comply with passenger carriers,
which must have reliable, regular service, and with truck drivers, who need prompt
intermodal connections. To cross the Alps, railroads have instituted special truck
trains. A truck driver is able to drive his vehicle onto the bed of a flatcar, park it,
walk away, and board the passenger car provided for drivers on the same train
from, say, Lyon to Turin. In Turin the driver walks up to the intermodal car hold-
ing his truck and drives away. Trains leave the loading area at regular time intervals
(e.g., at 20 minutes past, 40 minutes past, and on the hour), and drivers expect
their truck trains to arrive promptly at the other end of the tunnel. On long-dis-
tance overnight service, second-class sleeping cars are provided for the drivers,
enabling them to get a night’s sleep as good as or better than they would get in the
cab of a truck.
Since dispatching must accommodate passenger traffic, freight trains are often
given specific mileposts they must meet by certain times or else face penalties. In
return, freight trains are allowed to run at speeds close to that of passenger trains.
In some parts of Alpine Europe, it is common to see an 18-car passenger train fly
past and, on its heels, a 100-car, three-locomotive freight train moving at 60 mph.
This would be an astounding sight in America, but it should not be.
While by no means a comprehensive list, the following routes accommodate
high-speed freight service in Alpine Europe, on parts or all of the lines:
1. The Austrian railways cargo network (ÖBB) between Vienna and destinations
west and south through the Alps.
2. Over the Brenner Pass between Austria and Italy, passing through Innsbruck
and Bolzano and into northeast Italy.
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3. From Milan north into Switzerland through the Gotthard Tunnel to Zurich
and then Germany and Austria, and through the Simplon Tunnel to Brig,
Geneva, and beyond to France. Both tunnels are double-tracked.
4. In Switzerland, on the Bern Lötchberg Simplon (BLS) Railway’s main line
between Brig, Bern, and Basel, and then on into France and Germany.
There is no reason why the New York area, plagued by the same truck-related
congestion problems, cannot operate freight as quickly and efficiently. The biggest
investment, as the Europeans have demonstrated, is in dispatching discipline,
equipment technology, and operational philosophy.
4.2 Advanced intermodal transport
Today, coal accounts for 44 percent of rail freight tonnage in the United States,21
although intermodal traffic is rapidly becoming the primary growth market in rail
freight and holds the most promise for expanding traffic in the future. Over the
past 10 years, intermodal traffic has been the fastest-growing segment of the
industry and now accounts for about a fifth of freight rail’s revenue.22
The United States has two popular methods of intermodal transport, TOFC
and COFC (see section 2.3 for a more detailed description of traditional inter-
modal services). But planners should be aware that there are innovative alternatives
to traditional intermodal service that, together with an improved rail infrastructure
would provide relief for the region’s troubled transportation network.
SAVING TIME WITH SHORTER HAULS AND INTERMODAL SERVICE
The railroads’ share of goods that must be transported more than 1,000 miles is
respectable, but their share below 1,000 miles is not. As a result, the modal distri-
bution of freight for short and intermediate distances is lopsided and overly
dependent on trucks. For rail, becoming a competitive alternative to trucks for
PART B
A BLS freight train
travels through the
Austrian Alps near the
Lötschberg Tunnel.
B
LS
 L
Ö
TS
C
H
B
ER
G
B
AH
N
51
shorter distances will require not only some expansion of line capacity (discussed
further in chapter 5) but also the application and use of available and developing
technologies. These changes will require an increase in the number of trains offer-
ing service directly between important trading partners. As mentioned earlier,
New York and Cleveland lack a competitive alternative to truck service for trans-
porting freight.
The railroads will also need to institute more frequent services. Some trading
partners are very large and have many different freight transportation needs. To
serve these needs, it often is best to run shorter trains more frequently in order to
accommodate various schedules and loads. This, as well as direct service to smaller
markets, will demand flexibility from the railroads that can be accommodated best
(and, in some cases, only) by faster speeds. Shorter trains do cost more to operate
per ton-mile because of fixed labor costs, but these costs can be partially offset by
the development of low-cost locomotives and other equipment. Europe and
Canada are experimenting with a new kind of short-haul intermodal service—
sometimes for distances as short as 200 miles—that should attract both rail carriers
and truckers in the United States.23
To the north, the intermediate-haul Montreal-Toronto-Detroit run (about
560 miles) makes money for the Canadian Pacific (CP) and Canadian National
(CN) railroads. CP recently inaugurated an “Expressway” service, similar to its
Iron Highway service. Trucks are driven onto specialized railcar flatbeds and then
moved by rail to their terminal destination. CP offers twice-daily service between
Montreal, Toronto, Windsor, and, beginning this year, Detroit. According to a
company press release, the Expressway service has been fully booked for “almost
every trip” over the last year. The service has recently added Ford Motor Company
to its list of clients and is expanding.24 Competing along the Toronto-to-Montreal
route is Canadian National’s RoadRailer service, in which reinforced truck trailers
are placed on rail wheels, without removing the truck from its chassis, and pulled
by a locomotive.
In the Alps, geography has spurred a similar kind of innovation. For truckers,
the Alps are a massive barrier, one that is unluckily located right in the center of
the continent. It is almost as if the Himalayas were placed between New York and
Washington; trucks on the I-95 corridor would move slowly if they had to navi-
gate sharp switchbacks and narrow tunnels in Delaware and New Jersey. Actually,
trucks in the region face a Mont Blanc of their own: the George Washington
Bridge and the New York metropolitan area’s traffic. What if they could avoid the
congestion on the Hudson River while still delivering the door-to-door service
associated with trucking? 
The northeastern United States could emulate France’s nationalized rail car-
rier, known as SNCF, and other European rail carriers. Truckers driving north
could drive their rigs onto specially outfitted trains at a southern point, in New
Jersey or as far south as Washington, D.C., or Virginia. The trucks would travel by
rail under the Hudson, and truckers would get back in them once they passed the
snarl of traffic in the metropolitan area—probably in New Haven, where there is
ample yard space to accommodate them, or in geographic Long Island or the
Bronx, if adequate intermodal yard space became available. With the proper struc-
ture and financing, the system could take trucks off the road, easing congestion,
creating jobs, and leaving cleaner, healthier air.
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It is unclear exactly where such service should be provided and how it should
be financed in order to encourage trucking companies to take advantage of it.
Although these questions are beyond the scope of this study and our expertise,
what does seem evident is that the concept merits close study, soon.
THE ALPS’ LOW-PROFILE, FAST-LOADING INTERMODAL CARS
The current intermodal rail system in the Northeast, and certainly east of the Hud-
son, is ill equipped to handle this kind of rapid-transition traffic. The first problem
is the slow speed of most American freight rail. But the previous section demon-
strated that swift and reliable freight train dispatching is possible, even at passenger
train speeds, if carriers have incentives to commit to it. A second obstacle is techni-
cal: putting truck containers into deep-well train cars is not unusually slow, but it is
not very fast, either, and the rail system’s clearance remains a problem.
The Alpine rail providers faced the same two obstacles. Many of the tunnels
and bridge clearances were too low for traditional TOFC service, and loading
trailers onto the back of railcars was prohibitively slow, requiring a crane or gantry.
They therefore designed a unique railcar system with a low clearance profile and a
quick-loading system, known as Modalohr.
Modalohr railcars have a rotating bed—it looks a bit like a Swiss Army knife—
so that multiple trucks can load simultaneously. When the bed swings out, the trac-
tor-trailer drives onto the railcar. In some models, the cab is unhitched, and it drives
onto a separate flatcar, which usually carries two truck cabs. Modalohr’s intermodal
car also has a flat floor, making it possible to load vehicles of almost any size with-
out the need for special equipment or the reinforcement of the trailers.
The Modalohr car also enjoys a low profile—a benefit of having wheels with a
very small diameter. Historically, trains have had large wheels because small
wheels present a formidable engineering challenge. The friction associated with
the movement of steel wheels over steel rails is good in that it makes trains much
more energy efficient than cars, since rubber does not grip asphalt as tightly as
steel does. But steel generates tremendous heat. As a result, train wheels usually are
designed to have a generous surface area in order to radiate the heat efficiently, as
well as to accommodate heavy loads, and so flatcars have an accordingly high pro-
file. Using a novel system of ball bearings, Modalohr and others have been able to
resolve the friction problem, and, by distributing the weight over four to eight
axles, the cars can carry high-tonnage freight.
Since Modalohr cars are a new technology and so far have been ordered only
in small batches, they are relatively expensive to buy. In 2002, SNCF bought 35
cars at a cost of approximately $12.9 million. Since each car carries two trucks, this
works out to an average of $184,000 per unit of truck space. How does this com-
pare with the rest of the railcar market? In Europe, over the past fiscal year, Green-
brier Co. received orders for 1,300 Modalohr cars at $130 million; this figure
applies to all types of railcars, from intermodal to boxcar to coal hoppers. Roughly
speaking, then, a mass-produced railcar costs $100,000.25 It is reasonable to expect
that as the technology matures and the order sizes increase, economies of scale and
competition will drive down the cost to close to that of a traditional intermodal
car. Rail carriers should consider the service as an option and investigate pricing.26
In 2003 SNCF experimented with using Modalohr cars in its Lyon-Turin tunnel.
In addition to the Modalohr cars, the trains carry a passenger car for the truckers,
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complete with televisions and other amenities. By 2006, SNCF plans to offer reg-
ular service, with between 20 and 30 departures per day.
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE
The North American answer to European-style intermodal cars has been services
like the Expressway and, before that, the Iron Highway. Like Modalohr’s cars,
Expressway service is roll-on, roll-off, and it can accommodate most tractor-trail-
ers, albeit with limitations. Since the Iron Highway is older and has problems, this
section will focus on CP’s recently introduced and revamped Expressway service
from Montreal through Toronto and on to Detroit.
CP’s Expressway operates on a regular schedule for the convenience of truck-
ers. It only takes 15 minutes for a truck to check in. The driver enters the terminal,
unhooks the trailer, and has his ticket scanned. He then leaves the yard in the truck
cab, often after attaching another trailer brought to the terminal by the service. A
specially designed tractor rolls the trailer onto the flatbed, where it is secured.
Since the truck is loaded by way of a ramp, the rough handling associated with
cranes is avoided. At the other end, the trailer is ready to be picked up within 60
minutes of the train’s arrival.
According to CP, the service has been a success. The company recently
ordered 50 more flatcars to add to its fleet of 260, and it has acquired high-profile
clients, including the Ford Motor Company. The recent addition of the Detroit leg
should lead to more business, although the Detroit-to-Montreal run is not as fast
as the Toronto-to-Montreal service, generally offering second-morning availabil-
ity, instead of first-morning availability, after the departure date.27 Expressway
does not require extensive terminal equipment: the principal addition to the yard is
a security ticket system to make sure that the trailers are not stolen.
The Expressway service differs from the Modalohr-style intermodal in the
following ways:
1. It requires a specialized tractor to load the trailer.
2. Truck cabs are not carried on board the train. For some companies this is an advan-
tage, since the driver uses his cab to reach the rail yard. Other companies, without
enough free cabs at the terminal destination, find this extremely inconvenient.
3. Loading and unloading times are substantially longer. The simultaneous load-
ing of many trucks is not possible.
4. The clearance profile of Expressway is higher than that of Alpine intermodal cars.
Although Expressway is a worthwhile service, and one that ought to be widely
available in the United States, the Modalohr system has a number of advantages.
As U.S. companies consider expanding their intermodal service, it seems likely
that roll-on/roll-off service will become popular.
ROADRAILER, REEFERRAILER, AND RAILRUNNER
In some circumstances, shippers do not even need railcars to move containers by
locomotive.28 Wabash National’s RoadRailer and ReeferRailer,29 as well as the
forthcoming RailRunner built by RailRunner, N.A., make it possible to attach train
“wheels—“bogies”—to the bottom of truck trailers. The trailers are hitched
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together and pulled by a conventional locomotive along
the nation’s freight rail network. Since RoadRailers ride
low to the ground, they can travel virtually anywhere,
and all cars conform to plate B boxcar height standards
so that they can move freely East-of-Hudson. Road-
Railers are now in use in the United States, but the rail-
road industry does not regard them as important, even
though they have the potential to capture a significant
portion of short-haul intermodal service.
RoadRailer service offers the door-to-door flex-
ibility of truck shipping with freight rail efficiency.
At the yard, the trailer’s air-ride suspension lifts the
vehicle onto a bogie where it is locked in place, the
truck wheels are retracted, and the tractor is unhitched.
Each trailer needs only one bogie, although the train is
organized into units of trailers with CouplerMate
bogies separating a series of trailers. The trailers and
bogies are strong enough to accommodate a train with
up to 125 trailers and, depending on the configuration,
have a maximum speed between 70 and 90 mph. The
RoadRailer trailers have smoother handling than other
intermodal services, as the trailers have an air-ride suspension for the highway trip
and for the bogie attachment process.30 Moreover, the trailers have less slack
between cars (in some setups, 95 percent less than a double-stack train), leading to
fewer en-route jolts and less damage to freight.
The forthcoming RailRunner is a similar product with a slightly different de-
sign. A study by the company that makes the bogies found that the capital outlays
for a RailRunner-equipped terminal were significantly lower than for a double-
stack equipped terminal. But the company found ambiguous results for the operat-
ing costs, which in some circumstances could be higher using RailRunner.31
Both the RoadRailer and RailRunner truck trailers are different from tradi-
tional vehicles. They have a special suspension and coupling mechanism, and the
trailers must be reinforced in order to survive the extreme tension and compression
forces of rail transport. Accordingly, the trailer equipment itself weighs several
hundred pounds more than most trailers, but the total weight of the equipment
and goods transported is not heavier. Why this is so requires a brief discussion of
freight weight regulations.
A container is built to carry a certain amount of weight, known as its gross
weight, which is the sum of the net weight (the load weight of the goods trans-
ported) and the tare weight (the equipment weight). Highway laws regulate the
gross-weight-on-axle, which is always lower than the gross-weight-on-rail. Since
RoadRailer trailers operate on both highways and tracks, they must abide by the
lesser weight restrictions. Their added tare weight forces a reduced net weight per
trailer, thereby increasing the per-unit costs. However, these costs are more than
offset by the reduced space and infrastructure required for the trailers’ operation.
Most notably, their transfers do not require the construction and maintenance of
terminals. These cost savings, along with their lighter weight compared with that
of flatcar-based transport (which requires an additional tare weight of almost
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40,000 pounds in the form of a flatcar), make RoadRailers excellent candidates for
certain short-haul operations. Which operations they are best suited for depends
on the good transported. The internal dimensions match those of most over-the-
road trailers and are more spacious than any domestic container unit, making them
very useful for less dense goods. Like double-stack cars, RoadRailers’ better tare-
to-net ratio makes them an attractive choice for trips through hilly terrain.
Traditional trucks, the kind that nearly every shipper uses, cannot use Road-
Railers because of the specialized equipment they require. Nevertheless, there
appears to be a substantial market for RoadRailers.32 Amtrak has a fleet of about
300 RoadRailers and a number of ReeferRailers, which it runs between Phila-
delphia and Chicago or Florida. The service operates in conjunction with
Amtrak’s passenger service by attaching the RoadRailers and ReefRailers to the
passenger trains, and as a result, it has high performance expectations.
Before the acquisition of Conrail by the NS, Triple Crown was a joint Con-
rail/NS operation. Triple Crown had a terminal at E-Port across from Newark Air-
port near Ikea’s Elizabeth outlet and ran its service from that terminal to Atlanta.
About a year after the acquisition and the absorption of Triple Crown into NS, the
Atlanta train’s Triple Crown (RoadRailer) service was discontinued, and a few
months later the Triple Crown Northeast terminal was moved 80 miles west and
across the Delaware River to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Why Triple Crown moved
out of E-Port is not clear.There are NS claims that the Port Authority forced it out,
but the Port Authority insists that NS wanted to move out.
4.3 Advanced carfloats
New York Harbor has a cross-harbor float system,33 but a float system using state-of-
the-art technology would look quite different, with greater efficiency and speed than
the current system. The New York Cross-Harbor Railroad transports railcars across
the harbor using barges pushed by a tugboat. Although the carfloat barges may not
always be in good repair, even in pristine condition they have an operating flaw. Like
a lakeside dock, the apron that connects the float barge to land is hinged, so if the
tide is low, the connecting apron has a steep grade. Exaggerated, the situation would
look something like the following (or the reverse, depending on the tide):
As a railcar travels over the lip of this steep incline—although the angle would
never be as steep as depicted—it can get hung up, its wheels dangling slightly
above the tracks in midair. Complicating matters, the barges themselves have a
“frog” in the track, a switch on the barge itself that makes it a challenge to load and
unload railcars. Both these problems reflect the fact that the recent refurbishment
of the system did not incorporate state-of-the-art technology.
An expanded and better carfloat operation could be fast, reliable, and probably
just as cheap as the current system. Two rail barge systems handle train traffic to
Alaska: Canadian National’s (CN’s) Aquatrain and Alaska Rail Marine.
Alaska Rail Marine loads railcars directly onto a float barge, thereby avoiding
the apron problem just described. The company owns a fleet of six-track barges
Barge
Land
PART B
56
that carry up to 56 cars per trip. A barge leaves every week (even in the winter)
from Seattle and arrives seven days later in Whittier, Alaska, and then travels to
Seward. Alaska Railroad offers service from anywhere in the lower 48 states to
Alaska.34 For its part, CN’s Aquatrain service runs 32 times a year from Prince
Rupert, British Columbia, to Whittier. The service uses what CN calls “the
world’s largest railcar barge,” which accommodates 50 cars on eight 400-foot
tracks. The 5,670-ton barge is pulled by a 176-ton ocean tug on an 830-mile voy-
age that takes four days. Like Alaska Rail Marine’s service, the trains are loaded
directly onto the barge without a connecting apron. The service is used by a wide
range of customers, from British Petroleum to the Fort Knox Gold Mine, mostly
to move materials for the mining, fuel, and construction industries.35
In the Baltic Sea, too, several large-scale rail ferry operations run between Scan-
dinavia and the Baltic states. These services carry entire freight trains and passenger
trains. Rail cars are uncoupled and pushed onto the ferries. The ferries themselves
are quite versatile. One ferry run by Scandlines between Rostock and Trelleberg
offers a combined rail/motorcar/passenger service (with the passenger section of the
ferry offering amenities from a cinema to first-class cabins). Other ferries can unload
railcars on both ends, and some can carry large numbers of railcars. In most cases, the
ships are self-propelled ferries and not barges that must be pushed by tugboats.
On the Black Sea, large-scale rail ferry operations transport freight from Yalta to
Turkey and other destinations on the Sea’s southern shore. The ferry, roughly the size
of a passenger ocean cruiser, has two tiers of tracks that dual-load at both the dock
level and the upper level via a trestle. If such mechanisms can be installed for long dis-
tances like the Black Sea, surely smaller versions of these same ferries can be con-
structed for the relatively short distances between banks of the New York Harbor.
Is a float bridge simply a cheap alternative to a tunnel? The difference is a ques-
tion of volume. Generally, float bridges work best for relatively light traffic traveling
over a long distance. The Whittier-Seattle route, for instance, moves a fairly small
number of railcars over more than 800 miles.The distances involved in the Baltic and
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Black Sea transport also would require tunnels hundreds of miles long. Although float
operations offer some environmental benefits, because harbor sediment is disturbed
less, when moving a higher volume of traffic smoothly, particularly over a shorter dis-
tance, a tunnel or a bridge has decided advantages over a float operation.
Nevertheless, New York Harbor is a promising site for expanded float opera-
tions, particularly in the short term while no other Hudson crossing in the metro-
politan area is available. Since the Harbor is somewhat protected, weather is
usually not a problem. Although a float operation with a world-class barge system
could load railcars simultaneously on both shores and move a fair amount of traf-
fic, the volume of traffic moved by railcar barges alone would be limited.
4.4 Environmental and quality-of-life improvements
For the foreseeable future, trains will continue to be the cleanest way to move
freight. Higher emission standards will ensure that locomotives’ efficiency contin-
ues to exceed that of trucks. Regrettably, it appears that hybrid and fuel cell loco-
motives are not on the horizon. While there already are prototypes, it will take at
least a generation for them to be widely used. In the meantime, the major quality-
of-life problem for railroads is noise, which could be alleviated if the appropriate
noise-muffling technology were used.
CLEANER LOCOMOTIVES
The main reason that locomotives produce fewer emissions than trucks do is phys-
ical: the lower rolling resistance of steel on steel means that trains consume less
energy per ton-mile and therefore combust less fuel. This energy efficiency has
been increasing, as demonstrated by the decreasing energy intensity per ton-mile
of Class I railroads (see Figure 4-1).
In 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency established stringent emis-
sions reduction rules for new locomotives that will be fully phased in by 2005. The
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Energy intensity of Class I railroads
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standards will reduce hydrocarbon emissions by 40 percent, particulate matter
emissions by 40 percent, and nitrogen oxide emissions by 60 percent. The railroad
industry is ahead of schedule in meeting these new standards.
New engine technologies are emerging as well. Hybrid locomotives, which use
a combination of diesel power and electricity, are a feasible option for the future.
Since the only fuel that hybrid locomotives require is diesel, rail carriers could use
the current network of fueling stations. In a hybrid, a diesel engine is used for
charging a large bank of batteries, which power an electric traction engine.
RailPower Technologies recently built a prototype hybrid that it calls the
Green Goat.36 It is a switching locomotive, which means that it will be used in rail
yards and not for intercity traffic. Like most switching locomotives, it has a 2,000-
horsepower engine (an intercity locomotive is typically 3,000 to 4,400 horse-
power), and its maximum speed is relatively slow, about 20 mph. But RailPower
estimates that the hybrid will save carriers 30 percent on capital costs, including
fuel, and the engine reduces the quantities of most pollutants emitted, including
90 percent of nitrogen oxides, compared with that of a diesel-only switching loco-
motive. Union Pacific tested the locomotive for a year in California and then
moved it to Chicago in the winter for cold weather testing, and West Coast short
lines have also used it for test periods.37 If it proves to be a cost-effective option,
the Green Goat might be attractive for both Class I and short-line carriers.
ABBA Volt is interested in rebuilding an old Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (MTA) switching locomotive into a hybrid. The MTA has a fleet of
diesel-powered switching locomotives which it uses in the subway system and
elsewhere.38 Hybrid locomotives would allow workers to maintain the right-of-
way, with less exposure to harmful emissions in the confined space of a tunnel.
Electric freight trains have been out of the question because electrifying
freight rail lines is prohibitively expensive; railcars have varying heights, a problem
for designing the catenaries; and freight trains are longer and heavier than passen-
ger trains, demanding an enormously powerful electric locomotive. In the long
term, however, hydrogen fuel cell research could change this.
Locomotive fuel cells must be more powerful pound for pound than auto fuel
cells. It is possible that the high-power fuel cell technology built for boats could
one day be adapted for railroads. In 2003 the U.S. Navy tested a prototype 500-
kW fuel cell built by Fuel Cell Energy, Inc., in Philadelphia; the goal is to build a
3,000-kW fuel cell engine that could be used on the water.
Indeed, prototype fuel cell locomotives are already on their way. Sandia
National Laboratories has created a four-ton fuel cell locomotive for industrial
applications, about as long and wide as a golf cart, which will soon be put into use
in gold mines. Hydrogen fuel cell technology is attractive to the mining industry
because of the high cost of building ventilation shafts for diesel fumes. The second
project of note is being pursued by the MTA, which in January 2003 asked a Con-
necticut company to draw up plans to gut a diesel locomotive and build a fuel cell
prototype. Without a major technological breakthrough, however, fuel cell loco-
motives are at least a generation away.39
QUIETER TRAIN SERVICE
Historically, the best available noise-reduction technique for railroads was to build
barriers that muffled the sound. On the whole, though, barriers are expensive and
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have only limited benefits. The new technologies are trying to reduce train noise at
its source: the wheels and rails. The locomotive engines, of course, also make noise.
But like highway traffic, the noise that appears to carry the farthest is wheel noise.
The dull roar one can hear a half-mile from an interstate is often the noise of trac-
tor-trailer wheels on concrete or asphalt.
One technique used to deal with this problem is Track-Wheel Interaction
Noise Software (TWINS), which tries to pinpoint the source of the track noise.
Small imperfections and roughness in railcar wheels and tracks cause vibrations
that, in turn, cause the rumbling noise of a passing train.
4.5 Better customer service
Two advances—the personal computer and GPS—have meant enormously
improved freight rail customer service.40 It now is possible for companies to handle
almost all aspects of rail shipping through the Internet, from reservation to track-
ing and receiving. While freight rail is hardly the only industry to have taken
advantage of the Internet or GPS, it is worth observing that rail has kept pace with
the rest of the transportation world.
Both the North American Container System (NACS) and REZ-1 run ser-
vices to make it easy to move containers with multiple rail carriers.41 That both
systems’ clients include most Class I railroads makes for a geographically broad,
and quite vast, pool of resources. NACS has some 20,000 containers, and its par-
ticipants include BNSF, CSX, CN, CP, Kansas City Southern (KCS), and NS.
REZ-1 serves fewer railroads (Union Pacific, CSX, NS, and KCS) but about twice
as many container units. Most of REZ-1’s users are in the Midwest or on the West
Coast. Both systems have Web sites where clients can make reservations, check
shipments, and find empty containers. Most of the Class I railroads also have Web
sites listing price and transit time information, which is calibrated to the kind of
freight being moved, from beer to scrap metal. Some of the railroads also offer
online payment and tracking services.
Computerized logistics has been a boon for railroads, reducing the number of
empty backhaul containers. A significant amount of rail freight traffic is moving
empty railcars; logistics software allows rail companies to make better use of their
equipment and allows customers to book backhaul space at a discount.
Finally, automated terminals and containers with GPS units will make ship-
ping faster and tracking easier than is typically the case today. A new terminal in
Memphis for CSX and CN, which is scheduled to open sometime in 2004, will
include an advanced check-in system for trucks that takes less than two minutes. As
trucks enter the terminal, electronic sensors automatically scan the vehicle to check
for equipment condition and freight damage; the driver swipes a card through an
electronic reader; a digital camera automatically takes a photo of him/her; and
he/she is finished. This system dramatically reduces check-in time and makes just-
in-time intermodal faster and just as accountable as single-carrier transport.
4.6 Conclusion
Coupled with the improvements in freight rail fixed plant described in the next
chapter, the application of state-of-the-art freight technologies would greatly
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increase the efficiency and usefulness of freight rail East-of-Hudson and speed its
integration with the national freight rail network. These technologies include faster
trains, better dispatching, a wide range of advanced intermodal technologies and
services, advanced carfloats, and cleaner, quieter engines and improved customer
service. Such technologies can be used only with institutional changes that would
allow freight railroads to serve markets that are now served exclusively by trucking.
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According to the criteria described in chapter 3, improving freight rail may be
preferable to building more highways in order to add to freight transport capacity
in the Hudson region. That notion is amplified by the prospect of integrating the
freight rail policies and technological innovations discussed in chapter 4 into the
regional rail network. Nonetheless, these policies and innovations will do little
without improving the freight rail connections and increasing yard space. A major
revitalization of the freight rail network that connects the East-of-Hudson subre-
gion with the national rail network should include easy connections between and
within the west and east sides of the Hudson River. Real changes in freight mobil-
ity require investments in infrastructure, which are the topic of this chapter. They
can be divided into two broad categories: those that will create or rebuild impor-
tant rail connections (discussed in section 5.1) and those that will modernize the
Hudson region’s freight rail network (discussed in section 5.2). This chapter
describes how each of the choices in these two categories would change freight rail
service in the New York City metropolitan area.
CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THIS REPORT
Although countless proposed and possible initiatives might improve freight
mobility, here we look at only a few of them:
1. The proposal must be a major step toward improving access to the region’s eco-
nomic core, New York City, as well as to other parts of downstate New York and
southern New England.
2. The proposal must ease congestion on the Hudson River’s choke points—the
bridges and tunnels—which have been a great detriment to regional freight
mobility.
The purpose of these criteria is simply to eliminate those ideas that may be
worthwhile for other regions but do not have definitive benefits for mobility in
New York City, other parts of downstate New York, or the metropolitan area as a
whole.
The following two sections describe what a revitalized freight rail system
might look like, with an emphasis on the East-of-Hudson subregion. The first
section examines the most appealing options for moving freight trains across the
Hudson River. The second section expands the discussion to other urgent matters,
such as lifting height and weight restrictions and expanding rail yards.
5.1 A revitalized freight rail system: crossing the Hudson
THE EDC STRATEGY
The New York Economic Development Corporation (EDC) is in the process of
concluding the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) of its Cross-Harbor
Freight Movement Project, a sweeping study that is looking at ways to improve
freight movement in the New York City area. Because the study is a multimillion-
dollar effort with detailed engineering plans and economic analysis, it provides
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information beyond what our report can describe. Rather, we regard the EDC
study as a great reservoir of information that should be examined critically.
In investigating whether better freight rail service would lead to less roadway
use and congestion and economic opportunity, EDC is looking at ways to move
freight trains across the Hudson River. At an earlier stage in this investigation,
after analyzing 15 alternative strategies in the project’s May 2000 Major Invest-
ment Study (MIS), EDC chose four for further review and analysis in its EIS:
1. No action. The first alternative assumes that no investment will be made in the
current freight rail network, except in the infrastructure and planning work that is
already under way or appears very likely to be implemented by 2025 (see chapter 2).
This scenario provides a baseline for comparing the other three alternatives.
2. Transportation systems management (TSM). The second alternative is referred to
as (TSM) and is a strategy to make the most of the current rail freight network
with minimal capital investment. The emphasis is on better coordination of pas-
senger and freight operations, including single-track rehabilitation and minor
rail yard improvements. This alternative also includes a clearance to 17 feet, 6
inches, along the Bay Ridge and Montauk branches to accommodate TOFC
trains and signal systems upgrades. Finally, the TSM alternative would involve
rehabilitating the two existing Greenville Yard float bridges.
3. Expanded float operations. The third alternative encompasses the measures pro-
posed in the TSM alternative but goes further to expand the hours of float ser-
vice, schedule floating, and offer a larger network of support trains. In addition,
expanded float operations would construct a new bulk/merchandise yard in
Maspeth, Queens, and two more float bridges at Greenville Yard and two more
at the Sixty-fifth Street Yard.
4. Freight rail tunnel. The fourth and final alternative that EDC examined in the
MIS was building a single- or double-track freight rail tunnel under New York
Harbor along with a number of improvements both east and west of the Hud-
son River to take advantage of the new direct link.
THE EDC PROPOSAL FOR A RAIL FREIGHT TUNNEL
The principal attraction of a cross-harbor freight rail tunnel is that it would pro-
vide the shortest, most direct access for freight moving to or through the heart of
the New York metropolitan area.1 The MIS describes two possible alignments for
a cross-harbor rail freight tunnel: from Staten Island to Brooklyn and from New
Jersey to Brooklyn (see Figure 5-1). The draft EIS focuses on the latter.
For both alignments, EDC suggests raising the vertical clearances along the
Bay Ridge and Montauk branches to full intermodal access at a new intermodal
facility in Maspeth, Queens. Farther north, into the Bronx and the proposed Pil-
grim State Terminal (officially the Pilgrim Intermodal Freight Transportation
Center), the vertical clearances would have to be raised for at least TOFC service
(17 feet, 7 inches).
The Bay Ridge Branch has mostly a single track, but its right-of-way could
support up to four tracks. It certainly will need additional track capacity to accom-
modate the increased traffic that a tunnel is projected to bring. Ideally, it should
have at least two tracks that can handle double-stacked trains from the tunnel
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portal west to Glenwood Road in Brooklyn. Two additional tracks also will be
needed at the east New York section of Brooklyn, where the Bay Ridge Branch has
a single track. These additional tracks will lead to swifter service at the East-of-
Hudson freight yards.
Furthermore, the rail line extending through the East New York Tunnel and
farther east to Fresh Pond will have to be double tracked. Of these two lines, at
least one has to be able to accommodate double-stack cars, which means that the
Fresh Pond Yard and the Montauk Branch that connects to the site of the pro-
posed Maspeth terminal will have to be improved.
On the west side of the river, according to the EDC proposal, an additional
track must be constructed on the Chemical Coast Line to accommodate the
greater volume of traffic. Three active main tracks would provide the necessary
extra capacity. Connections between West-of-Hudson rail terminals also need
improvement. Conrail, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, and the
Port Authority are studying two projects: the addition of a new track that would
allow trains to pass through the Oak Island Yard, and the addition of a “fly-over”
track that would provide a more direct connection among the Oak Island, Kearny,
and Croxton yards.
The alignment of the Staten Island Tunnel, as described in the MIS, would
require a number of secondary improvements: the construction of a connection
between the Chemical Coast Line and the Staten Island Railroad; double-track-
ing of the Staten Island Railroad, the Bay Ridge Branch, and the proposed
Waverly Loop; the twinning of the Arthur Kill lift bridge; and the construction of
an intermodal yard in Maspeth. In addition, the Arlington Yard terminal on the
western end of the proposed tunnel would have to be improved, and facilities in
Fresh Pond and the Sixty-fifth Street Yard would have to be expanded and/or
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reconfigured. Finally, the Staten Island Railroad would need to be upgraded: dou-
ble-tracked from the tunnel portal to Arlington Yard and connected to the Chem-
ical Coast Line.
The New Jersey Tunnel alignment, which EDC identified in the MIS and the
draft EIS cites as the best option, would require the construction of a connection
between Conrail’s National Docks/Secondary Branch and the tunnel approach.
Two tracks would have to be built through the Greenville Yard on the New Jersey
side of the river. In addition, on the New York side of the river, the Bay Ridge Line
and Waverly Loop would have to be double-tracked.
Except for a short segment that, for geological reasons, would be submerged,
the tunnel would be bored. The final EIS will also evaluate the option of double-
tracking the tunnel and whether the tunnel should be so constructed.
The tunnel and the accompanying track improvements would require a huge
investment in the regional freight system. It would greatly enhance the infrastruc-
ture and provide a direct and dedicated link to the national network. Figure 5-1
depicts the two tunnel alignments.
REVITALIZING THE CROSS-HARBOR FLOAT SYSTEM
An important part of upgrading the regional freight rail system is improving the
cross-harbor float operations currently run by the New York Cross-Harbor Rail-
road (NYCH). More broadly, we need to reconsider using water as a means for
distributing rail freight in the harbor. As they were in the past, New York’s signif-
icant bodies of water can be used as a platform for transporting rail cars through-
out the metropolitan area. Accordingly, these bodies of water can be used more
efficiently for rail freight movement, largely through two general initiatives:
1. Establishing rail marine reload centers at strategic locations where heavy com-
modities such as building materials and aggregates can be moved very near to
the consumption points while at the same time minimizing highway use.
2. Using rail marine as a link between the national rail network and the East-of-
Hudson subregion.
The existing system must therefore be upgraded physically, as described in
section 4.3, and its perception must be modified. In order to attract users, the
operation should look like a seamless conveyor belt. Ideally, there would be two
to three trips (or “frequencies”) in each direction daily, on a reliable schedule.
The goal here is not just the reality of, but also the perception of availability of
service. Certain specific components must be modernized or replaced, such as
the pontoon—the floatation box used to support the rail bridge that first sup-
ports the rail cars when they are removed from the barges at the Bush Terminal
in Brooklyn.
HUDSON RIVER BRIDGES
North of the proposed tunnel alignment, two possible Hudson River crossings
between New York City and Selkirk, New York, could be considered. The first
would entail rebuilding the Poughkeepsie-Highland Railroad Bridge, and the sec-
ond would require constructing a standard rail line on the Tappan Zee Bridge, a
project already under way that is discussed later.
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Freight railroads, which had essentially abandoned the Poughkeepsie Bridge
before a fire in 1974 rendered it structurally unsound, are reluctant to support
reopening it. The reasons are that the bridge is an inconvenient distance from
Brooklyn and New York City, and near the end of the bridge’s life it had been used
only lightly—by about four to six freight trains per day.2 It is unlikely that the
bridge would divert trucks off the road and freight trains into New York City, given
how dilapidated the connecting system on both sides of the river has become, the
bridge’s distance from the city, and the fact that much of the surrounding right-of-
way has been sold and used for other purposes or has become otherwise encum-
bered. For an efficient connection between the region’s urban core in downstate
New York and the national freight system, this route would not currently provide
substantial advantages over the Selkirk crossing some 50 or so miles to the north.
The Tappan Zee Bridge is a northern crossing for the East-of-Hudson subre-
gion, which truckers use primarily to avoid the congestion on the George Wash-
ington Bridge. That bridge is nearing the end of its scheduled life span. Although
it still is safe and functional, the bridge has begun to deteriorate, and over the next
decade the New York State Thruway Authority will either have to rehabilitate it or
tear it down and build a new one. The eventual solution might be a new bridge
with some kind of transit in the form of a bus lane open to multi-occupant vehicles
such as vanpools or possibly a light or heavy commuter rail system.
As of October 2003, 14 options were being considered besides the “no build”
and rehabilitation options that would require the construction of a new bridge.3
The Tappan Zee Bridge could be replaced with a bridge containing barrier-sepa-
rated rapid-bus and carpool lanes, with or without tolling, or a commuter rail line.
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) is the agency charged with
investigating the commuter rail option for a new bridge, but it has not yet officially
considered a rail option that could be used for both freight rail operations and pas-
senger rail services. A new bridge could be built with full corridor commuter rail
tracks or light rail connecting to the Hudson Line or conceivably the Harlem and
New Haven lines. This project could include instead a supplemental commuter rail
tunnel. Even a hybrid form could be constructed that in some way included one or
more of the following: commuter rail, a commuter tunnel, high-occupancy lanes,
and light rail. Instead of a bridge, the Thruway Authority could bore a tunnel for
highway, commuter rail, and barrier-separated rapid-bus lanes. The task force
responsible for deciding on the option to be pursued is scheduled to pare down the
list to four or five by the spring of 2004, after an environmental impact assessment.
The possibility that a rail system would cross the Tappan Zee Bridge and, fur-
thermore, could be designed to accommodate freight rail trains is not out of the
question. Conceivably, such a rail line across the bridge could connect with the
CSX River Line on the west shore. On the east side the route would presumably
connect to the Hudson Line to provide access to New York City and Long Island.4
Weight limitation and clearance issues, discussed in the next section, would have
to be addressed.
This route has two very serious problems. First, while the New York Thruway
Authority and the MTA are looking at options for a new bridge at this location,
they are not considering a freight rail connection at this time. Second, without a
west-east heavy rail line across Westchester east of the Tappan Zee Bridge, freight
traffic on the east side would have to be routed down the Hudson Line. It would
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therefore provide a much less direct link from southern and western points into the
East-of-Hudson subregion than EDC’s proposed tunnel would.
5.2 Revitalizing freight rail with improved infrastructure
In order to accommodate more freight rail traffic downstate and East-of-Hudson, the
tracks on the east side of the Hudson must have higher clearances and higher weight
restrictions and, in some places, more track. Besides upgrading the existing yards, new
yards that both support and connect train operations would have to be built.
The freight rail system East-of-Hudson is outdated and has been so badly
maintained that it would take a huge amount of money to repair the existing sys-
tem and to make it competitive, let alone economically efficient, even with a direct
cross-Hudson link between this subregion and the national freight rail network.
Until recently, this freight system has suffered from the same kind of system
undermaintenance that characterized the MTA subway and bus system until the
MTA and the state put together the MTA’s first major five-year capital program in
1980. Over the last five years, with the help of the East-of-Hudson Rail Freight
Operations Task Force, EDC, the New York Department of Transportation, and
the Port Authority have come to acknowledge the backwardness of the 50-year-
old freight rail system and have begun to make some improvements, conduct stud-
ies, and plan major investments as described in chapter 2. This is a good
beginning, but only a beginning. This section describes the infrastructure changes
that should be part of a major freight rail revitalization initiative.
TOFC AND DOUBLE-STACK CLEARANCE ON EAST-OF-HUDSON FREIGHT
RAIL CORRIDORS
Most of the subregional freight rail system in the metropolitan area East-of-
Hudson has insufficient vertical and horizontal clearances. The network cannot
accommodate the high-profile freight cars, such as the TOFC and double-stack
intermodal, that are popular with railroads for their efficiency. In addition, the
third-rail power system along the Hudson Line and on the LIRR passenger lines
creates a horizontal restriction for most container well cars. Recently, one track on
the Hudson Line was cleared of vertical impediments for TOFC service, and a
second track is being cleared to allow intermodal trains to take advantage of the
opportunities of a double-tracked railroad. This is a step forward but offers only
limited flexibility. Metro-North, the New York DOT, and the Port Authority are
all collaborating to raise the clearances on the Hudson Line for TOFC service.
The long-term goal is to provide these clearances along the entire Hudson Line on
at least two tracks.
Raising the clearances would unclog a calcified system that prevents trains
from flowing into the East-of-Hudson subregion. It would be possible to run
TOFC and, eventually, double-stack trains from New Jersey to Brooklyn. This
could be done using the cross-harbor float system and/or a cross-harbor tunnel,
and from there trains could proceed to Queens or Long Island and points north
and east, via the Bay Ridge Line. These trains could also run from Selkirk and
points north down the Hudson Line and into the Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, or
Long Island. With these clearance improvements, New York City could be ser-
viced by the most modern and efficient train systems.
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At a minimum, the project would require major improvements of four seg-
ments of track. TOFC clearance on the Fremont and Bushwick lines to Fresh
Pond would greatly facilitate freight movements in and to Long Island. Raising
the clearances on the Bay Ridge Branch, from the Sixty-fifth Street terminal to
Fresh Pond, would allow freight cars of all sizes to use it and make the cross-har-
bor float system more competitive. Investments in the Fremont, Bushwick, and
Bay Ridge lines should include full physical intermodal access (i.e., double-stack
clearance) downstate and greater line capacity on the Long Island Main Line. Pro-
viding clearance on the Long Island Main Line to Pilgrim State would allow Class
I carriers to enter Long Island and deliver their shipments farther east, thereby
avoiding traffic congestion in Brooklyn and Queens. Service would then undoubt-
edly be more cost efficient and competitive than it is today.
Full intermodal access on the previously mentioned corridors would be a dra-
matic improvement. It would give the railroads additional flexibility in operating,
scheduling, and pricing freight services. Full intermodal access would also enable
the railroads to offer more options and service frequencies.
According to Cambridge Systematics, the consultant for both the EDC and
NYMTC studies, full intermodal access to Brooklyn, Queens, and Long Island is
a key element in any comprehensive long-term solution for freight access problems
east of the Hudson.5 Intermodal trains traveling long distances are much less
expensive to operate when using fully loaded, double-stack cars.
LIFTING WEIGHT RESTRICTIONS
Like vertical clearances, weight limits on East-of-Hudson rail routes must be
raised. Across the nation, since the Class I freight carriers are moving an increas-
ing volume of freight in cars that are 286,000 pounds gross weight on rail (or
“286s”), the East-of-Hudson subregion must keep up with this trend to stay com-
petitive and increase its market share. Currently only the Metro-North lines are
designated suitable for 286s, although other lines probably have this capability.
The LIRR is studying the bridge weights for its entire line (see chapter 2). Cur-
rently, hauling 286s on the LIRR is a heavily encumbered process: each car that a
railroad moves must have separate paperwork filed in order to be cleared for use,
even if it is identical to a car previously cleared. Many cars instead are loaded at
less than their full capacity, leading to gross inefficiencies.
The 286 issue is critical to the Hell Gate Bridge, which has yet to be
upgraded.6 Hell Gate is of paramount importance since it connects Brooklyn,
Queens, and Long Island to the rest of the network. If 286s cannot cross this
bridge, the major rail access route East-of-Hudson is thereby hampered, and no
railcar that is 286 pounds gross weight on rail can cross the Hudson River without
using the float system.
ADDITIONAL YARD SPACE
The lack of yard space or access to yard space slows the growth of the system.
Without available yard space, trains have nowhere to go. On the whole, the rail
yards in the East-of-Hudson subregion have enough extra capacity to handle a
large amount of freight. A NYMTC study published in the spring of 2003 found
that most existing East-of-Hudson yards can theoretically accommodate about
double what they do now.7 Some yards, like the Fresh Pond Yard, which handles
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1,500 carloads per acre every year, are already running at capacity. Most other
yards, however, only handle between 20 and 360 carloads per acre per year. Com-
pared with out-of-state rail yards, the East-of-Hudson rail yards could use their
space more efficiently than they do today.
Even with the efficient use of existing yard space, raised clearances, improved
weight limits, and increased line capacity, the system East-of-Hudson still needs
more space to uncouple, unload, and store trains, particularly if freight rail trans-
port is to grow. EDC has proposed adding two intermodal transfer facilities, one
in central Long Island that is the subject of a New York DOT study, and another
along Newton Creek in southwest Queens.
For central Long Island, the New York DOT has suggested building an inter-
modal transfer station on the site of what was formerly the Pilgrim State Hospital.
The site is on the LIRR Main Line near Deer Park Station. Similarly, EDC has
proposed an intermodal transfer facility on the former Phelps Dodge boundary
site in southwest Queens.8 The first proposal has progressed to the EIS stage.
While these two intermodal transfer facilities are not absolute necessities given the
current freight traffic, the development of Pilgrim State could provide much
needed yard capacity to permit likely significant increases in the likely Long Island
freight traffic given shippers’ widespread interest in the project.
The second proposed facility, the former Phelps Dodge site, is in Maspeth,
Queens. Galasso Trucking, Inc., currently has an option to buy the Phelps Dodge
site, which makes its future uncertain. EDC has indicated an interest in acquiring
this and adjacent properties if the city builds a tunnel or invests in a new cross-har-
bor float system. In either case, an intermodal transfer facility at the Phelps Dodge
site would be indispensable. In order to accommodate container and trailer vol-
umes, the city needs a substantial new yard.
The NS Rutherford Intermodal Terminal, a classification yard in Westmore-
land near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, is an example of the new kind of yard that
North American railroads are building in order to consolidate and reinvent new
intermodal trains. It is a hub for intermodal trains, located so that trailers on inter-
modal trains are coming from a certain group of origins, generally to the west. At
the yard, the trailers are sent to several different destinations east of the yard. Con-
sistent with the current trend, NS is assembling long intermodal trains and send-
ing them into northern New Jersey terminals, like that at Croxton. Not all
destinations demand enough volume for railroads to be willing to serve them,
however. For Philadelphia and other such locations, instead of direct train service,
trailers are grounded at the yard and hauled to their final destinations. This yard
functions well, but with the technological, track-sharing, and scheduling improve-
ments to trains discussed in chapter 4, it could serve a much greater area.
In southwestern Connecticut, near New Haven, the former Cedar Hill rail yard
has unused capacity that could accommodate an intermodal transfer facility. Still
another possibility, in Queens, would be to double-deck two conjoined yards, Yard
A—currently leased by the New York Thruway Authority from the LIRR—and
Amtrak’s Sunnyside Yard in Queens, for a rail freight yard and warehouse cluster.
Despite the many other examples of areas for increased capacity, most require
some imagination and determination. For example, Amtrak owns a broad right-
of-way in the Bronx that could be used as yard space. The section to the north of
the Hell Gate Bridge and past the Oak Point and Hunts Point yards could be
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designed to provide yard capacity with minimal disruption of the surrounding
communities. The right-of-way close to the Pelham Drawbridge is wide, with
enough space for eight tracks. Amtrak uses only two high-speed lines, and the rest
of the space is covered by weeds and is surrounded by light industry. In the New
Rochelle area, as well, where Amtrak joins Metro-North, a three- or four-mile
stretch is wide enough for eight tracks but has only two. Since this area is near a
residential area, a fully functioning yard could probably not be built, but freight rail
carriers might use it for car storage.
The problem, however, is not finding capacity somewhere but finding capacity
in the right places—areas where rail service would do the most business. Expand-
ing the capacity of the yards that already exist, while feasible, may not attract more
customers. Expanding rail yards in the right areas and building new ones in the
right neighborhoods and in hubs of production or distribution are probably the
greatest challenge for freight rail planners.
BUILDING A THIRD TRACK ON THE LIRR MAIN LINE
Additional line capacity is needed along the LIRR Main Line to accommodate
increases in volume. The LIRR is planning to add a third track on that portion of
the line for passenger operations (see chapter 2). The double-track main line
between Hicksville and Jamaica already is congested with passenger trains. With
an increase in line capacity, the number of freight trains could grow without inter-
fering with passenger train service. Without such improvements, rail’s market
share East-of-Hudson cannot be secured.
REACTIVATING THE STATEN ISLAND RAILROAD
New York City acquired the Staten Island Railroad and Arlington Yard in 1994
with federal funds. EDC is currently proceeding with its design for Arlington Yard
and an extension of the Travis Branch to connect to the Fresh Kills waste transfer
station. The Port Authority is constructing a connection to the Chemical Coast
Line, and the engineering work is scheduled to be completed by late 2004. The
Staten Island Railroad will provide dockside service to the Howland Hook Marine
Terminal, and it will serve the Visy Paper mill located on the Travis Branch in
Staten Island. This improved freight rail service linking Staten Island to New Jer-
sey and the national freight system will help reduce the freight-related congestion
on the Port Authority’s Arthur Kill Bridge crossings.
SHARING TRACKS WITH COMMUTER RAIL
New York already has a trans-Hudson rail tunnel and an extensive system of
tracks East-of-Hudson, but they are used first and foremost as commuter rail
lines. Where freight rail operators share trackage with commuter rail service
operators or freight rail competitors, it is particularly difficult to run long trains.
Nonetheless, freight rail operators typically have not looked for transport oppor-
tunities that might require short 10-, 20- or 30-car trains, and operational cus-
tom inhibits some track-sharing options. A regional rail line or short line
transporting goods from New Jersey across the Hudson on the cross-harbor float
system to the Bay Ridge Line and then the Long Island Railroad, or over the
Hell Gate Bridge to Metro-North’s New Haven Line, would have to deal with
four or five different entities.
PART B
71
As chapter 4 suggests, shorter trains often are best for routes that require timely
dispatching. Currently, freight rail’s unreliability in this respect has rendered shared
use during tightly scheduled daytime hours unworkable on many routes.
For example, on the rail line running from Albany to the Bronx on the east
side of the Hudson River, CSX is restricted to operating its services during six or
seven nighttime hours when no or very few passenger trains are operating. The
changes described in chapter 4 could greatly increase the wealth of track infra-
structure at the disposal of the railroads.
5.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, an East-of-Hudson freight rail network that is to become an integral
part of the national freight rail network needs both an efficient connection (or sev-
eral connections) between the west and east sides of the Hudson River in downstate
New York and a modernized system of yards and tracks that can accommodate
today’s intermodal railcars. In view of the size of the market for goods in the met-
ropolitan area East-of-Hudson, and the large portion of goods transported from
south and west of the subregion, as well as the severe congestion evident on the sub-
region’s major roadways, rail freight infrastructure improvements may constitute
some of the most economically worthy investments the subregion could make.
Chapter 5 notes
1 Most of the information in this section appears in the Cross-Harbor Freight Movement MIS,
published in May 2001. Therefore, it is possible that some of the stated ancillary projects, as well
as some of the estimations of actual and projected freight volume, may have been modified during
the EIS process. Refer to the MIS and draft EIS for a detailed and accurate account of all the
EDC market flow, engineering, and operational analyses.
2 Jim Detjen, “City Railroad Bridge to Be Reopened after Damage from Fire Is Repaired,” Pough-
keepsie Journal, May 9, 1974.
3 The bridge could be rehabilitated to function as it did before, or it could be widened to permit
light or heavy rail. A commuter rail tunnel could also be built. This option is being considered by
the Thruway Authority.
4 Such a move might also preclude access by the NS and thereby limit competition.
5 NYMTC Regional Freight Plan-Task 5, “Preliminary Identification of Improvements and Solu-
tions” (2001), p. 3-5. Note that double-stack service to Nassau and Suffolk would be much harder
to obtain.
6 The original owner of the bridge, the New Haven Railroad, operated several classes of large, heavy,
locomotives, including the EP-3, EP-4, and FL-9, which would have required the bridge to be
rated for higher gross weight and loadings than its current rating allows.
7 NYMTC, Rail Freight Yard Requirements: Land Assessment for the East-of-Hudson Region, March
2003.
8 Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., Cambridge Systematics, Inc., and Tioga Group,
Pilgrim Intermodal Freight Transportation Center: Study of the Feasibility of Developing an Intermodal
Freight Transportation Center at Pilgrim State Hospital Property on Long Island (New York: New
York State Department of Transportation, Long Island Region, 2001).
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Given the potential efficiencies of the state-of-the-art freight rail technologies
discussed in chapter 4 and the opportunities for modernizing the freight rail sys-
tem East-of-Hudson described in chapter 5, major freight rail improvements in
the region are likely to be able to meet the regional mobility, economic, and envi-
ronmental criteria stated in chapter 3 for increasing freight transport capacity bet-
ter than substantial highway expansion could. In section 6.1 we describe these
freight rail improvements in the context of a regional mobility plan.
Since highway congestion already is a serious problem and is projected to get
steadily worse, as described in chapter 1, we must look at freight rail investments as
part of an overall regional mobility strategy. Such a strategy must include com-
muter and high-speed trains as well as freight rail. The region already is consider-
ing major investments in transit. Since several other reports and studies deal
extensively with transit improvements, this report, in section 6.2, only briefly sum-
marizes the large transit investments being undertaken or considered. While tran-
sit and freight rail improvements may take many cars and trucks off the road, a
perennial problem is the large number of trips that freed-up highway capacity may
induce.1 In order for the region to receive the full return on these rail and transit
investments, the demand for road space must be regulated. One of the best such
mechanisms is a congestion-pricing scheme, and section 6.3 presents an overview
of the role of congestion pricing in a regional mobility strategy.
The New York metropolitan region has invested tens of billions of dollars in its
subway, bus, and commuter rail systems over the last 25 years and is planning to
invest tens of billions more over the next 25 years. But it does not have a comparable
commitment to freight rail, and it has only begun to use roadway pricing as a tool to
reduce congestion. A strategy that combines freight rail with transit and congestion
pricing with only very modest investments in critical, intractable highway bottle-
necks may in fact be able to improve regional mobility for both people and goods.
6.1 Freight rail improvements
For a cross-harbor tunnel, expanded intermodal yard space, and other freight rail
improvements East-of-Hudson to satisfy the criteria set forth in chapter 3, the tun-
nel must be planned and perceived not as a transportation project that will benefit
primarily the metropolitan area but as a much-needed regional improvement. The
benefits of this expansion of freight rail services and of the creation of more and con-
tinuous routes will be noticeable across the eastern seaboard. Realizing them requires
looking at all the elements of a revitalized freight rail system as described in chapter
5 and adopting the technologies and policy changes described in chapter 4. With the
proper infrastructure, equipment, and management, freight trains will be able to
come from points south via the Conrail Lehigh Valley Main Line, through Oak
Island Yard, to a cross-harbor tunnel. From there the trains could continue through
Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx, to New Haven-and there, one hopes, a rehabili-
tated Cedar Hill Yard-as well as other points in New England. At the same time,
continued upgrading of Hudson Line rail infrastructure would improve freight rail
operations to and from points north and west of the region (see Figure 6-1).
CHAPTER 6
A comprehensive mobility plan
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Pending the construction of a cross-harbor tunnel, New York City and the Port
Authority should immediately help establish a dependable, competitive rail marine
transfer system in New York Harbor. This would include the construction (or
rebuilding) of the Greenville float bridges (a current Port Authority project in
Greenville) and the institutional reintegration of the Sixty-fifth Street Yard and the
Sixty-fifth Street float bridges. The failure of CP to develop the Sixty-fifth Street
Yard underscores the lack of connectivity between the floats and the yards and the rail
systems on both sides of the Hudson River. These functions must be integrated. In
addition, the cross-Hudson float system should aim at providing frequent service, for
example, twice daily between Oak Island Yard and Fresh Pond, so that freight users
would be assured of reliable, competitive service.To do this, an operating subsidy and
the upgrading of the Bay Ridge Line to at least class 2 standards may be required,
with appropriate grade crossings to ensure the safety of the adjacent communities.
Full intermodal access on the Bay Ridge Line and other corridors discussed in
section 5.1 would bring freight rail East-of-Hudson a big step closer to taking full
advantage of the economies of scale afforded to intermodal freight rail. With a rail
tunnel capable of accommodating double-stack trains, these trains could reach
Phelps Dodge before transloading their cargo onto trucks. Other trains could con-
tinue north after leaving Fresh Pond, rather than going west to Maspeth. Going
north from Fresh Pond, these trains could then cross the Hell Gate Bridge and
either terminate at an expanded Oak Point Yard or continue into New England.
This would not only provide a West-of-Hudson-to-New-England freight service
highly competitive with trucking in both cost and time but could also relieve some
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new freight rail traffic at Phelps Dodge by diverting it to Oak Point. These kinds
of improvements would enable the NS Rutherford Intermodal Terminal, for
example, to assume a greater role in northeastern intermodal freight transport.
Two requirements must be met in order to do this properly. Plate H clearance
(at 20 feet, 6 inches) will be needed to allow double-stack cars to operate. In addi-
tion, the double-stack fleet needs minor design changes in order for the cars to
clear the third rail on the LIRR. On other lines, like the Hudson Line, TOFC
clearance would also encourage more traffic East-of-Hudson. The advantages of
this kind of system are well worth the investment and will be greatly amplified
with the aid of a modernized car float system like that just described.
Like raising clearances, lifting weight restrictions is a fundamental component
of the transformation that the East-of-Hudson freight rail network needs in order
to form an efficient linkage with the national freight rail network. Metro-North’s
track already is capable of accepting 286,000-pound gross-weight-on-rail cars.
With an adequate upgrade of the Hell Gate Bridge, as well as an overhaul of the
LIRR clearance barriers, rail would be able to haul heavier freight and more of it
East-of-Hudson. This would not only better exploit rail’s traditional advantage in
hauling heavy, less time-sensitive cargo over long distances but would also increase
usage of the freight route from Brooklyn to New Haven resulting from the con-
struction of a cross-harbor tunnel.
A modernized freight rail system with strategically located bridges and tunnels
must have ample yard space in which to load, unload, and store the increased volume
of freight it will attract. Among the possibilities for yard space discussed in chapter 5,
some clearly meet the criteria of chapter 3. The proposed Phelps Dodge terminal in
Maspeth should be built, all 27 available acres should be acquired for the new yard,
and additional acreage from adjoining properties should be acquired as necessary to
create a fully functional intermodal yard.2 Amtrak’s broad right-of-way in the Bronx
should be redesigned as a rail yard that could relieve the pressure on the Oak Point
and Hunts Point yards and accommodate the additional freight traffic. The Cedar
Hill Yard should be rehabilitated to handle freight from Metro-North’s track that
originates both in the East-of-Hudson subregion and points south of the EDC tun-
nel. The Sunnyside Yard and Yard A in Queens should be decked for a rail inter-
modal transfer facility and reload yard. Decking would make available a large
amount of space, some of which could be allocated for necessary warehousing space.
Rail freight, commuter, and high-speed passenger services cannot remain sepa-
rate in dense urban areas like the East-of-Hudson subregion. Operators have the
technical knowledge required for efficient track sharing—and here efficiency does not
mean just simple divisions like running freight trains only at night and passenger
trains only during the day. Rather, back-to-back scheduling of freight and passenger
trains is possible with the technology and institutional changes described in chapter 4.
To be sure, all these improvements have the potential to yield good returns on
the investment, but they must be implemented gradually, and they cannot be the
sole component of a regional mobility plan.
6.2 Reducing congestion by investing in transit
In order to improve freight transport, major freight rail investments should be care-
fully coordinated with transit capital projects in the region. The region is pursuing
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transit projects to help people move throughout the region more efficiently. One
project that has just opened is the Secaucus Transfer in the Hackensack Meadow-
lands that, along with the Kearney Connection, will improve access to Penn Station
for several New Jersey Transit lines. The new trans-Hudson tunnel project known
as Access to the Region’s Core (ARC) of the New Jersey Transit, the Port Author-
ity, and the MTA could likewise greatly help people moving between the New Jer-
sey and New York sides of the Hudson River. These trans-Hudson transit projects,
coupled with a new cross-harbor freight rail tunnel and modernization of the East-
of-Hudson freight rail system, should reduce congestion for trucks using the prin-
cipal New Jersey roadways and trans-Hudson corridors.
On the New York side of the Hudson River, the East Side Access for the
LIRR project of the MTA, the Metro-North Harlem Line third track project in
Westchester County, and the LIRR Main Line third track proposal in Queens and
Nassau counties should help divert commuting cars from highway travel to rail.
Together with the much more efficient freight rail system for the East-of-Hudson
subregion described in section 6.1, these projects should relieve truck congestion
in the East-of-Hudson subregion.
Transportation models used by the MTA, NYMTC, Port Authority and New
Jersey Transit are capable of estimating the number of auto trips that a major transit
project is capable of diverting from congested roadways. The MTA estimates that its
construction of the Second Avenue Subway would attract some 25,000 new riders.3
For the East Side Access for the LIRR Project, the MTA estimates that by 2010,
some 341,000 daily automobile VMT would be eliminated; 11,000 daily automo-
bile trips between home and work would be eliminated; and 24,000 daily hours of
travel would be saved.4 For the ARC project, the MTA Regional Transit Forecast-
ing Model and the North Jersey Travel Demand Forecasting Model estimate that
depending on the alternative adopted, 4,200 to 9,400 daily auto trips would be
diverted.5 This is one measure for evaluating the reduction in congestion and the
improvement in air quality. But these models do not calculate whether these pro-
jects would reduce congestion or improve mobility on the affected roadways either
by themselves or with other projects or measures. NYMTC’s Best Practice Model
is envisaged to have this kind of capability. But at the time of this report’s publica-
tion, the model is either unusable or unreliable for many of its originally intended
uses because in many cases its calibrated traffic flows deviated substantially from
actual traffic counts. NYMTC is trying to correct these problems.
Some investments in transit and commuter track could be designed to
improve freight rail transport as well. An example is the MTA’s proposal for a third
track on the LIRR Main Line between Jamaica and Hicksville. This additional
track would facilitate the operation of LIRR trains during commuter hours,
including reverse commuting. At the same time, with scheduled freight trains, a
third track would add flexibility during many hours of the day for freight trains if
the use of freight rail to Long Island, with possible access to an intermodal yard at
Pilgrim State Hospital, were expanded significantly. Any proposal to add track
capacity to the Hudson Line’s right-of-way could similarly make dispatching
freight and passenger rail trains more flexible.
Investing in transit or freight rail should be justified by the actual reductions in
congestion and improved service, not just the diversion of cars and trucks. A funda-
mental problem with estimating or modeling the impact of these investments on
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roadway congestion, however, is that, in the long term, freed-up space on a roadway
may encourage more car or truck traffic, when people find that they can live farther
from work or shopping areas and shippers decide to send more trucks via such road-
ways. Thus, if investments in both transit and freight rail are to make freight more
mobile and reduce highway congestion, the region needs a way to discourage induced
car or truck travel on these less congested roadways. Properly implemented, the most
powerful such mechanism is congestion pricing. It is used today only to a limited
degree in the region, but it is a potentially effective market tool to make both cars and
trucks more mobile, if applied broadly throughout the region to relieve congestion.
6.3 The impact of congestion pricing
In our society, we rely on prices to bring supply and demand in line. If the supply of a
commodity does not meet the demand, the price goes up; if the supply of a com-
modity is greater than the demand, the price should go down. Highways become con-
gested in large part because most roadway facilities do not use prices to tell drivers and
shippers about the relationship between the supply of and the demand for roadway
capacity at particular times of the day. When the demand for a segment of a road-
way at a particular time exceeds its capacity (i.e., supply), it becomes congested.
Congestion pricing (also known as time-of-day tolling or variable tolling) uses
roadway fees to moderate demand during periods of tight supply, such as com-
muter periods. Conversely, during evening or nighttime hours when congestion is
low or nonexistent, the prices could be low or zero. If transit or freight rail invest-
ments diverted enough traffic during periods of high demand, congestion pricing
could help maintain the mobility resulting from these investments and discourage
additional travel by giving people and shippers an incentive to use transit and
freight rail alternatives.6
Congestion creates both economic costs, in the form of time lost, and environ-
mental costs, for movement of goods and people. Idle vehicles emit three times as
many volatile organic compounds as do moving vehicles, and cars traveling under
10 mph emit more nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide. Trucks stuck in traffic
similarly emit higher rates of pollution and use more fuel per ton-mile than do
trucks moving at moderate speeds. In general, drivers or shippers experience only
their own congestion costs, not the congestion costs that one additional car or
truck imposes on all the other users of heavily congested roadways (i.e., the social
cost of driving). Congestion pricing is a tool that can inform a driver of a car or
truck what congestion costs that vehicle is imposing on other drivers.
The first extensive economic analysis of congestion pricing, Highway Benefits:
An Analytical Framework,7 suggested theoretically in 1962 what has since been
shown to be true empirically: congestion pricing diverts some drivers from using
tolled roads during peak periods.8 The resulting decrease in congestion allows for
smoother flows of traffic and better absorption of the social cost of driving by indi-
vidual drivers and shippers using trucks. Congestion pricing is most effective when
roadway users have alternatives. For commuters this means the availability of rail
or bus services, convenient, employer-supported car or vanpool services, or the
ability to travel at off-peak times of the day. While there is, of course, no analogue
to the carpool for trucking, shippers have two options if they wish to avoid paying
tolls: moving goods during uncongested periods such as nighttime or finding
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alternatives to highways for freight transport, such as freight rail or barge.9 To
meet the needs of most such shippers, a partial shift to rail is a logical course of
action as long as the service is convenient and reliable.
Many bridges and tunnels in the New York region, operated by the Port Author-
ity, the MTA, and, in the case of the Tappan Zee Bridge, the New York Thruway
Authority, are tolled. The primary purpose of those tolls is to provide revenues to
cover the debt service on bonds and to maintain the facilities. A few highways, such as
the New Jersey Turnpike, the Garden State Parkway, and the New York Thruway, also
are tolled. When it raised the tolls on its bridges and tunnels in mid-2001, the Port
Authority introduced a congestion-pricing feature that required users to pay some-
what more during peak commuter hours than at other times of the day.
Since bridges, tunnels, and roadways in the New York region are congested for
an increasing number of hours each day, congestion-based tolls could produce
additional revenues that could be used to pay for their maintenance. They also
could be used to help fund investments in transit, freight rail, and other demand-
related alternatives. Using such tolls to fund transit or freight rail investments is
justified in that they allow people and goods to move through the region without
contributing to highway congestion.10
Since time-of-day roadway pricing offers an incentive for roadway users to
maintain the mobility that investments in transit and freight rail have produced,
the technology for improving roadway user fees should be efficient and not inter-
fere with mobility. In this region, commuters and truckers are accustomed to having
to decelerate drastically at tollgates even if they have EZ-Pass cards, particularly at
MTA tolled facilities with a speed limit of 5 mph. State-of-the-art electronic
tolling technology, however, allows for smooth, uninterrupted travel with variable
pricing designed to control traffic levels.
One example of this kind of tolling technology can be found on San Diego
County’s I-15 High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lane system, which operates on an
8.5-mile stretch of interstate highway. Carpoolers may drive in the single HOT
lane without charge, and single occupancy vehicles (SOVs) pay via transponder
using a system called FasTrak. Tolls are readjusted electronically every six minutes
to maintain a free flow of traffic and are posted upstream.11 Some of the toll rev-
enues have been used to improve transit on the I-15 corridor by paying for four
new express bus lines that serve areas otherwise lacking transit access.12 A recent
study commissioned by SANDAG, San Diego’s regional planning agency, found
that the pricing scheme has increased carpooling on I-15.
Many congestion-pricing mechanisms have been
installed around the world. One of the best developed
and time tested is Singapore’s Area Licensing Scheme
(ALS). Since June 2, 1975, Singapore has had a re-
stricted zone surrounded by a cordon. Before the ALS
was implemented, the restricted zone was severely
congested, more so than the rest of the city and par-
ticularly during peak hours. In response, in 1998 Sin-
gapore’s Land Transportation Authority installed its
Electronic Road Pricing system, which requires all
users of the road to have a transponder into which they
insert a “smartcard”—a card they buy, from which a
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particular amount is deducted via short-range radio as their vehicle passes under
the overhead gantries around the city. Cameras on the gantries photograph viola-
tors’ license plates.13 Investigations into the fairness of pricing have not found the
tolls to be excessively high when time savings are calculated based on the wage
rate.14 Similar technology is now being used in Melbourne, Oslo, and Toronto.
London has been fairly successful at reducing congestion by implementing a flat toll
system along a cordon surrounding its central business district, but has had prob-
lems with complaints from drivers who believe they have been fined mistakenly.
Recent advances in GPS and general packet radio service (GPRS) technology
have enabled a new type of tolling. Using GPS/GPRS technology, a satellite can
track cars’ movements and send the distance calculations to the driver’s on-board
unit (OBU).The OBU then displays the charges and sends them through the phone
network to the toll administration agency.15 Although the GPS/GPRS technology is
expensive to set up, the variable public costs of increasing the number of users are
much lower than those incurred by gantry-based systems. Individuals are generally
expected to buy OBUs, even though they are more expensive than gantry transpon-
ders. Germany will soon begin implementing a GPS/GPRS system for trucks, hav-
ing recognized how well they can alleviate the country’s congestion problems. Both
types of system have two benefits. First, they allow traffic to move at regular speeds,
without vehicles having to decelerate rapidly at toll plazas, as they do on many Hud-
son region tolled roadways. Second, they eventually become self-sustaining, since the
tolls are used to maintain the affected roadways, with extra revenues ideally dedi-
cated to providing alternatives, such as transit or freight rail, that help relieve con-
gestion, thus benefiting the very motorists and truckers who pay the tolls.
The use of congestion pricing must ultimately be considered in the larger context
of regional transportation planning, with policymakers considering highway, transit,
and freight rail investments as a whole. A well-designed congestion pricing system
can help ensure a highly efficient and mobile transportation system that realizes the
traffic-diversion and congestion-reducing benefits of investing in transit and freight
rail. Current off-peak drivers, as well as those peak drivers who switch to driving dur-
ing off-peak hours in response to congestion pricing, could face lower tolls on tolled
facilities. Thus beyond the rewards of cleaner air, the benefits of a congestion pricing
scheme could be, for many drivers, not only time saved but also money saved.
6.4 Conclusion
The New York metropolitan area should improve its freight rail system,
including a trans-Hudson tunnel, modernized clearances, and a greatly expanded
system of strategically situated rail yards, in conjunction with the continued imple-
mentation of major transit projects and a greater use of roadway congestion pric-
ing. According to the criteria of chapter 3, this is a far better freight transportation
strategy for the region than expanding highway capacity.
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Investing in freight rail would help solve our congestion problem, clean our air,
and strengthen our economy. But—we might ask—how should we finance this
project, particularly when the federal government is not likely to spend large sums
of money to fix freight rail tracks? And how should we plan a comprehensive pro-
gram for freight rail revitalization? We also must find the funds and encourage the
region’s institutional capability to plan for freight rail in the metropolitan area.
This chapter shows how the government is investing in freight transportation
and how freight rail companies are put at a competitive disadvantage by the gov-
ernment. It also describes the instruments already in place—the agencies, depart-
ments, and federal and state financing mechanisms—that would play a role in
revitalizing New York’s freight rail system.
A combination of state and local agencies should oversee the revitalization of
a freight rail network on the east side of the Hudson River. In return for better
infrastructure, freight rail carriers should open their rights-of-way to all other
freight rail operators, within reasonable limits; and freight rail and passenger rail
should cooperate more. The revitalization program should be financed by distrib-
uting the costs among the federal, state, and local governments, as well as the com-
muters, shippers, and railroads that will benefit from the program.
7.1 Seeking federal funds for rail infrastructure
Public funds typically do not pay for freight rail improvements. For major highway
or transit capital investments, state and municipal governments usually look to
Washington for money. No comparable federal source for freight rail investment,
however, is available.
Funding for most no-toll roadways comes from the federal government through
a surface transportation bill debated every five or six years. The most recent one is
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), which expired in
2003 but has been extended through 2004. States are the other primary source of
funding.The federal government finances a very large portion of the costs of expand-
ing, rebuilding, and maintaining major roadways and a substantial portion of the
transit investments in the region, with help from dedicated state taxes. Although the
revenues for the federal and state transportation programs are derived largely from
fuel taxes, the federal and state diesel fuel taxes that trucks pay do not cover the full
costs of the capital and maintenance of the major roadways that the trucks use. The
other source of funding for highways, bridges, and tunnels are bond issues repaid with
future tolls. All the Port Authority’s and MTA’s bridges and tunnels require payment
of tolls, which pay for their maintenance and contribute to transit operations.
No comparable, regular source of federal, state, or local funding for freight rail
capital investments exists in the New York metropolitan region or in any other
metropolitan region in the country—even though freight rail companies pay taxes
on the diesel fuel they purchase, which go into the federal government’s general
fund.1 The assumption has been that the freight rail companies in the United
States pay for the system’s improvements and maintenance out of this revenue.
They also pay property taxes on their tracks and yards, although highways and
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airports are not similarly taxed. Only in 2002 did New York State pass a bill that
substantially reduced property taxes on freight rail rights-of-way and facilities.
The Transportation Research Board offers criteria for determining whether a
freight infrastructure project requires public financing at all or whether market forces
will ensure its completion by the private sector. Fulfillment of any of these criteria
warrants government involvement. The government should be involved if the pro-
ject (1) reduces the external costs of transportation (i.e., those imposed by users on
others, like congestion); (2) yields external economic development benefits (e.g.,
by promoting growth not directly resulting from the actual improvement); (3) is an
intervention to redress the market imbalance caused by subsidies to some category
of carrier; (4) fulfills a defense or public safety interest; or (5) “falls within the
established government responsibility for major parts of the transportation infra-
structure.”2 Almost every element of our plan clearly fulfills conditions 1, 2, and 3,
and the freight rail tunnel fulfills condition 4 in addition (see section 7.2). Condi-
tion 5 is satisfied by our plan in principle but not in practice. We believe this expe-
rience ultimately justifies our plan on the basis of condition 3. How the need for
this “intervention to redress the market imbalance” came to be requires a brief his-
tory of the last three decades of government involvement in railroading.
In 1970, with the establishment of Amtrak, the federal government assumed
responsibility for intercity rail passenger movement. In 1973 it intervened to pre-
vent the total collapse of the freight rail system in the north central and northeast-
ern states. It established the U.S. Railway Association in 1974, which was charged
with creating a viable rail freight system in the north central and northeast states.
Most of the money went to restructuring, reorganizing, and rebuilding the longer
east-west routes. The objective of this investment was to make the longer distance
markets efficient and to preserve local commuter rail services. As a result, unused
components of the former north-south freight corridor deteriorated, and the fund-
ing did little to make short- and intermediate-haul corridors in the central and
northeastern states efficient or competitive. A large portion of public funds was
spent on improving passenger services, especially commuter services around the
large northeastern cities. But in the early 1980s and between the mid-1980s and
the late 1990s, public funding dropped dramatically for investments in main line
or Class I freight rail infrastructure. Instead, the federal money was spent mainly
on highways and local rail services.3
In the last few years, however, this trend has begun to reverse itself in a modest
way in the Hudson region and elsewhere, as discussed in chapter 2. The sums avail-
able are still very small compared with federal and state investments in either roadways
or transit. Often, the Class I railroads themselves have been the greatest defenders of
this situation, since they fear greater government regulation and being forced to share
their track with new entrants into the railroad industry in exchange for funding.This
antagonistic relationship between carriers and government is only beginning to soften.
Some federal programs for financing freight rail investments through loans or
grants do exist, but have not been used extensively (or in some cases, at all) in the
Northeast, including the New York metropolitan area. In 1998, (TEA-21) estab-
lished the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) program
to provide loans to railroads, state, and local governments and government-affili-
ated authorities. These loans can be used to “(A) acquire, improve, or rehabilitate
intermodal or rail equipment or facilities, including track, components of track,
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bridges, yards, buildings, and shops; (B) refinance outstanding debt incurred for
the purposes described in subparagraph (A); or (C) develop or establish new inter-
modal or railroad facilities.”4 Applicants could submit proposals beginning in early
2001, when Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations governing the
application process were issued. Since then, of the $3.5 billion authorized for the
RRIF program, about $700 million in loans has been approved.
An emerging consensus is that the biggest problem with RRIF is the applica-
tion process. The application itself should be simplified, with redundancies
removed, and streamlined. More guidance to applicants would encourage more
seekers of funding. In general the current program is somewhat user unfriendly to
applicants, partly because of the lack of a formal application form and process, the
application fee, and the overly strict credit risk assessment. The FRA also should
consider reducing the number of people from which a proposed project must
receive approval.
At the FRA’s request, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center recently completed an evaluation of RRIF and
suggested that better outreach to the railroads was needed and that the widely held
perception that only politically well-connected railroads would be successful appli-
cants for RRIF funding should be refuted.5 The Volpe Center encouraged out-
reach, particularly to the short-line and regional railroads, for which $1 billion of
the total funding is earmarked.
The Volpe Center claims that RRIF needs more administrative resources so it
can serve rail interests more effectively and efficiently. Staff must be expanded and
their roles better defined. Currently, prospective applicants do not know to whom
they should address their questions. The Volpe Center also has encouraged the
FRA to reduce the burden on applicants to produce vast amounts of historical
financial data.
The inability of many railroads to take out such loans with the certainty that
they can be repaid on time may ultimately prevent many potential beneficiaries
from applying. Furthermore, many short-line railroads, regardless of outreach, will
still not be interested in taking out loans to upgrade tracks, since they often oper-
ate on tracks they do not own, creating eligibility problems in the RRIF credit risk
assessment. Nevertheless, adopting these recommendations would significantly
increase the program’s attractiveness, particularly for metropolitan planning orga-
nizations like NYMTC and government entities like the New York DOT, which
has thus far been unsuccessful in meeting the requirements of the application
process, though it has tried several times.
The Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program
(CMAQ), jointly administrated by the Federal Highway Administration and the
Federal Transit Administration under the auspices of TEA-21, was authorized
with more than $8 billion for projects aimed at improving air quality in “non-
attainment areas”—areas in which ambient levels of one or more pollutants named
by EPA are above those established in its National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards. As of the publication of this report, no county in downstate New York was
in attainment for all pollutants. Most are in nonattainment of the Standards for
ambient levels of ozone (see Figure 7-1).
CMAQ funding has been used in the region for a number of transit projects.
Especially if TEA-21 reauthorization were to increase CMAQ funding signifi-
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cantly, the program could provide funding for some freight rail projects. The rail-
roads have begun to use some CMAQ funding, but they cannot take full advantage
of it until NYMTC has better inventories of emissions from freight transport, as
well as projected emissions changes from freight rail investments. Without knowl-
edge and modeling of present and future emissions, particularly of ozone precur-
sors, the pollutant overwhelmingly responsible for the nonattainment of all Hudson
region counties, CMAQ funds cannot currently be allocated to many freight rail
projects. Any investments that the railroads can make to improve the quantity,
availability, and accuracy of their emissions data will help the CMAQ disbursers
better evaluate whether freight rail projects that could divert measurable amounts of
truck traffic are more or less deserving of its monies than other proposals.6
7.2 Financing improvements in freight rail
Federal, state, and local governments have established ways of financing large
transportation projects. Indeed, the kind of revitalization of the freight rail system
described in Part B of this report could not occur without the public funding of at
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least a magnitude comparable to that of the late 1970s. New York DOT’s Indus-
trial Access Program funds rail projects of at most $1 million with 60 percent in
the form of a grant, and 40 percent in the form of a no-interest loan to be repaid
within five years. Several other programs offer funding, usually of lower amounts.
This is far from ample, and accordingly, we need to explore how the government
might fund the revitalization of freight rail in the Hudson region.
Freight rail investment should be viewed as a strategy for making freight trans-
port more efficient and reducing truck-related highway congestion, just as transit
investments reduce car-related congestion. Congress and the President should
therefore consider including a freight rail title in the new federal transportation bill.
The inclusion of such a title is justified by the fact that freight rail entities pay fed-
eral taxes on the diesel fuel that they use. It appears that the House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure is taking steps in this direction.
Its reauthorization is expected to include a section authorizing funding for Projects
of National and Regional Significance.7 Projects that further the nation’s security
interests will be looked on particularly favorably. In this context a cross-harbor
freight rail tunnel, as part of a revitalization program connecting the East-of-Hudson
subregion to the national freight rail network, should qualify. Not only does the
tunnel have clear regional benefits, but it also fills a security need by providing an
alternative connection between the two subregions in the event that one of the
existing trans-Hudson tunnels or bridges that trucks use is out of service.
In addition to any diesel fuel taxes that freight rail firms pay, a logical source of
local funding would be a portion of the congestion tolls that trucks and cars pay on
tolled facilities. The imposition of roadway congestion fees on those roadways
throughout the metropolitan region that experience severe mobility problems, as
well as time-of-day variations on currently tolled facilities, would be justified to
reduce the enormous economic costs of delays caused by congestion. Shippers
using trucks would, in particular, be far better off economically if the congestion
fees resulted in significant improvements in highway mobility.
Since the aim of congestion pricing schemes is ultimately to relieve roadway
congestion, toll revenues are usually used not only to cover operating costs and
road maintenance, but also to fund investments that improve mobility on the
tolled roadway. For example, a significant portion of SANDAG’s I-15 receipts are
directed toward improving bus transit in the corridor (see chapter 6). If the region
were to implement a congestion pricing scheme, investing a portion of the toll
receipts to improve freight rail would be a logical allocation of toll revenues, and
one the authors support.
The final source of revenue would be tunnel use fees. Private freight rail carriers
should expect to pay tunnel user fees, although these charges should be set at a level
that assumes an efficient use of the tunnel and makes freight rail service attractive.
Initially, as freight rail business expands, the fees should be low. With a congestion-
pricing program established on the roadways, freight rail entities would be in a posi-
tion to pay higher tunnel fees and still provide competitive services. A concurrent
imposition of congestion pricing and tunnel user fees would also advance the
proposition that users should bear part of the costs of the transportation infrastructure
from which they benefit, regardless of mode. This is a concept that transportation
experts and economists alike have long propounded as the best way to ensure that
only the most worthwhile transportation infrastructure projects are undertaken.8
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7.3 Better planning to increase mobility
As all states do, New York and New Jersey have elaborate roadway-planning and
implementation capabilities. To plan roadway expansion and maintenance, transit
operations, and capital investments, both the New York and New Jersey DOTs
have very large budgets, backed by both federal and state funds.
Although the planning staffs of the two state DOTs deal with freight rail
improvements, both staffs are very small. For both state DOTs, freight transport
planning—whether relating to highways, freight rail, or waterborne (and other
port-related) freight—has a far lower priority than passenger movement does.9 But
as these state transportation agencies have begun to realize, it is shortsighted to
concentrate almost exclusively on passengers, since freight carriers compete for the
same space in the transportation system.10 In order to improve transportation for
the general public, state and federal agencies must also address the movement of
freight, by strengthening the professional capabilities of their respective staffs.
In the past few years, New York’s and New Jersey’s DOTs have taken an
increasingly active role in regional freight planning.11 In New York, the Pilgrim
State EIS, the Downstate Rail clearance program, and other planning efforts attest
to the state’s renewed interest in rail freight matters. Along the same lines, New
Jersey’s DOT has established a freight transport task force.
The Port Authority once had a substantial planning staff that paid attention to
freight movement issues. Although most of that staff was dismantled in the last
decade, it still has a small, dedicated group that deals with freight rail issues.
Nonetheless, in recent years the Port Authority has resuscitated its freight plan-
ning efforts in both the East- and West-of-Hudson subregions. It has just invested
$25 million in the $40 million joint New York DOT-Port Authority East-of-
Hudson freight rail initiative and is involved in other East-of-Hudson planning
efforts (see chapters 2 and 5).12 With other local and regional agencies, it also is
developing and implementing the Comprehensive Port Improvement Plan. The
plan’s purpose is to identify potential improvements in the Port of New York and
New Jersey, especially those that can shift freight from truck to railroads, barges,
and coastal shipping.13 The plan is currently being refined, and its draft EIS is
expected to be released in the fall of 2004.
EDC is the government agency that has devoted the most resources to evaluat-
ing large investments in freight rail East-of-Hudson and cross-harbor possibilities.
In addition, NYMTC has been carrying out its Regional Freight Plan, on which this
report drew extensively. Nothing comparable has been done for more than 20 years.
Although a new entity for freight rail, similar to the MTA, might make sense,
we should take advantage of existing transportation agencies by upgrading the
importance of the freight transport agenda. Freight planning should be carried out
regionally. The governors of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut should allo-
cate more state and federal funds for freight transportation planning and improve-
ments, and they should also coordinate their planning.
If freight transportation is planned regionally, the governors of New York and
New Jersey should also ask the Port Authority to look beyond just the port and
upland freight transportation planning. While the Port Authority may be prepared
to accept a larger responsibility for bi-state freight rail planning, it may hesitate for
fear that the city of New York and the two states would expect it to provide signif-
icant public funding for the multibillion-dollar investments that EDC’s freight rail
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tunnel study envisions. Section 7.2 addresses this concern with proposals for new
sources of funding.
7.4 Making the network of tracks East-of-Hudson available to all
freight carriers
Resuscitating the East-of-Hudson freight rail system is a challenge because most
of the track is owned or controlled by passenger rail carriers (i.e., Metro-North,
the LIRR, or Amtrak) and one freight rail firm, CSX. The problem of shared use,
ownership, and control is described in section 5.2.
A short-line railroad, such as the New York and Atlantic Railroad, and a
regional railroad, like the Providence and Worcester Railroad, tend to look
aggressively for new business opportunities, but they have great difficulty gain-
ing access to tracks owned by CSX East-of-Hudson or the other large freight
rail entities. Norfolk Southern does not operate East-of-Hudson, and extended
service through marketing agreements is minimal. Robust competition, however,
is as important to efficient freight rail operations as it is to other sectors of the
economy. These regional carriers therefore should be accommodated, since they
think in terms of moving relatively short freight trains over shorter distances,
exactly the kind of service that competes with trucks. It also would be useful to
encourage more competition among the larger carriers on both sides of the
Hudson River.
There are two ways of addressing these track ownership and control issues.
Over the next five to ten years, some governmental entity could take over the own-
ership and control of all the tracks East-of-Hudson and lease the use of those
tracks to passenger and freight rail services based on social and economic factors.
In effect, this is the way the highway system works. As they do with roadways,
government agencies would maintain the rights-of-way and establish rules of use
while levying tolls and taxes to pay for them.
Another approach would have different pieces of the rail system owned, man-
aged, maintained, and controlled by a combination of public and private entities.
Other carriers could arrange to use the tracks.14 An oversight body would have to
be established to make sure that the terms of usage were reasonable and fair to
both track owners and track users. It would have to price access high enough to
encourage continued investment in freight rail infrastructure by those private rail-
roads and public agencies that can afford to do so, and low enough to enable other
operators, assuming their operations were adequately efficient, to use the track.
The price should be determined by the cost of the track, its maintenance costs, and
the revenues forgone by the owner in leasing the track to the lessee.15 Special
attention should be given to pricing access in a way that takes into account the
high costs of capital investment in rail infrastructure.16
Since a cross-harbor freight rail tunnel would presumably be largely financed
publicly, it should be open to all freight rail companies at equitable prices. The
East-of-Hudson subregion should move toward public oversight of track usage
and charges in order to encourage competition and good customer service. At the
same time, freight rail carriers must be able to use trains of modest length with
state-of-the-art locomotives that can move at high speeds and that can share
tracks with passenger service during off-peak daytime and nighttime hours.
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In the coming decades, it is the federal government’s responsibility to allocate
federal dollars to freight rail improvement, particularly in densely populated met-
ropolitan areas. TEA-21 offers an opportunity to give freight rail the kind of fund-
ing it needs. Allocation of funds to freight rail can be encouraged by propagation
of a greater understanding of the regional benefits it provides for regional freight
mobility and reduced congestion for all vehicles. More generally, freight rail, tran-
sit, and highway investments must be part of better, coordinated planning efforts
by state and federal agencies to maximize the return on major transportation
investments. Railroads and trucking companies should make efforts as well to
maximize their efficiency and competitiveness. Improved regional mobility will be
a direct result of these efforts.
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1. Many of the Hudson region’s major roadways are heavily congested, and with
the tonnage of freight hauled by truck projected to increase in the coming
decades, it is doubtful that the current highway network can accommodate the
increase in truck vehicle miles traveled. Given the requisite highway improve-
ments and the severe and worsening congestion, it is clear that the region is
overly dependent on trucking to move freight.
2. While the West-of-Hudson regional freight rail network is reasonably well
integrated into the national network, the East-of-Hudson subregional freight
rail network is poorly integrated into it. The two subregional networks do share
some use of passenger tracks, although East-of-Hudson freight rail is heavily
dependent on shared tracks. Some of the many important yards on both the east
and west sides of the Hudson River are currently underutilized. Downstate, the
only current rail connection across the Hudson is the cross-harbor float system,
which is inefficient and underutilized. Intermodal traffic has been increasing
using several types of cars, each of which is subject to various weight and height
restrictions that can limit its use. Finally, some rail improvement programs and
studies are now under way.
3. Investments in the improvement of freight rail and highways should be evalu-
ated according to whether they look promising with respect to congestion
reduction, land use, air quality, energy consumption, economic growth, and
regional security.
4. In order for the benefits of these investments to be fully realized and for the
railroads to increase their market share, the freight rail sector must adopt both
new and already existing technologies. These range from braking, to car and
locomotive design, to carfloats. The railroads also must consider institutional
changes, which can be broadly grouped into changes in dispatching and relia-
bility, speeds, and the types of markets and distances served.
5. There are several ways to improve the infrastructure of the Hudson region’s
freight rail network in order to better connect the East-of-Hudson subregion to
the national rail network better. The most important are a cross-Hudson tunnel
and, in the near term, an improved cross-harbor float system. Land-based infra-
structure needs and clearance and weight limit problems also must be
addressed, and more yard capacity is urgently needed. Passenger and freight rail
operations should share track more often than they do now. This is an attainable
goal if it is aided by institutional reforms and the adoption of appropriate tech-
nologies.
6. Specific investments in freight rail that the authors support should be coupled
with investments in transit and congestion pricing as part of a comprehensive
regional mobility plan.
7. These proposed improvements will not be cheap. Even though the federal
funding of freight rail improvements has declined in the last two decades, it
now ought to increase. Different mixes of public and private funds, a share of
roadway congestion fees, and usage fees for freight rail improvements could
provide some funding. All such money, however, risks being misspent if state
agencies do not incorporate the freight rail sector and consider track-sharing
possibilities in their regional planning.
SUMMARY
OF REPORT
FINDINGS
89
National Headquarters
257 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010
212-505-2100
1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20009
202-387-3500
5655 College Avenue
Oakland, CA 94618
510-658-8008
2334 North Broadway
Boulder, CO 80304
303-440-4901
2500 Blue Ridge Road
Raleigh, NC 27607
919-881-2601
44 East Avenue
Austin, TX 78701
512-478-5161
18 Tremont Street
Suite 850
Boston, MA 02108
617-723-5111
Project Office
3250 Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 1400
Los Angeles, CA 90010
213-386-5501
THE EAST OF HUDSON
RAIL FREIGHT OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE
Main Office
750 Lexington Avenue
Fourth Floor
New York, NY 10022
212-872-1500
